F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
APR 12 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
KEVIN MCGUIRE,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
vs. No. 98-1388
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 95-WY-1813-WD)
Diane MacArthur Brown, Olsen & Brown, L.L.C., Niwot, Colorado, on the brief
for Plaintiff - Appellee. *
Mary H. Stuart, Holme Roberts & Owen, L.L.P., (Daniel R. Satriana, Jr., Alan
Epstein and Marianne E. Pierce, Hall & Evans, L.L.C., on the briefs), Denver,
Colorado, for Defendant - Appellant.
Before KELLY, ALARCON, ** and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
*
The appellee elected not to present oral argument.
The Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Circuit Judge, United States
**
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
This appeal involves the application of Colorado law to disciplinary
procedures and an internal grievance process contained in an employee
handbook. Appellant Continental Airlines, Inc. (Continental) appeals from a jury
verdict in favor of appellee Kevin McGuire for $200,000 damages on alternative
theories of breach of implied contract/promissory estoppel. Our jurisdiction
arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.
Background
Mr. McGuire began working for Continental as a machinist on July 21,
1987. He remained at the same job, with the exception of one short transfer to
another position, until his termination on March 28, 1994 for violation of
Continental’s attendance policy. The job of machinist was covered by various
rules laid out in an employee handbook – Continental’s Technical Operations
Employment Policy for Technical Operations, Facilities Maintenance and GSE
Hourly Employees (“handbook”). Appendix D of the handbook, entitled
“Attendance Policy,” was designed to “ensure that each employee is aware and
understands what the Company considers an acceptable level of attendance, and
to establish the disciplinary action imposed on the employee when appropriate.”
III Aplee. Supp. App. at 542. When an employee began to reach “an
unacceptable level” of absences, the handbook required that a supervisor meet
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with the employee and counsel them “to assure that the employee is aware of the
consequences.” Id. at 543. If counseling failed to correct the problem, a four
step disciplinary process was required. This process consisted of: (1) a verbal
warning after the fourth incident of absence in a twelve calendar month period;
(2) a written warning after the fifth incident; (3) a termination warning after the
sixth incident; and (4) termination after the seventh incident. Id. at 543-44. 1
It is uncontested that Continental followed the form of these procedures.
On December 15, 1993, Merle Toavs, McGuire’s supervisor, counseled plaintiff
regarding his absenteeism. See Aplt. App. at 31. A verbal warning was then
given on January 19, 1994; followed by a written warning on February 8; a
written termination warning on March 4; and finally a written notice of
termination on March 28. See id. at 40-41; see also Aplt. Supp. App. at 565-67
(testimony of McGuire that he received the warnings of the four step corrective
process).
Mr. McGuire asserted, however, that Mr. Toavs incorrectly counted the
number of incidents of absence he had accrued. While Continental listed eight
incidents on the notice of termination, Mr. McGuire contested at least two of
The handbook defined incident as “[a]ny single specific period of
1
continuous absence for a single reason.” III Aplee. Supp. App. at 542. Absences,
for purposes of discipline, included sick leave, tardiness/lateness, and unapproved
personal absences. Id.
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these. The first involved a lateness of twelve minutes for a meeting which Mr.
McGuire asserted was non-mandatory. The second involved two absences from
work (January 5 thru 18 and January 31 thru February 7) which Mr. McGuire
claimed should be counted as a single incident under the Company’s “Premature
Attempt to Return to Work” policy. 2
If these absences were removed, only six
would remain and Mr. McGuire could not be terminated.
After his termination, Mr. McGuire’s first step in challenging the number
of incidents was to appeal using Continental’s internal appeal procedure.
Chapter 20 of the handbook established a grievance procedure that employees
could use as follows:
It is usually best for an employee to discuss any problem
or disagreement regarding the proper application of
Company policies and disciplinary action with his/her
immediate supervisor. Between the employee and the
supervisor, nearly all problems and misunderstandings
can be resolved quickly.
...
2
This section was part of Continental’s Attendance Policy and stated:
If an employee is absent and attempts prematurely to
return to work but finds it necessary to again be absent
because of the same illness, both absences will be
considered as a single incident. The second absence
must have occurred within fourteen calendar days of the
first absence in order to have both absences count as a
single incident.
Aplee. Supp. App. at 543.
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If a matter involving the proper application of Company
policy or disciplinary action (including dismissal) is not
resolved to the employee’s satisfaction, the employee
may file a formal appeal using Continental’s Appeal
Procedure.
Id. at 537. The Appeal Procedure consisted of a four step process, whereby the
disciplinary action would be reviewed in turn by the employee’s supervisor (Step
One), a local management representative (Step Two), senior management
representatives (Step Three), and finally a certified arbitrator whose decision
“will be final and binding on both parties” (Step Four). Id. at 539.
Representation was available for the appellant at every stage in the person
of employee representatives elected solely by Continental’s employees, i.e. the
Employee Representative (Step One); the Local Appeal Committee (LAC) (Step
Two); and the System Council Appeal Committee (SAC) (Steps Three and Four).
With the exception of Step One appeals, the policy required the representative,
rather than the employee, to initiate the next level of the appeal.
Randall Gebben was the Employee Representative responsible for Mr.
McGuire’s Step One appeal. II Aplee. Supp. App. at 475-76. However, Section
E of the Appeal Procedure provided that in all cases involving termination, the
appeal would proceed on an expedited basis and would begin at the Step Two
level. See III Aplee. Supp. App. at 541. Therefore, Mr. Gebben, as the
representative, initiated a Step Two appeal on behalf of Mr. McGuire to
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challenge the grounds for termination. II Aplee. Supp. App. at 476. At the Step
Two appeal, Mr. Gebben’s representation ended, see II Aplt. Supp. App. at 706,
and Mr. McGuire was represented by the LAC, primarily by its chairman, Dave
Conley. Id. at 703, 725. Although the Appeal Procedure guaranteed him the
right to attend the Step Two hearing in person, Mr. McGuire chose not to attend.
Id. at 584-85. 3
After the presentation of evidence by both sides, the hearing officer, Marc
Bradell determined that Continental had properly counted the incidents of
absence and upheld the termination. Aplt. App. at 47-48. Under the terms of the
Appeal Procedure, a Step Three appeal could only be brought “[i]f in the opinion
of the Local Appeal Committee (LAC), the answer received at the Step Two
Level is not satisfactory .” III Aplee. Supp. App. at 539 (emphasis added). Mr.
McGuire never requested the LAC to initiate a Step Three appeal, see II Aplt.
Supp. App. at 704-05, and the internal grievance process ended at this point. 4
3
Mr. Gebben testified that Mr. McGuire could not attend the hearing
because of a personal conflict. He requested a postponement of the hearing so
that Mr. McGuire could attend personally, but the postponement was denied. II
Aplee. Supp. App. at 477, 479. This testimony is contradicted by both Dave
Conley and Marc Bradell, the hearing officer, who testified that nobody ever
asked for a postponement of the hearing. Id. at 705, 723-24. We need not decide
this issue, however, because the Appeal Procedure did not give a right to
postpone a hearing and Mr. McGuire does not challenge his termination on this
ground.
Mr. Gebben, who sat in on the Step Two appeal, informed Mr. Conley,
4
immediately following the hearing, that he felt the decision should be appealed to
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Subsequently, Mr. McGuire filed a complaint against Continental in federal
district court, alleging unlawful discrimination in violation of Title VII, breach of
implied contract and promissory estoppel. The case went to the jury, which held
in favor of Continental on the Title VII claim, 5
but awarded Mr. McGuire
$200,000 in damages on the alternative claims of implied contract/promissory
estoppel. Defendant’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law was
denied and Continental appeals, claiming that the district court erred in
submitting either the breach of contract claim or the promissory estoppel claim to
the jury.
Step Three. II Aplt. Supp. App. at 706. However, there is no indication that this
was anything other than Mr. Gebben’s personal opinion. See id. at 707. There is
no evidence in the record that Mr. McGuire either desired or sought a Step Three
appeal or requested Mr. Gebben to seek one on his behalf. In fact, there is some
indication that it was Mr. Conley’s practice to intitiate a Step Three appeal for
any employee who requested one. See I Aplee. Supp. App. at 51-52 (trial court
referring to an affidavit by Mr. Conley to this effect – unfortunately, this affidavit
is not part of the record on appeal). Regardless, Mr. Conley, after discussing the
merits of the case with the other two members of the LAC, decided not to seek a
Step Three appeal. Id.
5
Mr. McGuire does not appeal the judgment against him on his Title VII
claim.
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Breach of Implied Contract
We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 6
See
Baker v. Barnard Constr. Co., Inc. , 146 F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 1998). Under
this standard, we assume that Continental incorrectly counted the number of
incidents when terminating Mr. McGuire. This was the ground on which the
district court denied Continental’s motion for partial summary judgment. See I
Aplee. Supp. App. at 51 (“[A] genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
defendant properly counted plaintiff’s absences. If the plaintiff’s absences were
not properly counted in accordance with the T.O.P. handbook, then a jury could
find a breach of an implied contract.”). Continental contends, however, that Mr.
McGuire received every procedural step required by both the Attendance Policy
and the Appeal Procedure, and is therefore barred from relitigating his claim in
federal court.
Colorado follows the doctrine of employment at-will: employment “may be
terminated by either party without cause and without notice, and [] termination
does not give rise to a cause of action.” Crawford Rehabilitation Servs. v.
Mr. McGuire attempts to characterize the issue on appeal as a challenge to
6
the sufficiency of the evidence, and fails to contest – or even mention – the legal
authority raised in Continental’s briefs. We reject this mischaracterization and
address the appeal solely as a question of law.
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Weissman , 938 P.2d 540, 546 (Colo. 1997). This doctrine functions in the
absence of an employment contract between the parties. An employer can bind
itself by distributing an employee handbook detailing a system of progressive
disciplinary procedures to be followed prior to termination. “An employee
originally hired under a contract terminable at-will may be able to enforce such
termination procedures under a theory of breach of implied contract or
promissory estoppel.” Id. at 547.
Mr. McGuire does not contest the fact that he was originally hired as an at-
will employee. Rather, he claims that Continental’s handbook created an implied
contract that the Attendance Policy would be correctly applied. From the time of
its initial answer until the close of evidence at trial, Continental denied that any
implied contract of employment had been formed by the handbook, although
apparently never disputing the application of the appeal procedures. It is
apparent that the parties were somewhat obscure in framing the issues for trial.
On appeal, Continental admits that an implied contract existed, at least insofar as
the appeal procedures are concerned, and we accept that admission for purposes
of this opinion. 7
7
Mr. McGuire contends that Continental should be judicially estopped from
arguing a position on appeal contrary to its position at trial. Continental denied
the existence of any implied contract up until the close of evidence. Then, for the
first time, during a final jury instruction conference, Continental attempted to
stipulate that a contract existed. The stipulation was offered in an attempt to
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Assuming, as we do, that a contract existed, the pivotal question in this
case is what remedies were available to Mr. McGuire for an alleged breach of
that contract. Ordinarily, an employee must seek to exhaust an employer’s
exclusive internal grievance process before seeking judicial relief. See Jefferson
County Sch. Dist. v. Shorey , 826 P.2d 830, 844 (Colo. 1992) (grievance
procedure of a collective bargaining agreement); see also Albertson’s, Inc. v.
Rhoads , 582 P.2d 1049, 1050 (Colo. 1978) (“[I]f the grievance procedure is the
exclusive remedy then it must be exhausted.”); but see Musgrave v. Eben Ezer
Lutheran Institute , 731 P.2d 142 (Colo. 1986) (employee need not exhaust
grievance procedures in order to recover unemployment compensation benefits).
Although Continental’s Appeal Procedure speaks in somewhat permissive terms
(i.e. an employee “may” submit an appeal), the Colorado Supreme Court has held
in cases involving similar grievance procedures “that use of the term ‘may’ was
eliminate that part of Jury Instruction 13 which dealt with McGuire’s claim of
promissory estoppel. See Aplt. Second Supp. App. at 19-20 (counsel admitting to
a contract so that “the estoppel issue goes by the wayside.”). The trial court
rejected the stipulation as untimely.
While we empathize with Mr. McGuire’s frustration at Continental’s
apparent last minute flip-flopping in an attempt to gain tactical advantage, it is
well established that judicial estoppel does not exist in the Tenth Circuit. See
Webb v. ABF Freight System, Inc., 155 F.3d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir. 1998).
Moreover, our decision in this case is not in any way affected by Continental’s
admission on appeal. Under our standard of viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Mr. McGuire, we would assume that an implied contract
existed.
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not intended to allow individual employee suits as an alternative to the grievance
procedure.” Albertson’s , 582 P.2d at 1050. Any doubt as to the application of
the procedure is to be resolved in favor of exclusivity. See id. (quoting Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox , 379 U.S. 650, 658 (1965)). Applying this standard, we
hold that Continental’s grievance procedure was the exclusive remedy for
challenging a breach of the Attendance Policy.
Mr. McGuire availed himself of this procedure to challenge the number of
incidents upon which his termination was based. Continental’s Attendance
Policy defines an incident as “[a]ny single specific period of continuous absence
for a single reason.” III Aplee. Supp. App. at 542. Tardiness/Lateness is listed
as an example of an incident. Nowhere does the handbook state that lateness for
a non-mandatory meeting will not be counted as an incident. Nor does the
handbook specify what proof is necessary to show that an illness is the “same
illness” for purposes of the “Premature Attempt to Return to Work” clause. 8
Id.
at 543. The Appeal Procedure was the proper mechanism for raising these
claims. Mr. McGuire argued both of these issues on his Step Two appeal. The
We note, as did Mr. Bradell, that Mr. McGuire never challenged the
8
incidents at the time they were counted in the disciplinary procedure. See Aplt.
App. at 48. Mr. McGuire received a written warning on February 8, 1994
regarding the two periods which he alleged should have been counted as one, and
received a March 4, 1994 written termination warning letter for the latenesses
which he claims were for non-mandatory meetings.
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hearing officer determined that “the termination was accomplished in accordance
with the Technical Operations attendance policy.” Aplt. App. at 48. Mr.
McGuire did not attempt a Step Three appeal on this claim, the internal appeal
process ended, and so did all claims as to the actual number of incidents involved
in the termination decision.
An “employee may not accept those portions of the policy that are deemed
to be favorable and reject those that may be considered unfavorable.” Floyd v.
Coors Brewing Co. , 952 P.2d 797, 806 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997), reversed on other
grounds , 978 P.2d 663 (Colo. 1999). Mr. McGuire’s sole remedy as to whether
or not an absence should properly be counted as an incident lay with
Continental’s internal grievance process.
The case of Allsup v. Mount Carmel Med. Ctr. , 922 P.2d 1097 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1996) (relied upon in Floyd , 952 P.2d at 806) is particularly instructive on
this point. The plaintiff employee sued Mount Carmel for breach of an implied
employment contract. Mount Carmel had a policy which provided a four step
grievance procedure for disgruntled employees, which culminated in review by
the Director of Personnel and the company Administrator whose decision “is
final.” Id. at 1099. The employee did not pursue the grievance process past the
first step but filed suit in Kansas state court. In affirming summary judgment for
Mount Carmel, the Kansas Court of Appeals held:
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The Mount Carmel grievance procedure . . . provided
that ‘[t]he decision of the Administrator is final.’ As
such, the terms of the grievance procedure limited the
employee’s recourse to the procedure provided. Filing a
grievance was optional, but under the terms of the
policy, it was the only option.
Id. at 1101.
Mr. McGuire raised his challenge to the number of incidents in the Appeal
Procedure. This issue was decided against him and the same argument is not
available to him in court. See Floyd , 952 P.2d at 806. Therefore, “the only
possible contract breach that plaintiff could assert would be one grounded upon
allegations that the [hearing officer’s] decision resulted from a violation of the
procedures adopted by that policy.” Id. Mr. McGuire does not argue that he was
denied any of the steps of the disciplinary process or somehow kept from fully
pursuing Continental’s Appeal Procedure. Therefore, his claim of breach of
implied contract must fail. See Bellairs v. Coors Brewing Co. , 907 F. Supp.
1448, 1455 (D. Colo. 1995), aff’d , No. 95-1486, 1997 WL 107767 (10th Cir.
March 12, 1997).
Moreover, his claim of promissory estoppel must fail for the same reason.
Mr. McGuire asserts that he relied upon the provisions of the employee handbook
to his detriment. Without an assertion that Continental failed to follow these
procedures, the promissory estoppel claim lacks any foundation and must be
dismissed.
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In granting judgment in favor of Continental, we note the limited nature of
our holding. An employee should not be given two bites at the same apple. Mr.
McGuire had his opportunity to contest whether an absence was an incident or
not when he brought his Step Two appeal. He did not show up at the hearing,
lost, and did not attempt to go on to Step Three. Continental was bound by the
decision of the Step Two hearing officer and so was Mr. McGuire. See III Aplee.
Supp. App. at 537 (stating that Continental had the right to file an appeal
beginning at Step Three). An employee must accept both the benefits and the
responsibilities of an employee handbook which creates an implied contract.
REVERSED.
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