F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 27 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MELANIE JO ANDERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-1361
(D.C. No. 97-S-2509)
DILLON COMPANIES, INC., a (D. Colo.)
Kansas corporation, doing business in
Colorado as KING SOOPERS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and
ALLEY, Senior District Judge. **
Plaintiff Melanie Jo Anderson appeals from a summary judgment entered
against her on claims of sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and wrongful discharge
under state law. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable Wayne E. Alley, Senior District Judge, United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
Plaintiff presents three issues for decision. Two issues challenge the
district court’s conclusions that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of
material fact for trial concerning each of her Title VII claims. The third issue
concerns an evidentiary matter, namely, exclusion of the opinion of plaintiff’s
psychological expert as evidence of the existence of a hostile work environment.
The standards of appellate review are well settled. We review a summary
judgment decision de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the district
court. Penry v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 155 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1039 (1999); Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d
1355, 1360 (10th Cir. 1997). A moving defendant is entitled to summary
judgment if the factual record and inferences favorable to the plaintiff "could not
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the [plaintiff]." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). If the plaintiff (who bears the
burden of proof) lacks sufficient evidence on an essential element of a claim, then
other factual issues concerning the claim are immaterial. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion. Wright-Simmons v. City of Oklahoma City, 155 F.3d 1264, 1268 (10th
Cir. 1998). Applying these standards, we find no reversible error.
First, we have carefully reviewed the appellate record (including the
telephone message that first troubled plaintiff) and find ourselves in complete
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agreement with the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the
sexual harassment claim. We cannot add significantly to the district court’s
thorough analysis of facts relevant to whether plaintiff was subjected to a hostile
work environment. Simply stated, no rational juror could find that the incidents
of which plaintiff complains were severe or pervasive enough “to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment – an environment that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive . . . .” Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Factual issues argued by plaintiff regarding whether
defendant properly investigated or appropriately responded to her harassment
concerns relate to another element of this claim (employer liability for a hostile
environment, see Baty v. Williamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1241-42 (10th
Cir. 1999)) and are irrelevant to the dispositive issue.
Second, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling that the
psychological expert’s opinion was inadmissible to show that a hostile
environment existed in plaintiff’s workplace. In addition to reasons stated by the
district court, with which we have no quarrel, the psychologist’s affidavit and
report are not probative of an objectively hostile work environment. The
psychologist reported how the alleged harassment affected plaintiff and testified
how a reasonable woman would be expected to react to the conduct that plaintiff
had described. (Appellant’s App. at 188-203, 205.) While the latter opinion
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suggests an objective view, it was based on incidents as related by and perceived
by plaintiff. By relying on plaintiff’s perception of things and incidents that
plaintiff only heard about from others, the psychologist’s opinion became skewed
by its limited basis in plaintiff’s subjective thinking, characterized by her own
expert as “bizarre ” (Appellant’s App. at 197), and lost any probative force.
Finally, we also agree completely with the district court’s analysis of the
retaliation claim. A review of the record facts underlying this claim leads us to
conclude, as did the district court, that no rational juror could find a causal
connection between plaintiff’s harassment complaints and any adverse
employment action. Plaintiff points to purported delays in payment of accrued
vacation and sick leave and disability benefits and a reported statement by her
manager in connection with one of the delays, “Well, Melanie, this is what you
get.” (Appellant’s App. at 211.) Viewed most favorably to plaintiff, this
comment might raise an inference of a retaliatory motive for any adverse action to
which it related. The record contains no indication, however, that the delay in
vacation pay linked to the comment was such an adverse action. No fact is
presented to show that plaintiff was entitled to be paid sooner; the record shows
only that the check was not available on the day plaintiff had been told it would
be.
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We have reviewed the parties’ summary judgment briefs, the magistrate
judge’s recommendation, plaintiff’s objections to it, the district court’s decision,
the parties’ appellate briefs, and the relevant record. Finding no error, we affirm
for substantially the same reasons stated in the district court’s May 27, 1999
Memorandum Opinion and Order.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Wayne E. Alley
Senior District Judge
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Anderson v. Dillon Companies
Combined Opinion