F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUL 5 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
RONALD E. CHASTEEN,
Plaintiff,
and
PACER INDUSTRIES, INC., a
Missouri corporation; INJECTION
RESEARCH SPECIALISTS, INC., a
Colorado corporation,
No. 99-1020
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNISIA JECS CORPORATION, a
Japanese corporation; SUZUKI
MOTOR CORPORATION, a Japanese
corporation; ARCTIC CAT, INC., a
Minnesota corporation; ARCTIC CAT
SALES, INC., a Minnesota
corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 97-Z-2606)
G. Stephen Long, Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., Denver, Colorado, (Joseph
W. Halpern and Stephen G. Masciocchi, Holland & Hart, LLP, Denver, Colorado;
John H. Bernstein, Kutak, Rock, Denver, Colorado; William E. Quirk, Shughart,
Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., Kansas City, Missouri, on the briefs), for Plaintiffs-
Appellants.
Alan G. Carlson (J. Derek Vandenburgh on the brief), Merchant & Gould, P.C.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota; Roger P. Thomasch (Jon Bernhardt on the brief),
Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, Denver, Colorado; Barry L. Grossman
(Brian P. Akers on the brief), Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; (David G.
Palmer, Brian L. Duffy, Zevnik, Horton, Guibord, McGovern, Palmer & Fognani,
L.L.P., Denver, Colorado; William A. Bianco, Davis, Graham & Stubbs, L.L.P.,
Denver, Colorado, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.
Before MURPHY, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and
ROGERS, District Judge *
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, Injection Research Specialists, Inc. and Pacer Industries, Inc.
(collectively, “Injection Research”) 1 filed suit against Arctic Cat, Inc., Arctic Cat
Sales, Inc. (collectively, “Arctic Cat”), Suzuki Motor Corp. (“Suzuki”) and
*
Honorable Richard D. Rogers, Sr. District Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
1
Ronald Chasteen was also a named plaintiff in the original complaint. The
district court, however, ruled that Chasteen lacked standing to prosecute the suit.
Chasteen has not appealed that ruling.
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UNISIA JECS Corp. (“JECS”) (collectively, the “Defendants”), claiming the
Defendants committed trade secret misappropriation and fraud. Specifically,
Injection Research alleged the Defendants stole its trade secrets and used them to
develop an electronic fuel injection (“EFI”) system for two-cycle snowmobile
engines. The Defendants moved for summary judgment on both claims,
contending Injection Research filed suit after the statutes of limitations had run.
Applying a three-year statute of limitations to both the trade secrets and fraud
claims pursuant to Colorado state law, the District Court for the District of
Colorado granted the Defendants’ motion and dismissed the suit as time-barred.
Injection Research now appeals the grant of summary judgment, asserting
the following three arguments: (1) the district court erroneously concluded that
Injection Research’s misappropriation claim accrued more than three years before
it filed suit; (2) even if Injection Research filed its misappropriation claim outside
the limitations period, the Defendants’ wrongful concealment of information
equitably tolled the statute of limitations; and (3) the fraud claim should be
governed by Minnesota’s six-year statute of limitations, and thus, that claim was
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timely filed. 2 This court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
affirms.
II. BACKGROUND
With Injection Research financing, Ronald Chasteen invented a prototype
EFI system for two-cycle engines, which are used in snowmobiles and other
vehicles. The EFI system effectively replaces the carburetor in a two-cycle
engine, increasing the engine’s efficiency and allowing it to operate at an
optimum level under variable atmospheric and temperature conditions. Injection
Research obtained patents to protect numerous features of its EFI system.
In July 1987, Injection Research contacted Polaris Industries, L.P.
(“Polaris”), a major snowmobile manufacturer, in an effort to sell its EFI system
to Polaris. Over the next fifteen months, Injection Research worked with Polaris
to develop a contractual relationship, which included sharing trade secrets with
Polaris. In October 1988, Injection Research discovered that Polaris had hired
Gerhardt Maier, a former Injection Research employee who had helped develop
2
Injection Research contends Minnesota law should govern the statute of
limitations for both its fraud and misappropriation of trade secrets claims.
Because the statute of limitations for misappropriation of trade secrets is three
years under both Minnesota and Colorado law, however, Injection Research does
not challenge the district court’s choice of law ruling as it relates to the
misappropriation claim. See Minn. Stat. § 325C.06; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7-74-107.
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its EFI system, though Polaris insisted that Maier would merely assist in
cultivating Polaris’ interest in EFI and its relationship with Injection Research. In
December, however, Polaris informed Injection Research that it had decided EFI
technology was too costly and that it no longer was interested in pursuing EFI
systems for its snowmobiles. Nonetheless, one year later Polaris began marketing
and selling the industry’s first EFI-equipped snowmobiles.
When its relationship with Polaris broke down, Injection Research
contacted Arctic Cat, a major competitor of Polaris, to once again attempt to sell
its EFI system to a snowmobile manufacturer. After Arctic Cat signed a
confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement, Injection Research performed a
number of field tests for Arctic Cat to demonstrate its EFI system and sold Arctic
Cat three prototype EFI units. In the Fall of 1989, however, Arctic Cat informed
Injection Research of its intention to collaborate with Suzuki and JECS, one of
Suzuki’s vendors, to independently develop its own EFI system. In December
1991, Arctic Cat began marketing a snowmobile with an EFI system, and its
advertisements boasted that Arctic Cat and its suppliers had developed the system
on their own.
In 1990, Injection Research brought suit (the “Polaris action”) against
Polaris. Injection Research amended its complaint in late 1991 to add as
defendants Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd. (“Fuji”), Polaris’ engine supplier, and
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JECS, which manufactured the EFI system used in the Polaris/Fuji snowmobile
engines. Injection Research asserted claims for, inter alia, trade secret
misappropriation by Polaris and Fuji and patent infringement by Polaris, Fuji, and
JECS. The amended complaint alleged a “conspiratorial scheme” between
Polaris, Fuji, and JECS to manufacture “an EFI system which is saturated with
[Injection Research] . . . confidential and proprietary information.” In the Polaris
action, JECS answered Injection Research’s interrogatories, claiming it had based
the EFI system it developed for Fuji/Polaris on prior design work it had
undertaken on behalf of another company. Documents which JECS produced in
the Polaris action in 1995, however, indicated to Injection Research that JECS did
not independently develop its EFI system, but rather relied on the work done and
approach adopted by Injection Research. Ultimately, Injection Research prevailed
on its trade secret claim, though the patent infringement claims, the only claims
then made against JECS, were dismissed.
On December 12, 1997, Injection Research filed the instant suit against
Arctic Cat, Suzuki, and JECS, asserting against all the Defendants one
misappropriation of trade secrets claim and one fraud claim. The district court
granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on both claims,
concluding they were time-barred pursuant to Colorado’s three-year statute of
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limitations for both misappropriation of trade secrets and fraud. Injection
Research now appeals that ruling.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
This court reviews de novo a grant of summary judgment. See Charter
Canyon Treatment Ctr. v. Pool Co., 153 F.3d 1132, 1135 (10th Cir. 1998).
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A “material
fact” is one which could have an impact on the outcome of the lawsuit, while a
“genuine issue” of such a material fact exists if a rational jury could find in favor
of the non-moving party based on the evidence presented. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). In applying this standard, this
court views the evidence and draws reasonable inferences therefrom in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party. See Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208,
1212 (10th Cir. 1996).
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B. Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
“An action for misappropriation of a trade secret shall be brought within
three years after the misappropriation is discovered or by the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have been discovered. For the purposes of this
section, a continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim.” Col. Rev.
Stat. § 7-74-107. The statutory definition of “misappropriation” includes both
disclosure and use of a trade secret in contravention of a duty to maintain its
secrecy. See id. § 7-74-102(2)(b)(II). Injection Research filed the instant suit
against the Defendants on December 12, 1997. If, therefore, Injection Research
knew or should have discovered prior to December 12, 1994 that Arctic Cat,
Suzuki, and JECS misappropriated its trade secrets, Injection Research filed its
trade secrets misappropriation claim beyond the limitations period.
1. Was the claim filed outside the limitations period?
The Fall 1989 issue of Snowmobiler’s Race & Rally magazine contained an
article entitled “Fuel Injection Under Development at Arctic Cat.” On November
2, 1989, that article was faxed to Injection Research. Ronald Chasteen admitted
in his deposition testimony that in the article, a manager at Arctic Cat disclosed
trade secrets belonging to Injection Research in violation of Arctic Cat’s
confidentiality agreement. In November 1989, therefore, more than six years
before filing the instant lawsuit, Injection Research had actual knowledge that
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Arctic Cat had misappropriated its trade secrets by disclosing them when it had a
duty to maintain their secrecy. Even though in the instant suit Injection Research
more directly complained of Arctic Cat’s use of its trade secrets, rather than
disclosure of them, the controlling statute of limitations states, “For purposes of
this section, a continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim.” Id. at § 7-
74-107.
In interpreting an identical statute of limitations provision in California’s
version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”), the Ninth Circuit similarly
held that the statute of limitations begins to run once a plaintiff learns a
defendant improperly disclosed trade secrets, even though the defendant
subsequently may also have unlawfully used those same trade secrets. 3 See
Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1990). Furthermore,
whether Chasteen or anyone else at Injection Research understood that the
disclosures legally constituted a misappropriation of trade secrets is of no
3
In Ashton-Tate Corporation v. Ross , the Ninth Circuit was interpreting the
statute of limitations for trade secret misappropriation under California’s version
of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”). See 916 F.2d 516, 523 (9th Cir.
1990). Although in the instant case this court is operating under Colorado law,
Colorado has also adopted the UTSA and its version states, “This article shall be
applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law
with respect to the subject of this article among states enacting it.” Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 7-74-109. This court, therefore, has been encouraged by the Colorado
legislature to rely on interpretations of other states’ versions of the UTSA, such
as the decision in Ashton-Tate and others discussed infra.
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consequence, as long as Injection Research knew the facts which could give rise
to such a claim. Cf. Morris v. Geer, 720 P.2d 994, 997 (Colo. App. 1986)
(“What is critical in determining when a legal malpractice action accrues is
knowledge of the facts essential to the cause of action, not knowledge of the
legal theory upon which an action may be brought.”). Because it is undisputed
that Injection Research had actual knowledge Arctic Cat misappropriated its trade
secrets more than six years before filing the instant suit, the district court
properly ruled that Injection Research’s misappropriation claim against Arctic
Cat was filed outside the limitations period.
The disclosures in the magazine article, however, did not trigger the statute
of limitations for Injection Research’s misappropriation claim against Suzuki and
JECS. This court must therefore determine whether other facts known to
Injection Research before December 12, 1994 sufficiently placed it on notice that
Suzuki and JECS also misappropriated its trade secrets. Injection Research
contends the district court, in dismissing its trade secrets claim, incorrectly relied
on the similarity between Arctic Cat’s EFI system and that of Polaris, when the
proper focus should have been on how Arctic Cat, Suzuki, and JECS developed
its EFI system, what Injection Research knew of that development history, and
when Injection Research acquired such knowledge. Because Injection Research’s
trade secrets claim would fail if indeed the Arctic Cat EFI system was
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independently developed, as JECS and Arctic Cat purported, Injection Research
argues that the statute of limitations on the trade secrets claim did not begin to
run until it could disprove the possibility of such independent development,
which it could not do more than three years before filing the instant suit. This
court rejects that argument for two reasons: (1) Injection Research’s proposed
statute of limitations standard, which hinges on a plaintiff’s ability to
conclusively disprove the possibility of independent development, is overly
lenient; and (2) any belief which Injection Research had that the
JECS/Suzuki/Arctic Cat EFI system was independently developed was
unreasonable and thus fails to create a material issue of fact.
Injection Research cites Sokol Crystal Products, Inc. v. DSC
Communications Corporation for the proposition that mere suspicion of
misappropriation does not trigger the statute of limitations. See 15 F.3d 1427,
1430 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp.
1258, 1266 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“Intermedics I”) (“[S]uspicion and fear are not
sufficient predicates for launching a lawsuit . . . .”). In Sokol, the plaintiff never
discovered or produced evidence to directly demonstrate that the defendant used
plaintiff’s confidential information in developing a product; “[i]nstead, the jury
inferred the misuse from the fact that [the defendant] had access to this
information and from the similarity between Sokol’s and [the defendant’s]
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products.” 15 F.3d at 1429-30. The Seventh Circuit concluded, based on
Sokol’s lack of knowledge, that the statute of limitations did not begin to run
until the defendant’s product was sold on the market. See id. at 1430. Contrary
to Injection Research’s position, therefore, the lesson of Sokol is that the statute
of limitations on trade secret misappropriation claims begins to run not when a
plaintiff can positively and directly prove misappropriation rather than
independent development, but simply when the plaintiff has knowledge of
sufficient facts from which a reasonable jury could infer misappropriation.
A rule such as the one Injection Research proposes, under which a statute
of limitations only begins running when a plaintiff can unassailably establish a
legal claim for trade secret misappropriation, would effectively eviscerate the
statute of limitations in all cases in which the plaintiff never discovers “smoking
gun” evidence of misappropriation, but instead must rely on circumstantial and
inferential evidence to prove misappropriation. The District Court for the
Northern District of California recognized a further absurd consequence which
would flow from Injection Research’s proposed approach:
[U]nder plaintiff’s theory, a defendant could successfully invoke the
statute of limitations only by proving, in trial, that at an earlier time,
outside the limitations period, plaintiff would have established
liability if it had litigated the matter to judgment. Defendant, in
other words, would be required to litigate against herself the
plaintiff’s stale claim, introducing the evidence that plaintiff would
have introduced in the hypothetical earlier litigation, then
introducing the evidence that she as defendant would have
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presented, and then asking the jury to find that she (as defendant)
would have lost.
Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 634, 641 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(“Intermedics II”). In determining the timeliness of Injection Research’s filing of
its misappropriation claim against Suzuki and JECS, therefore, this court must
resolve whether the undisputed material facts demonstrate that prior to December
12, 1994 Injection Research had knowledge of sufficient facts from which a
reasonable jury could infer JECS and Suzuki had misappropriated Injection
Research trade secrets. If, however, a genuine issue of material fact exists on
this question, summary judgment must be denied.
In October and November of 1989, Injection Research learned that Arctic
Cat had decided to work with Suzuki and JECS to independently develop an EFI
system, instead of continuing its collaboration with Injection Research toward
that goal. An internal Injection Research memorandum written by Chasteen in
March of 1990 states that he then knew the EFI system JECS was developing for
Suzuki/Arctic Cat was “identical” to the one it had developed for Fuji/Polaris.
Moreover, the amended complaint which Injection Research filed in the Polaris
action in October 1991 accused JECS of involvement in a “conspiratorial
scheme” with Polaris and Fuji “to misappropriate a unique and proprietary . . .
EFI system . . . for two cycle engines developed by . . . [Injection Research] . . .
.” Thus, by late 1991, Injection Research believed JECS had participated in
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misappropriating its trade secrets to develop the Polaris/Fuji EFI system and was
presently developing an “identical” EFI system for Arctic Cat/Suzuki. From
these undisputed facts, any reasonable jury would conclude that Injection
Research knew or should have discovered over six years prior to filing the instant
suit that JECS and Suzuki had misappropriated its trade secrets. Additionally,
Injection Research actually purchased and inspected an Arctic Cat EFI-equipped
snowmobile in late 1992 or early 1993, still well over three years before filing
the instant suit, giving a jury further reason to find Injection Research either
knew or should have discovered the alleged misappropriation prior to December
12, 1994.
Injection Research argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether it knew or should have discovered the purported misappropriation,
because throughout the Polaris litigation, JECS claimed it independently
developed the EFI system for Polaris. JECS’s claim of independent development
during the Polaris action, however, fails to create a genuine issue of material fact;
no reasonable jury could find Injection Research believed such a claim, as it
would neither have filed a misappropriation of trade secrets claim against Polaris
and Fuji nor alleged that JECS was part of a conspiracy to misappropriate its
trade secrets if it in fact believed JECS’s claim. Injection Research similarly
contends Arctic Cat’s claim that it independently developed an EFI system with
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Suzuki and JECS apart from JECS’s work with Polaris and Fuji was credible,
because Injection Research spent less time with and disclosed less information to
Arctic Cat, because Arctic Cat did not market its EFI system until two years after
Polaris, and because it would be unreasonable to assume JECS would share the
proprietary information of one customer, Polaris, with its competitor, Arctic Cat.
Injection Research argues that the credibility of Arctic Cat’s independent
development claim also generates a genuine issue of material fact about whether
it knew about or should have discovered the alleged misappropriation before
December 12, 1994. Again, however, Injection Research’s contention that Arctic
Cat’s claim of independent development was credible collapses under the weight
of logic. It is irrational to believe that JECS participated in the misappropriation
of nearly thirty specific trade secrets to help design an EFI system for Polaris but
somehow developed an identical system containing the exact same trade secrets
for Suzuki and Arctic Cat without considering or utilizing the proprietary
information it gained while collaborating with Polaris. In short, if Injection
Research did in fact believe that JECS and Suzuki independently developed an
EFI system for Arctic Cat snowmobiles, such a belief was illogical and
unreasonable given the information Injection Research possessed about JECS’s
involvement with Fuji and Polaris. No reasonable jury could conclude, therefore,
that because Injection Research may have irrationally believed in the possibility
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of independent development by JECS, Suzuki, and Arctic Cat, it neither knew
about nor should have discovered the alleged misappropriation.
Finally, the instant case is distinguishable from Intermedics I, in which a
district court refused to grant the defendant summary judgment on statute of
limitations grounds because although prior to the limitations period the plaintiff
both knew the defendant possessed its trade secrets and suspected that the
defendants would use its trade secrets to develop a product, the statute did not
begin to run until certain information about the product was published indicating
the defendant had used plaintiff’s trade secrets. See Intermedics I, 775 F. Supp.
at 1265-66. As the facts outlined above demonstrate, unlike in Intermedics I,
Injection Research had good reason to know prior to the limitations period that
JECS, Suzuki, and Arctic Cat had already used its trade secrets to develop an EFI
system. Moreover, Injection Research’s situation differs from that of the plaintiff
in Intermedics I because Injection Research’s contention that it had no reason to
believe its trade secrets had been used to develop the Arctic Cat EFI system is
“inherently implausible.” Id. at 1266.
In sum, as early as October 1991, Injection Research had knowledge of
sufficient facts from which a reasonable jury could infer that JECS and Suzuki
had misappropriated Injection Research trade secrets to develop an EFI system
for use in Arctic Cat snowmobiles. The district court therefore properly ruled
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that Injection Research had filed its misappropriation of trade secrets claim
against JECS and Suzuki beyond the three-year statute of limitations. The
misappropriation claim against Arctic Cat was also filed outside the limitations
period because Injection Research had actual knowledge in November 1989 that
Arctic Cat improperly disclosed Injection Research trade secrets.
2. Was Injection Research’s misappropriation claim equitably
tolled? 4
Injection Research alternatively argues the district court erred in
dismissing the case as time-barred because genuine issues of material fact exist as
to whether the Defendants’ concealment of information equitably tolled the
statute of limitations until 1997. Specifically, Injection Research asserts that
Arctic Cat assured Injection Research it had not breached their confidentiality
agreement, that JECS continually claimed it had independently developed its EFI
system, and that JECS delayed production of documents which Injection
Research sought in the Polaris action from 1991 until 1997. Based on these
alleged acts of concealment by JECS and Arctic Cat, Injection Research argues
genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the statute of limitations for its
misappropriation claim was tolled until 1997 when it finally obtained from JECS
4
Injection Research raises an equitable tolling argument only with respect
to its misappropriation claim.
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the discovery documents indicating the JECS/Suzuki/Arctic Cat EFI system was
developed by using Injection Research trade secrets.
The Colorado Supreme Court has adopted the doctrine of equitable tolling
of the statute of limitations “where the defendant’s wrongful conduct prevented
the plaintiff from asserting his or her claims in a timely manner.” Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Hartman, 911 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Colo. 1996). Injection
Research has alleged no wrongful conduct committed by defendant Suzuki which
may have prevented Injection Research from timely filing its misappropriation
claim against Suzuki. Because “[t]he principle underlying equitable tolling [for
wrongful concealment] is that a person should not be permitted to benefit from
his or her own wrongdoing,” Injection Research’s failure to file its
misappropriation claim against Suzuki within the limitations period cannot be
saved under the doctrine of equitable tolling absent evidence that Suzuki itself
wrongly concealed information. Id. at 1096-97 (emphasis added).
As to defendant Arctic Cat, we concluded that the statute of limitations for
Injection Research’s misappropriation claim against Arctic Cat began to run
when Injection Research learned in November 1989 that Arctic Cat had disclosed
trade secrets in a magazine article in violation of a confidentiality agreement. In
support of its equitable tolling argument, Injection Research has alleged only that
Arctic Cat concealed its use of Injection Research trade secrets but not that
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Arctic Cat ever concealed its improper disclosure of those secrets. Because
Injection Research does not assert that Arctic Cat concealed the very act which
triggered the statute of limitations on the misappropriation claim against Arctic
Cat, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding equitable tolling on that
claim.
Finally, this court must determine whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists regarding JECS’s purported concealment of information. Because we
concluded that the statute of limitations began to run on Injection Research’s
misappropriation of trade secrets claim against JECS when the amended
complaint was filed in the Polaris action in October 1991, Injection Research
must produce evidence showing that JECS improperly concealed information
about the claim prior to October 1994 when the statute would have expired.
JECS’s general assertion that it independently developed an EFI system cannot
constitute the basis for equitably tolling the statute of limitations. The mere
denial of liability, which is what an assertion of independent development
amounts to in the face of a trade secret misappropriation claim, is not “wrongful
conduct” which implicates the doctrine of equitable tolling. Id. at 1096. To hold
otherwise would place defendants in the untenable position of either admitting
liability or foregoing a statute of limitations defense.
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However, JECS’s failure to produce documents regarding the development
history of its EFI system, which Injection Research sought to discover in the
Polaris litigation, could potentially require the equitable tolling of the limitations
period. “Equity will toll a statute of limitations if a party fails to disclose
information that he is legally required to reveal and the other party is prejudiced
thereby.” Garrett v. Arrowhead Improvement Ass’n, 826 P.2d 850, 855 (Colo.
1992) (emphasis added). Unfortunately, Injection Research has failed to include
in the record on appeal evidence from which this court can determine that, prior
to September 1995, when the district court actually ordered JECS’s compliance
with Injection Research discovery requests, JECS had a legal duty to supply the
discovery documents. Aside from its own discovery request and the documents
ultimately produced, Injection Research has not included in the appellate record
any of the motions filed by the parties in the Polaris action or stays issued by the
court between 1991 and September 1995 or even the September 1995 order to
compel itself. Without knowing what the parties’ motions entailed and their
effect on pending discovery requests or the nature of the district court’s stays,
this court has no way to ascertain whether JECS was under a legal obligation to
produce the documents before the September 1995 order. 5 “If the appellant
5
As mentioned above, the Colorado Supreme Court stated in Garrett v.
Arrowhead Improvement Association that “[e]quity will toll a statute of
limitations if a party fails to disclose information that he is legally required to
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intends to urge on appeal a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence
or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant must include in the record a
transcript of all evidence relevant to that finding or conclusion.” Fed. R. App. P.
10(b)(2); see also 10th Cir. R. 30.1(A)(1) (“The appellant must file an appendix
sufficient for considering and deciding the issues on appeal.”) Because Injection
Research has failed to provide this court with a sufficient record to determine the
appropriateness of summary judgment on the issue of whether, prior to October
1994, JECS withheld discovery documents which it was legally required to
produce, we cannot employ the doctrine of equitable tolling to disturb the district
court’s judgment that Injection Research’s misappropriation of trade secrets
claim against JECS was time-barred. See Tilton v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 115
F.3d 1471, 1474 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that if “the appellant’s appendix is
insufficient to permit assessment of [a] claim of error, we must affirm”). We
reveal and the other party is prejudiced thereby.” 826 P.2d 850, 855 (Colo. 1992)
(emphasis added). In First Interstate Bank v. Piper Aircraft Corporation,
however, the Colorado Supreme Court established a slightly different standard for
equitably tolling a statute of limitations because of a defendant’s fraudulent
concealment. See 744 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Colo. 1987). The First Interstate test
requires a plaintiff to show, inter alia, “the concealment of a material existing
fact that in equity and good conscience should be disclosed.” Id. (emphasis
added). Even if this court attempted to apply the slightly more lenient disclosure
standard of First Interstate, the appellate record would still be insufficient for our
task, because without a clearer understanding of the proceedings in the Polaris
action, this court cannot decide whether JECS should have produced the discovery
documents “in equity and good conscience.”
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therefore conclude the district court properly dismissed Injection Research’s
misappropriation claim against the Defendants for its failure to file the claim
within the three-year statute of limitations period.
C. Fraud
Injection Research contends that the district court erroneously applied
Colorado’s three-year statute of limitations to its fraud claim, when Minnesota’s
six year limitation period should govern. Because we concluded that Injection
Research’s misappropriation of trade secrets claim against all three defendants
accrued more than six years before it filed suit and because Injection Research
bases its fraud claim on the same conduct as it does its misappropriation claim,
the district court’s choice of law on the proper statute of limitations for fraud is
irrelevant. Injection Research’s fraud claim was filed outside the limitations
period established in either Minnesota or Colorado.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court concludes the district court properly
ruled Injection Research’s claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and fraud
against all the Defendants were filed after the statutes of limitations had expired.
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Therefore, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court for the District
of Colorado.
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