F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
FEB 10 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
FREDERICK A. JONES,
KATHERINE PRESTON, AND
LILLIAN B. TURNER,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 98-1458
DENVER POST CORPORATION, a
Colorado corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D. Ct. No. 96-S-2359)
Scot Melvin Peterson (Michael H. Berger with him on the briefs), Waldbaum,
Corn, Koff, Berger & Cohen, P.C., Denver, Colorado, appearing for Plaintiffs-
Appellants.
Mary H. Stuart, Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP, Denver, Colorado, appearing for
Defendants-Appellees.
Before TACHA , McKAY , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
TACHA , Circuit Judge.
The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs’
claims of racial discrimination in employment. Plaintiffs filed a timely appeal
and we exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part and
reverse in part.
I.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard used by the district court.” Simms v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs. , 165 F.3d 1321, 1326
(10th Cir.), cert. denied , 120 S. Ct. 53 (1999). Summary judgment is appropriate
“if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “‘We view the evidence and draw any inferences in
a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, but that party
must identify sufficient evidence which would require submission of the case to a
jury.’” Aramburu v. Boeing Co. , 112 F.3d 1398, 1402 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Williams v. Rice , 983 F.2d 177, 179 (10th Cir. 1993)). In an employment
discrimination case, the trial court finding of intentional discrimination against a
protected class is a finding of fact. EEOC v. Flasher Co. , 986 F.2d 1312, 1317
(10th Cir. 1992). We review this finding for clear error. Id.
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II.
The three plaintiffs allege that defendants’ employment practices violated
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (“Title VII”). 1
We review each plaintiff’s claims
individually.
A. Frederick Jones
1. Background
Frederick Jones, an African-American, began working at the Denver Post
(“Post”) in 1989. Between 1989 and 1996, Jones worked primarily as a voluntary
sales representative, processing phone requests for classified advertisements.
Beginning in 1992, Jones received letters from Post management regarding
his absenteeism. On August 11, 1992, Rhonda Canino, one of Jones’s
supervisors, issued him a written reprimand for insubordination concerning an
extended lunch hour. On August 27, Canino advised Jones in writing that he had
abused the company’s sick leave policy by taking an unauthorized medical
absence.
On January 3, 1995, Rosemary Reitz, another of Jones’s supervisors,
issued him a written warning for long-distance telephone calls made on company
time and at company expense. On September 20, 1995, Jones received an
1
Denesia Bey was also a plaintiff in the district court. Ms. Bey did not
appeal from the final judgment of that court and therefore is not a party to this
appeal.
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additional written warning from Nancy Allen, another Post supervisor. Allen
reprimanded Jones for using Post phones to conduct outside business. Allen
cautioned Jones that future violations would result in his immediate termination.
From late 1995 to early 1996, Jones worked at the Post’s fax desk, taking
fax orders from advertisers. During this period, Reitz approached Jones about
complaints regarding his work. Reitz advised Jones that if the situation at the
desk did not improve, changes would be made. After a few months at the fax
desk, Jones was sent back to the voluntary classified sales department.
On April 22, 1996, Jones filed a discrimination charge with the Colorado
Civil Rights Division (CCRD) and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). On August 1, 1996, the EEOC issued Jones a Notice of
Right to Sue. Jones’s discrimination charge alleged that the Post disciplined him
differently than other employees and that the Post demoted him from the fax desk
without warning. Based on the scope of the charge, the district court limited its
jurisdiction to Jones’s claims of disparate treatment and discriminatory demotion
based on race. 2
2. Analysis
2
In his First Amended Complaint, Jones raised additional claims that the
district court found unrelated to his discrimination charge. The court dismissed
these claims for failure to exhaust, and Jones does not appeal the dismissal of
these additional claims.
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In Title VII cases, the inquiry is whether defendant intentionally
discriminated against plaintiff based on protected class characteristics. Flasher ,
986 F.2d at 1317. A plaintiff may prove intentional discrimination “‘either
directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence.’” EEOC v. Wiltel, Inc. , 81 F.3d 1508, 1513
(10th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States Postal Service v. Aikens , 460 U.S. 711,
716 (1983)) (second citation omitted). A personnel policy which is
discriminatory on its face provides direct evidence of intentional discrimination.
See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston , 469 U.S. 111, 121-22 (1985). Since
Jones offers no evidence of “an existing policy which itself constitutes
discrimination,” Ramsey v. City & County of Denver , 907 F.2d 1004, 1008 (10th
Cir. 1990), his claim rests on indirect evidence of discrimination.
In Title VII cases based on indirect evidence, plaintiff has the initial burden
of establishing a prima facie case. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973). If plaintiff does so, then defendant must “articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the challenged personnel action. Id.
Plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating that defendant’s stated
reason is in fact a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id. at 804.
The district court found that Jones failed to establish a prima facie case of
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disparate treatment regarding his discipline by the Post. We agree. A prima
facie case of disparate discipline may be established if the plaintiff proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) the plaintiff is a racial minority, (2) the
plaintiff was disciplined by the employer, and (3) the employer imposed the
discipline under circumstances giving rise to an inference of racial discrimination.
Cf. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)
(articulating prima facie case for discriminatory treatment in context of failure to
promote claim); id. , at 254 n.6 (The prima facie “standard is not inflexible, as
‘[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of
the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in
every respect in differing factual situations.”) (quoting McDonnell Douglas , 411
U.S. at 802 n.13). One of the ways this third prong may be met, and the method
chosen by Jones here, is by attempting to show that the employer treated similarly
situated employees differently.
In the instant case, Jones contends that Rhonda Canino took orders for
pastries from her husband’s business during business hours, but the Post did not
discipline her for this alleged conduct. Since the Post reprimanded Jones for
using Post phones to conduct his outside business, Jones claims disparate
treatment. However, the comparison Jones makes between himself and Canino is
not legally relevant. Canino was one of Jones’s supervisors and therefore cannot
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be deemed similarly situated in a disciplinary matter such as this one. Jones
points to no other individual who was disciplined differently. Thus, the district
court correctly granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this count.
Jones also contends that his transfer from the fax desk back to voluntary
sales constituted a discriminatory demotion. To establish a prima facie case of
discriminatory demotion, plaintiff must show (1) that he was within a protected
group, (2) adversely affected by defendant’s employment decision, (3) qualified
for the position at issue, Hooks v. Diamond Crystal Specialty Foods, Inc. , 997
F.2d 793, 799 (10th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Buchanan v.
Sherrill , 51 F.3d 227, 229 (10th Cir. 1995), and (4) that the job from which he
was demoted was not eliminated, Perry v. Woodward , Nos. 97-2343, 98-2003,
1999 WL 1256340, at *13 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 1999).
The district court did not evaluate Jones’s prima facie case under the
standard outlined above. Instead, the judge focused on Jones’s lack of evidence
concerning similarly situated non-African-American employees. We therefore
assume without deciding that Jones established a prima facie case, and the burden
shifted to the Post to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
returning him to voluntary sales. At this stage , defendant need only “explain its
actions against the plaintiff in terms that are not facially prohibited by Title VII.”
Flasher , 986 F.2d at 1317. Jones had a long history of problems at the Post: he
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received both verbal and written warnings and was disciplined for various
workplace violations. In addition, there were specific complaints about his
performance at the fax desk. Thus, on this record, the Post has met its burden.
Jones bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating that defendant’s proffered
reasons for his demotion were pretextual. The district court concluded that the
evidence as a whole was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact
regarding pretext. We agree. Jones’s replacement at the fax desk apparently was
passed over for another position at the Post. Based on this singular objective fact,
Jones offers his personal belief that the replacement was less qualified than he
was for the fax position. “It is the manager’s perception of the employee’s
performance that is relevant, not plaintiff’s subjective evaluation of his own
relative performance.” Furr v. Seagate Tech., Inc. , 82 F.3d 980, 988 (10th Cir.
1996). Based on documented workplace violations and specific complaints, a
Post manager returned Jones to voluntary sales. We find no evidence of
pretextual behavior and thus affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on Jones’s discriminatory demotion claim.
B. Katherine Preston
1. Background
Katherine Preston, an African-American, began working full-time at the
Post in December 1995 as a voluntary sales representative. In February and May
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of 1996, Preston applied for a promotion to the real estate contract desk. On both
occasions, the Post selected another employee for the position. On May 29, 1996,
Preston filed a discrimination charge with the CCRD and the EEOC. On August
1, 1996, the EEOC issued Preston a Notice of Right to Sue. In the discrimination
charge, she alleged that she was denied a promotion based on her race. The
charge specifically limited the date of discrimination to May 22, 1996.
2. Analysis
In dismissing Preston’s single claim for failure to promote, the district
court assumed she had established her prima facie case. The court then found that
defendant set forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its personnel
decision, and Preston could not make a sufficient showing of pretext. We affirm
the district court’s dismissal of Preston’s claim.
The Post hired Tara Wagner, a white female, to the position Preston sought
in May 1996. Nolan Epple, a Post manager, cited the following factors in support
of his decision to hire Wagner: (1) Wagner’s experience for one year within the
department, (2) recommendations from both her supervisors, (3) her rapport with
clients, and (4) her ability to work in the team environment at the Post. We agree
with the district court that Epple’s testimony concerning Wagner’s superior
qualifications constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the Post’s
decision not to promote Preston.
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We also agree that Preston has not carried her ultimate burden in
demonstrating genuine issues of material fact concerning pretext. Preston
counters Epple’s objective criteria with her subjective belief that Wagner
contributed to the demotion of a fellow employee, thereby casting doubt on her
abilities as a team player. 3
“[P]laintiff’s ‘mere conjecture that [her] employer’s
explanation is a pretext for intentional discrimination is an insufficient basis for
denial of summary judgment.’” Panis v. Mission Hills Bank, N.A. , 60 F.3d 1486,
1491 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Branson v. Price River Coal Co. , 853 F.2d 768,
772 (10th Cir. 1988)). We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Preston’s May 1996 failure to promote claim.
In the First Amended Complaint, Preston alleged numerous additional
discriminatory practices at the Post. Based on the scope of the discrimination
charge, the district court limited its jurisdiction to the single claim of failure to
promote in May 1996 and dismissed Preston’s other claims for failure to exhaust.
On appeal, Preston contends that the district court erred in dismissing two of
these claims.
First, Preston claims that the district court should have considered her
claim of failure to promote in February 1996. We disagree. A plaintiff must
In her brief, Preston also relies on affidavit testimony from two co-
3
workers. However, this testimony only relates to a claim Preston failed to exhaust
below.
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exhaust her administrative remedies before bringing suit under Title VII.
Aramburu , 112 F.3d at 1409. “The suit may include allegations of discrimination
reasonably related to the allegations listed in the administrative charge, including
new acts occurring during the pendency of the administrative charge.” Id.
Preston expressly limited the allegation in the charge to May 22, 1996. She now
attempts to plead past acts not documented in that charge. Exhaustion gives the
charged party notice of the alleged violation. Ingels v. Thiokol Corp. , 42 F.3d
616, 625 (10th Cir. 1994). Here, Preston gave notice of a singular failure to
promote and apparently declined to allege a pattern of discrimination. The
district court therefore properly dismissed this claim for failure to exhaust.
Second, Preston argues that the district court should have considered her
claim that the Post retaliated against her for filing an administrative charge.
Preston contends that, after the charge was filed, the Post limited her
opportunities to substitute on other desks for extra pay. It is true that “‘an act
committed by an employer in retaliation for the filing of an EEOC complaint is
reasonably related to that complaint, obviating the need for a second EEOC
complaint.’” Id. (quoting Brown v. Hartshorne Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 , 864 F.2d
680, 682 (10th Cir. 1988)). Thus, the district court should have considered the
retaliation claim on the merits.
The Post asserts that Preston did not raise her retaliation claim before the
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district court and therefore cannot maintain it on appeal. We disagree. Both the
First Amended Complaint and Preston’s brief opposing summary judgment raised
this claim, and the district court ruled on it. We therefore hold that Preston’s
retaliation claim is not barred for failure to exhaust, and that Preston adequately
raised it below. We thus remand the claim for consideration by the district court
on the merits.
C. Lillian Turner
1. Background
Lillian Turner, an African-American, joined the Post in 1984 as a contract
sales representative in the automotive department. During the course of her
employment with the Post, Turner has received numerous verbal and written
warnings concerning absenteeism and performance problems. On February 29,
1988, M. Jean O’Toole, a manager in the classified department, expressed
concern in writing about Turner’s attendance record. In the spring of 1995,
Rhonda Canino counseled Turner about an error in a particular advertisement. On
June 9, 1995, Canino issued Turner a written warning based on additional errors
in published advertisements. On June 20, 1995, Bob Haddad, another Post
supervisor, suspended Turner for one day without pay as a result of continued
customer complaints.
Finally, on August 16, 1995, after another customer complaint, the Post
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moved Turner from contract to voluntary sales. Her base salary remained the
same but was frozen for a period of time. According to plaintiff, she was
eventually promoted back to contract sales. Defendant neither admits nor denies
this fact.
On April 17, 1996, Turner filed a discrimination charge with the CCRD and
the EEOC. On August 1, 1996, the EEOC issued Turner a Notice of Right to Sue.
Given Turner’s allegations in the charge, the district court limited its jurisdiction
to Turner’s claims of disparate treatment and discriminatory demotion in violation
of Title VII. 4
2. Analysis
The district court did not expressly evaluate Turner’s prima facie case for
discriminatory demotion under the controlling criteria set forth in Hooks and
Perry . We therefore assume without deciding that Turner established a prima
facie case and the burden shifted to the Post to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for returning Turner to voluntary sales. As set forth
above, Turner had a history of discipline problems at the Post. The company
imposed progressive discipline for continued violations, which culminated in the
4
In her First Amended Complaint, Turner raised additional claims that the
district court found unrelated to the administrative charge. The court dismissed
these claims for failure to exhaust, and Turner does not appeal the dismissal of
these additional claims.
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demotion at issue. By documenting a pattern of performance problems, the Post
has met its burden at this stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
To survive summary judgment, Turner must demonstrate that “there is a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the employer’s proffered reason for
the challenged action is pretextual – i.e. unworthy of belief.” Randle v. City of
Aurora , 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir. 1995). Turner has not done so on the record
before us. Turner concedes that she was the lowest producer on the automotive
desk and admits to making numerous errors with her advertisements. The
gravamen of her allegation is that other employees on the contract desk made
similar errors and were not disciplined accordingly. However, Turner has
produced only generic and conclusory testimony to support this allegation. When
opposing a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant may not rest upon
“mere allegations” but must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The affidavits Turner produced
are wholly devoid of any specific instances of disparate treatment.
Beyond that, there is no evidence in the record that any supervisor was
aware of the alleged mistakes committed by fellow employees. In fact, one
supervisor, in his written reprimand, expressly informed Turner that other sales
representatives with comparable responsibilities were not having the same
problems. Turner even acknowledged that she does not know if advertisers were
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making similar complaints about other employees. Thus, Turner has not
demonstrated that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning pretext, and
we therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of this count.
Turner’s claim of disparate treatment fails for the same reasons. One
method plaintiff may employ to give rise to an inference of racial discrimination
is to show that she was treated differently than other similarly situated employees.
The record contains the affidavits of similarly situated employees who state that,
in their opinion, the Post subjected Turner to disparate treatment. However, these
employees reference no particular incidents to support the charge. Without
specific examples of unlawful discrimination, Turner cannot withstand a motion
for summary judgment. See id. at 1408 n.7 (stating that fellow employees’
subjective belief that employer discriminated against plaintiff is not sufficient to
preclude summary judgment). In addition, we have found no objective evidence
of disparate treatment in the record. For example, there is no independent
evidence that a white employee made the same mistakes as Turner and that this
white employee’s supervisor knew about the mistakes but did not discipline the
employee. Thus, we also affirm the district court’s dismissal of Turner’s
disparate treatment claim.
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D. Attorney Fees to Canino
Finally, plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in awarding attorney
fees to defendant Canino. We review the factual findings underlying an attorney
fee award for abuse of discretion. Mann v. Reynolds , 46 F.3d 1055, 1062 (10th
Cir. 1995). However, we review de novo the legal conclusions supporting the
award. Bryan v. Office of Personnel Mgmt. , 165 F.3d 1315, 1320 (10th Cir.
1999).
In the First Amended Complaint, Turner asserted a single claim against
Canino for “Aggravation of Preexisting Medical Conditions.” The district court
found that this self-styled allegation did not state a claim for relief under
Colorado law. The court thus dismissed the claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
“When exercising jurisdiction over pendent state claims, we must apply the
substantive law of the forum state . . . just as we would if our jurisdiction rested
on diversity of citizenship.” Lytle v. City of Haysville , 138 F.3d 857, 868 (10th
Cir. 1998). In the Tenth Circuit, attorney fee statutes are considered substantive.
See Boyd Rosene & Assocs. v. Kansas Mun. Gas Agency , 174 F.3d 1115, 1118
(10th Cir. 1999) (finding that attorney fees are substantive for diversity purposes).
Therefore, the district court properly consulted Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-17-
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201 (West 1999), the applicable Colorado fee recovery statute. 5
Section 13-17-201 provides that if a court dismisses a personal injury
action pursuant to a 12(b) motion, then “defendant shall have judgment for his
reasonable attorney fees.” 6
Because the district court dismissed Turner’s
“personal injury” action on a Rule 12(b) motion, the court properly awarded her
fees. See Smith v. Town of Snowmass Village , 919 P.2d 868, 873 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1996) (finding that where entire action against one defendant was dismissed
but claims remained against another defendant, § 13-17-201 entitles prevailing
defendant to attorney fees).
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART , and REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
5
At one point in its order, the district court cites both state and federal law
concerning fee recovery. However, the court clearly relied upon Colorado law in
its final order awarding fees to Canino. We therefore review the district court’s
application of Colorado law and do not address the court’s reference to federal
law.
6
Section 13-17-201 expressly applies only to actions dismissed under Rule
12(b) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. However, we find the statute
applies with equal force when a federal court dismisses a pendent state tort
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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No. 98-1458, JONES et al. v. DENVER POST CORPORATION
McKAY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I join in the court’s opinion except as to Appellant Turner. I am persuaded
that the trial court erred in treating the affidavit testimony of fellow employees
Jeffry J. Mangin and Gloria K. Smith as conclusory and nonprobative. This
testimony, viewed in a light most favorable to Ms. Turner, is sufficient to
establish a prima facie claim for disparate treatment. Based on this evidence, a
trier of fact could find that “the employer imposed the discipline [on Ms. Turner]
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of racial discrimination.” Maj.
Op. at 6. As noted by the majority, a showing that she was treated differently
than similarly situated employees is sufficient to demonstrate such circumstances.
See id. The testimony is also sufficient to create a substantial fact issue
concerning pretext in connection with the discriminatory demotion claim.
Far from being merely conclusory as the majority determines, the testimony
of these fellow employees in the classified advertising department represents both
specific facts and specific observations which are both relevant and persuasive.
Mr. Mangin’s affidavit stated:
All of us made mistakes and Lillian made no more mistakes
than the rest of us. . . .
. . . When I made errors I was not written up[;] however when
Lillian made errors she was written up by Rhonda Canino. The
volume was enormous, as I stated above, and everyone made
mistakes so why did they single out Lillian. Susan Passwalt and I
even had discussions regarding the fact that Lillian was being singled
out.
Appellants App., Vol. 2 at 404-05. 1 This is not mere conclusion and allegation.
It is statement of fact by one who knows whether his mistakes were known to
their joint supervisor and who was in a clear position to observe the difference in
consequences. Who better to know the facts than the one receiving preferential
treatment. At the summary judgment stage it is not necessary for a witness who is
integral to the environment at issue to submit a comparative table of errors or
even to cite specific cases. When he says he was “not written up,” that
adequately implies that his errors were known.
Ms. Smith’s testimony included the fact that “Rhonda was out to get Lillian
and some of the charges were minor and common for the people working in that
department. It was clear to me and many others in classified that Lillian was
being badgered.” Id. at 426. This is not the “vague and conclusory” stuff the
trial court held it to be. First of all, “badgering” does not lend itself to tables and
charts. It is uniquely one of those things any person can recognize. This is a
fellow employee, intimately and uniquely in a position both to observe and
1
Ms. Smith’s affidavit indicates that the two employees who worked at the
automotive contract desk in the same position as Ms. Turner, Mr. Mangin and Ms.
Passwalt (or Patzwaldt), were not of minority descent. See Appellant’s App.,
Vol. 2 at 426.
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compare. Moreover, the affidavits reveal that the badgering was so open and
notorious as to be a matter of common discussion within the office. The detailed
differences in the frequency of errors is a matter for cross-examination at
trial–not for dismissal at summary judgment.
Because Ms. Turner has presented evidence demonstrating genuine issues
of material fact, I would reverse and remand for trial in her case.
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