F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 8 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
PAMELA S. PILGRIM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-5152
(D.C. No. 95-CV-543-M)
KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, (N.D. Okla.)
Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , EBEL , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Pamela S. Pilgrim appeals from the district court’s decision affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of her application for Social Security disability insurance
benefits. We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether it is
supported by substantial evidence and whether correct legal standards were
applied. See Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 933 F.2d 799,
800-01 (10th Cir. 1991). Finding her arguments for reversal unpersuasive, we
affirm for the reasons stated below.
Ms. Pilgrim filed her application for benefits in April 1992, alleging
disability since March 1991 due to carpal tunnel syndrome in both wrists. Her
application was denied administratively, and in June 1995, she filed a complaint
in the district court challenging the denial of benefits. Because the transcript of
the hearing could not be located, the parties agreed to a remand for a second
hearing before the same administrative law judge who conducted the first hearing.
Following the second hearing in September 1996, the ALJ again denied Ms.
Pilgrim’s application, and that denial was again affirmed by the Appeals Council,
making the ALJ’s second decision the final decision of the Commissioner for
purposes of this appeal.
In his decision, the ALJ found that Ms. Pilgrim was severely impaired by
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and fibromyalgia, but that she had the residual
functional capacity to do the full range of light and sedentary work limited by an
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inability to do continuous grasping and constant repetitive work with her hands.
Because the ALJ found she could not do her past relevant work, the claim reached
the fifth step of the five-step analysis, at which point the burden was on the
Commissioner to show there were jobs in the national economy that Ms. Pilgrim
could perform. See Daniels v. Apfel , 154 F.3d 1129, 1132 (10th Cir. 1998). The
ALJ noted that she would not be considered disabled under the Medical-
Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, Rules 202.21 and
202.22. Relying on these rules and the testimony of a vocational expert that there
were a variety of jobs Ms. Pilgrim could perform with her limitations, the ALJ
found her not disabled and denied her application for benefits.
On appeal, Ms. Pilgrim raises four arguments, the first two of which are
related to the ALJ’s consideration of the various medical opinions regarding the
severity of her impairments. She contends that the ALJ violated the treating
physician rule by rejecting the opinion of treating physician Dr. Farrar that she
was disabled. She also contends that the ALJ erred by relying on the incomplete
and biased opinion of a consultative examining physician, Dr. Sutton.
Doctors’ opinions regarding Ms. Pilgrim’s ability to return to work were
mixed, and only Dr. Farrar concluded that she was totally disabled. Dr. Vosburgh
performed carpal tunnel surgery on her right wrist, and on followup, concluded in
July 1991 that she could return to work without any limitations. In August 1991,
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Dr. Letcher performed surgery on her other wrist, and he concluded in November
1991 that she could return to her job as a custodian. A few days later, she visited
a hand specialist, Dr. Clendenin, who diagnosed arthritis in her thumbs and
concluded that she was temporarily disabled. Following a work hardening
program, Dr. Clendenin noted that she still had pain but that he did not think she
would benefit from further medical or surgical care. In May 1992 he released her
to do light or sedentary work that did not require lifting more than five or ten
pounds with either hand or doing repetitive work. In October 1992, Dr. Farrar
diagnosed fibromyalgia in the cervical and thoracic regions that was related to her
wrist pain. In March 1992 and January 1993, Dr. Farrar concluded, apparently for
workers compensation purposes, that she was thirty to thirty-five percent disabled
in each hand and he recommended vocational rehabilitation. On examination in
October 1993, Dr. Sutton concluded that she exhibited no objective evidence of
disability, although he concluded she would be limited to lifting fifty pounds
occasionally due to the residual effects of her impairments. The next day, another
consultative examining physician, Dr. Miller, concluded that she was sixty
percent disabled “to the body as a whole” due to her hands and twenty percent
disabled due to depression. In January 1994 and September 1996, Dr. Farrar
wrote that she was permanently and totally disabled.
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The treating physician rule requires the Commissioner generally to give
substantial weight to the opinion of a claimant’s treating physician and to provide
specific legitimate reasons for rejecting such an opinion. See, e.g. , Frey v.
Bowen , 816 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir.1987). Recognizing the treating physician
rule, the ALJ rejected Dr. Farrar’s opinion because it was conclusory, not
supported by clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and inconsistent with
other evidence in the record, reasons we have recognized as legitimate, see id.
The record supports the ALJ’s conclusion. Dr. Farrar’s January 1993 opinion
stated she was in need of vocational rehabilitation and aptitude testing, indicating
he thought she could still work. His two subsequent brief opinions of total
disability referred generally to her fibromyalgia and wrist problems, but did not
identify what these impairments precluded her from doing or how her condition
had deteriorated. None of his other reports or clinical notes indicated that she
was totally disabled, nor would they support such an opinion.
In challenging the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Sutton’s opinion, Ms. Pilgrim
argues that it shows bias and that it was based on an inadequate examination
because it did not include a variety of tests she contends should have been
performed. We see no evidence of bias. On its face, Dr. Sutton’s opinion is
supported by his examination. To the extent Ms. Pilgrim argues he should have
performed additional tests, any deficiency in the tests performed might go to the
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weight to be given to his opinion, but not to its validity as medical evidence per
se. Moreover, in his decision, the ALJ noted Dr. Sutton’s opinion, but in
discussing the specific evidence he relied on to determine Ms. Pilgrim’s ability to
work, he referred to the opinions of Drs. Vosburgh, Letcher and Clendenin, not
that of Dr. Sutton. It thus appears the ALJ did not place much if any weight on
this opinion. Weighing conflicting medical opinions is the responsibility of the
ALJ, see Casias , 933 F.2d at 801, and we conclude the ALJ did not err in
assessing either Dr. Farrar’s or Dr. Sutton’s opinions.
Ms. Pilgrim next argues that the ALJ did not analyze her allegation of
disabling pain and depression in accordance with the requirements of Luna v.
Bowen , 834 F.2d 161, 165-66 (10th Cir. 1987), and Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d
387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995). In his decision, the ALJ considered the objective and
subjective evidence of her pain, along with her daily activities and the effects of
the medication she takes, in concluding her pain was not disabling. His analysis
of her pain met the requirements of Luna and Kepler. The ALJ also recognized
that Ms. Pilgrim at times suffered from depression. He considered the
medications she took to control it, her testimony regarding its effect on her
activities, and the medical opinion diagnosing it as mild dysthymic disorder in
determining that it would not affect her ability to work. Again, we see no
reversible error in the ALJ’s analysis.
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Finally, Ms. Pilgrim contends that the ALJ did not consider all of her
impairments individually and in combination because he did not address the effect
of her tendonitis and arthritis of her thumbs. There is no indication that these
alleged impairments had any effect other than on Ms. Pilgrim’s use of her hands,
and the ALJ considered her hand limitations in determining her residual
functional capacity. We see no error in this regard.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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