F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 29 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CURTIS LEE WATSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 99-2205
DONALD DORSEY, Warden,
(D.C. No. CIV-99-0525-SC/RLP)
Torrance County Detention Facility;
(Dist. N.M.)
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF
AMERICA; TORRANCE COUNTY
DETENTION FACILITY,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, EBEL and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Curtis Lee Watson (“Watson”), a prisoner at the
correctional facility at Torrance County, New Mexico, filed the present action in
federal district court against Defendants-Appellees seeking injunctive relief.
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be
cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Watson specifically alleged that a number of his constitutional rights had been
violated when Defendants assigned him a maximum security classification and
placed him in segregation and lockdown upon his arrival at Torrance on April 23,
1999. (See Doc. 1, 3.) Watson had been transferred to Torrance from an Ohio
facility. (See id.) Watson also alleged in the complaint that: (1) he had been
denied access to legal materials; (2) the Corrections Corporation of America had
breached a settlement agreement reached in another, unrelated suit; and (3) he had
not received adequate medical care for an injury to his ankle. (See id.)
The district court dismissed this case sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (See Doc. 8.) The court found that the
circumstances of Watson’s incarceration were temporary and only in effect while
formal security classification proceedings were pending. (See id. at 2.) The court
dismissed Watson’s claims related to the circumstances of his confinement on the
ground that he had no protected liberty interest in his security classification. (See
id.) The court went on to dismiss Watson’s claim that he was denied access to
legal materials because Watson had failed to alleged any relevant actual injury.
(See id.) Finding that Watson’s claims arising under federal law lacked merit, the
district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Watson’s state
law claim concerning the breach of the settlement agreement pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a) & (c). (See id. at 2-3.)
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We review the district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint pursuant to §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) for an abuse of discretion, see Schlicher v. Thomas, 111 F.3d
777, 779 (10th Cir. 1997), and § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo, see Perkins v. Kansas
Dep’t of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999). After thorough
consideration of Watson’s claims, we find that the district court properly
dismissed the claims relating to Watson’s security status and his access to legal
materials for substantially the same reasons set forth in the order of the district
court. We also find that Watson’s claim that he was denied adequate medical care
for the injury to his ankle is without merit because he has failed to state a
cognizable Eighth Amendment claim by alleging “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L.
Ed. 2d 251 (1976). Because the district court properly dismissed Watson’s
federal law claims, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Watson’s state law claim
concerning breach of the settlement agreement. See Smith v. Enid, 149 F.3d
1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that we review a district court’s decision
to dismiss supplemental state law claims pursuant to § 1367(c) under an abuse of
discretion standard). As a final matter, this court wishes to remind Mr. Watson
that he has an ongoing obligation, pursuant to an order of this court dated October
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18, 1999, to make partial payments toward the $105 in court costs and fees
assessed in connection with this suit. AFFIRMED.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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