F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 12 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
WILLIAM L. FLEMING,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-8035
(D.C. No. 97-CV-170-J)
JUDY UPHOFF, Director of (D. Wyo.)
Corrections, State of Wyoming, in her
individual and official capacity;
JAMES FERGUSON, Warden of the
Wyoming State Penitentiary, in his
individual and official capacity;
JAMES DAVIS, Health Service
Administrator, Department of
Corrections, State of Wyoming in his
individual and official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES,
INC., a qualified foreign corporation;
JOHN PERRY, Health Care
Administrator, Wexford Health
Sources, Inc.; PAUL LONG, M.D.,
Medical Director, Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., and JOHN AND JANE
DOES 1-10,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , ANDERSON , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff-appellant William L. Fleming appeals the district court’s dismissal
of his civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Background
Plaintiff entered the Wyoming State Penitentiary in April 1996, following a
conviction for escape. Plaintiff alleged that the escape, which took him to
Denver, Colorado, and then to Armadillo, Texas, was for the purpose of seeking
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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medical care from a certain surgeon for his circulatory condition. 1
Upon his entry
into the Wyoming prison, plaintiff received a medical orientation and saw a
physician who prescribed medication. At this time, health care to the Wyoming
institution’s inmates was provided under contract with defendant Wexford Health
Sources, Inc. 2
In August 1996, plaintiff was transported to the Veterans Administration
Center (VA) in Denver, Colorado, for evaluation. He was also seen by a private
physician in Rawlins, Wyoming. Plaintiff contends that the Wexford board
denied approval for the additional tests requested by the VA and the Rawlins
doctor. He alleged that he had another appointment at the VA in Denver on
December 5, 1996, which defendant Uphoff refused to allow him to keep. On
December 13, 1996, plaintiff saw Dr. Long, a Wexford physician at the prison,
who prescribed additional medication.
In his complaint, plaintiff requested compensatory damages for medical
malpractice, alleged a third party claim pursuant to the contract between the
Wyoming Penitentiary and Wexford, and alleged a civil rights claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
1
Plaintiff does not reveal the exact nature or diagnosis of his circulatory
problems in any of the pleadings or supporting documents submitted to this court.
2
Plaintiff states in his brief that his claims against Wexford were settled, and
a stipulated dismissal order as to Wexford was entered on April 5, 1999.
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Defendants Judy Uphoff, Jim Ferguson, and James Davis moved for dismissal
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (2) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Defendants further asserted that plaintiff failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
In granting defendants’ dismissal motion as to plaintiff’s federal claims, the
district court concluded that plaintiff failed to state a cognizable claim for relief.
In this light, the court declined to retain jurisdiction over plaintiff’s pendant state
law claims, and declined to address defendants’ exhaustion arguments. After
careful review of plaintiff’s arguments and record on appeal, we agree with the
district court that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Discussion
The legal sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law; hence, a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal is reviewed de novo . See Sutton v. Utah State Sch. For the
Deaf & Blind , 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999). In reviewing the district
court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
all well-pleaded allegations in the . . . complaint are accepted as true
and viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. A
12(b)(6) motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.
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Id. at 1236 (quotation and citation omitted). The rules create “a powerful
presumption against rejecting pleadings for failure to state a claim.” Cayman
Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co. , 873 F.2d 1357, 1359 (10th Cir.
1989).
“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners”
constitutes a violation of the Eight Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97,
104 (1976). “However, ‘a complaint that a physician has been negligent in
diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical
mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.’” Green v. Branson , 108 F.3d 1296,
1303 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Estelle , 429 U.S. at 106). In addition, neither
medical malpractice nor disagreement with medical judgment constitutes an
Eighth Amendment violation. See id. Therefore, in order to prevail here,
plaintiff must show a “deliberate refusal to provide medical attention, as opposed
to a particular course of treatment.” Id.
Plaintiff’s only argument on appeal challenges the district court’s dismissal
of his claims against the prison officials, in particular defendant Uphoff. In
dismissing these claims, the court accepted the allegation in plaintiff’s complaint
that his medical condition was serious. Relying on Green , 108 F.3d at 1303, the
court concluded, however, that plaintiff’s complaint alleged only a difference of
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opinion regarding the type and timing of medical treatment, which did not
constitute actionable deliberate indifference.
Although plaintiff alleges on appeal that Wexford continued to deny him
medical care during the year he was incarcerated, he does not specifically identify
any other instances after December 13, 1996, when he requested medical care
from the prison staff and was refused. Plaintiff generally contends that due to the
denial of adequate medical care during his incarceration, his medical condition
deteriorated resulting in the need for more complex surgery upon his release. He
does not elaborate further on either the nature of the surgery or the nature or
extent of the increased complexity. Although in his complaint plaintiff alleged
that the delay of medical care would “cause him permanent problems,” he does
not describe the nature or extent of these problems. Appellant’s App. at 16.
The Eighth Amendment imposes on the government the affirmative duty to
provide adequate medical care to incarcerated persons. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at
103 . The standard for determining whether the government has shown deliberate
indifference to the medical needs of a prisoner has two components: “‘an
objective component requiring that the pain or deprivation be sufficiently serious,
and a subjective component requiring that the offending officials act with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Mitchell v. Maynard , 80 F.3d 1433, 1444
(10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Miller v. Glanz , 948 F.2d 1562, 1569 (10th Cir. 1991)).
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Delay in treatment can be actionable under Estelle , see Hunt v. Uphoff , 199
F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999), but it must, in itself, reflect “deliberate
indifference which results in substantial harm.” Olson v. Stotts , 9 F.3d 1475,
1477 (10th Cir. 1993) (quotation and citation omitted). Here, plaintiff’s
allegations of delay reflect nothing more than his general disagreement with the
course of his medical treatment. This, at most, involves a claim of medical
malpractice or negligence that is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment.
See Estelle , 429 U.S. at 106; see, e.g., Tyler v. Sullivan , No. 95-1232, 1996 WL
195295 (10th Cir. April 22, 1996) (following Olson to hold “[a] difference of
opinion as to the kind and timing of medical treatment does not rise to the level of
an Eighth Amendment violation”) (emphasis added) (unpublished); cf. White v.
Colorado , 82 F.3d 364, 367 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment
because “plaintiff’s allegations of denial of, or delay in providing, diagnostic
evaluation and other means of treatment . . . implicate only defendants’
negligence”). Further, plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations do not
indicate how the alleged deprivation or delay “exacerbate[d] [his] medical
problems” or “result[ed] in a lifelong handicap or a permanent loss,” Hunt , 199
F.3d at 1224 (quotation omitted).
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In conclusion, we agree with the district court’s determination that
plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Therefore, the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Wyoming dismissing plaintiff’s complaint is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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