F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
FEB 18 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-3081
BRIAN C. PRINCE,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. No. 98-CR-20005)
Submitted on the briefs:
Jackie N. Williams, United States Attorney and Leon Patton, Assistant U.S.
Attorney, Kansas City, Kansas, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, James P. Moran, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before EBEL , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
KELLY , Circuit Judge.
Defendant was indicted on one count of bank robbery in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). He entered into a plea agreement with the United States,
agreeing to plead guilty to the offense. In exchange, the government agreed that
it would not oppose a three-level reduction in the applicable offense level under
the United States Sentencing Guidelines (guidelines) for acceptance of
responsibility and that it would not take any position on the sentence to be
imposed within the applicable guideline range. The district court declined to
apply the three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Defendant now
appeals his sentence, arguing that the government breached the plea agreement
and that the district court erred in not crediting him with a reduction in his
offense level for acceptance of responsibility. 1
We review de novo defendant’s assertion that the government violated the
plea agreement. See United States v. Cooper, 70 F.3d 563, 565 (10th Cir. 1995).
The district court’s denial of the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility is
entitled to great deference and will not be disturbed unless it is without
foundation. See United States v. Amos, 984 F.2d 1067, 1071-72 (10th Cir. 1993).
Application of the guidelines to the facts is a question of fact that we review for
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
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clear error. See id. at 1072. However, “[p]ure questions of interpretation of the
sentencing guidelines, which are closely analogous to questions of statutory
interpretation, are questions of law,” which we review de novo. Id. Guided by
these standards, we affirm.
While defendant was in custody awaiting sentencing, the government
received FBI reports indicating that defendant stabbed another prisoner. The
government passed the reports on to the probation department, and the probation
officer included the information in his presentence investigation report. The
probation officer recommended in the report that defendant not receive the
reduction for acceptance of responsibility because defendant’s actions were
inconsistent with a “voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct.”
USSG § 3E1.1, comment (n.1(b)).
Defendant first argues that the government violated the plea agreement by
providing the probation department with the FBI reports of defendant’s criminal
conduct that occurred while he awaited sentencing. The government agreed not to
oppose a reduction in offense level for acceptance of responsibility. The
presentence investigation report prepared by the probation department reflected
the government’s lack of opposition to the reduction, and the government did not
actively oppose, or otherwise comment on, the reduction at the sentencing
hearing. Cf. United States v. Hawley, 93 F.3d 682, 692-93 (10th Cir. 1996)
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(holding that government accomplished through indirect means what it promised
not to do directly when prosecutor qualified its lack of opposition through
comments at sentencing).
The plea agreement must be construed according to what defendant
reasonably understood at the time he made the agreement. See United States v.
Jimenez, 928 F.2d 356, 363 (10th Cir. 1991) (government may inform the court of
relevant conduct occurring subsequent to the plea agreement without violating
plea agreement provisions concerning a sentencing recommendation). The
agreement cannot be reasonably interpreted as prohibiting the government from
informing the sentencing court of conduct relevant to sentencing. “In fact, the
prosecutor has an ethical duty to disclose such information which, in this case,
postdated the parties’ plea agreement.” Id.; see also United States v. Hand, 913
F.2d 854, 856 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1990) (contrasting cases where prosecutor argued
opposite position of that agreed upon in plea agreement and holding that
prosecutor’s cross-examination was not breach of plea agreement, but rather
fulfilled prosecutor’s responsibility to inform the court “so that its decision would
not be tainted by incomplete and inaccurate information”). It is not a reasonable
interpretation of the plea agreement to “require the judge to sentence in the dark.”
Jimenez, 928 F.2d at 363 (further quotation omitted). The government did not
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violate the plea agreement by supplying the probation department with the reports
of defendant’s post-plea agreement criminal conduct. See id. at 363-64.
Defendant also argues that the district court erred in denying the acceptance
of responsibility reduction based on the reports that he stabbed a fellow prisoner
because that criminal activity was unrelated to the criminal conduct for which he
was convicted. The guidelines state that voluntary withdrawal from criminal
conduct is a relevant consideration in deciding whether to grant a reduction for
acceptance of responsibility. See USSG § 3E1.1, comment (n.1(b)). The
guidelines do not, however, qualify that factor to permit consideration of only
criminal conduct related to or of the same nature as the offense of conviction.
The majority of circuit courts that have addressed the issue have held that,
in deciding whether to grant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility pursuant
to § 3E1.1, a sentencing court is entitled to consider whether a defendant has
voluntarily withdrawn from criminal conduct, regardless of whether the conduct is
similar or related to the criminal conduct for which a defendant was convicted.
See United States v. O’Neil, 936 F.2d 599, 600-01 (1st Cir. 1991); United States
v. Ceccarini, 98 F.3d 126, 130-31 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Watkins, 911
F.2d 983, 984-85 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. McDonald, 22 F.3d 139, 144
(7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Byrd, 76 F.3d 194, 197 (8th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Pace, 17 F.3d 341, 343 (11th Cir. 1994); but see United States v.
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Morrison, 983 F.2d 730, 735 (6th Cir. 1993). We join the majority of circuits and
hold that the guidelines do not prohibit a sentencing court from considering, in its
discretion, criminal conduct unrelated to the offense of conviction in determining
whether a defendant qualifies for an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility
under § 3E1.1. Consequently, the district court’s denial of an adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility based on reports of defendant’s criminal conduct in
prison while awaiting sentencing was not legal error.
Finally, defendant has the burden to show he is entitled to an adjustment
for acceptance of responsibility. See Amos, 984 F.2d at 1073. We agree with the
district court that defendant did not meet his burden. Defendant objected to
inclusion in the presentence investigation report of the information contained in
the FBI reports on the basis that he had not been “charged or found guilty of the
unlawful conduct alleged by the report.” R. Vol. I, Tab 50 at 1. Defendant did
not, however, dispute or offer any evidence against the fact or accuracy of the
witness accounts. The district court’s decision not to grant the adjustment
because defendant had not met his burden was not clear error.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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