IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-20518
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOE LOUIS CHAMPION,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(H-96-CR-255-2)
September 30, 1998
Before JOHNSON, DUHE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Joe Louis Champion appeals his conviction for conspiracy to
possess, as well as aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine base
with the intent to distribute. Champion argues that the district court
erred (1) by accepting the guilty verdict when the evidence was
insufficient to support the conviction, (2) in admitting evidence of
Champion’s prior convictions of drug related crimes, (3) by refusing to
grant a mistrial after the prosecutor elicited an unwarned custodial
statement from a witness, and (4) in failing to properly instruct the
jury of the elements of aiding and abetting.
*
Pursuant to 5th CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the
limited circumstances set forth in 5th CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Champion contends that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support his conviction.1 The standard under which this
court reviews a claim of legal insufficiency is whether “a rational
trier of fact could have found that the evidence establishes the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. El-Zoubi, 993 F.2d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 1993) (citations
omitted). This standard leaves the assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses as well as the weight of the evidence within the exclusive
province of the jury. See id. In reviewing an insufficiency claim, we
must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942);
United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1551 (5th Cir. 1994). After
careful analysis of the record, we find that the evidence was sufficient
to support a reasonable juror’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt on all of the essential elements of charged offenses.
Champion next argues that the court erred in admitting evidence of
his past convictions for drug related crimes under the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Admission of evidence is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Bently-Smith, 2 F.3d
1368, 1377 (5th Cir. 1993). Under this circuit’s law, Rule 404(b)
evidence is admissible when it is relevant to an issue other than the
defendant’s character and it possesses probative value which is not
outweighed by unfair prejudice. See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d
898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). Specifically, evidence of other
1
The defendant complied with FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 29(c) to preserve
error on this point.
2
crimes may be admitted “when a defendant places his intent at issue in
a drug conspiracy case by pleading not guilty. This is especially true
when the defendant contends he was merely present at the scene of the
crime.” United States v. Wilwright, 56 F.3d 586, 589 (5th Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted). Because Champion’s intent was at issue and the
probative value outweighed any unfair prejudice, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by admitting the prior convictions.
Champion contends that the court erred by refusing to grant a
mistrial after the jury was permitted to hear testimony regarding an
unwarned custodial statement. A district court’s failure to grant a
mistrial will warrant reversal only if the court abused its discretion.
See United States v. Layne, 43 F.3d 127, 134 (5th Cir. 1995). A motion
for mistrial should be granted when, viewing the record as a whole,
there is a significant possibility that the evidence presented had a
substantial impact on the verdict. See id. In this case, the
prosecutor elicited testimony from a police officer that the defendant
admitted to possessing the keys to the car used in the drug sale.
Defense counsel asked for and received a curative jury instruction. We
hold that because the jury was appropriately instructed to disregard the
statement and other evidence in the record established ownership of the
car, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion for mistrial.
Champion finally argues that the jury instruction given on aiding
and abetting was insufficient. Because the defendant did not object at
trial, we will review this claim under the plain error standard. See
FED R. CRIM. P. 52(b). Under this standard, this court may only reverse
3
if (1) there is an error, (2) it is clear and obvious, and (3) it
affects the defendant’s substantial rights. See United States v.
Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994).
When a district court instructs a jury, it has substantial latitude
in wording the instruction so long as it is a correct statement of the
law and fairly covers the issues in the case. See United States v.
Masat, 948 F.2d 923, 928 (5th Cir. 1991). In this case, the instruction
given to the jury was a correct statement of the law of aiding and
abetting. See United States v. Harris, 25 F.3d 1275, 1279 (5th Cir.
1994); cf. United States v. Neal, 951 F.2d 630, 633 (5th Cir. 1992)
(reciting a substantially similar jury instruction as an example of an
aiding and abetting instruction). Therefore, the district court did not
plainly err.
AFFIRMED.
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