F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 21 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
HENRY L. RUDOLPH,
Petitioner-Appellant,
No. 99-4207
v. (D.C. No. 99-CV-371)
(Utah)
HANK GALETKA,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, EBEL and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner Henry Rudolph appeals the dismissal of his petition for habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and requests a certificate of appealability from
this court. We grant the certificate and reverse and remand.
Mr. Rudolph was convicted of aggravated burglary and violation of a
protective order in Utah district court. After his convictions were affirmed by the
Utah Supreme Court on direct appeal, see State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221 (Utah
1998), he filed the present habeas petition alleging twelve constitutional
violations. The magistrate judge concluded that five of these claims had not been
presented to the state court and that under Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510
(1982), the mixed petition “must be dismissed without prejudice.” App., vol. I,
Report and Recommendation at 2. The district court adopted the
recommendation, reiterating that the petition “must” be dismissed. Id., Order
filed Aug. 10, 1999, at 1. The district court dismissed Mr. Rudolph’s petition
without prejudice, instructing him that he could refile his federal petition
including only his exhausted claims, or he could seek review of the unexhausted
claims in state court under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b). Mr. Rudolph appeals this
decision, arguing that the unexhausted claims should be addressed on the merits
because he only failed to bring those claims on direct appeal due to the
ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel.
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Both the district court and the magistrate judge relied on Rose for the
proposition that petitions including exhausted and unexhausted claims for relief
must be dismissed without prejudice. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 520 (holding district
court should dismiss mixed habeas petitions which raise claims unexhausted in
state court). Rose was superseded by statute, however, upon the passage of the
Anti-Effective Death Penalty and Anti-terrorism Act (AEDPA), codified in
relevant part at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Section 2254(b)(2) states that “[a]n
application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits
notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in
the courts of the State.” This section allows federal district courts entertaining
habeas petitions which contain unexhausted claims to address those claims if they
can be decided on their merits against the petitioner. 1
This court has held that section 2254(b)(2) is a codification of the holding
in Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987), under which a federal court that is
“‘convinced that the petition has no merit’” may deny the petition on the merits
rather than apply the exhaustion rule. Hoxsie v. Kerby, 108 F.3d 1239, 1242-43
(10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Granberry, 481 U.S. at 134). Similarly, the Supreme
Court has indicated that when an unexhausted claim is “easily resolvable against
1
Mr. Rudolph filed this § 2254 petition in the United States District Court in
Utah on May 27, 1999, after the April 24, 1996 effective date of AEDPA. Thus,
we apply the provisions of § 2254 as amended by AEDPA.
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the habeas petitioner,” the district court may apply section 2254(b)(2) and deny
the claim on the merits. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997).
Thus, under section 2254(b)(2), where the district court is convinced the
unexhausted claim is without merit, or that the issue is easily resolvable against
the defendant, the court may reach the merits of the claim rather than dismiss the
petition.
Neither the magistrate judge nor the district court indicated an awareness of
the district court’s discretion under section 2254(b)(2) to determine whether the
unexhausted claims are easily resolvable against Mr. Rudolph and, if so, to
address the exhausted claims without the necessity of dismissing the petition
under Rose v. Lundy.
Accordingly, we GRANT Mr. Rudolph’s certificate of appealability,
REVERSE the order of the district court, and REMAND for further
consideration.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Chief Judge
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