F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 14 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 99-2354
v. (D.C. No. CR-98-934-JC)
(New Mexico)
LEONARD BARNARD YAZZIE,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Leonard Bernard Yazzie appeals his convictions for aggravated sexual
abuse of a child under the age of twelve in Indian Country in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2241(c), and 2246(2)(D), and abusive sexual contact with a child
in Indian Country in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2244(a)(1), and 2246(3). We
affirm.
Mr. Yazzie claims there was insufficient evidence at trial to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed these crimes on the dates alleged in
the indictment. Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law which we review
de novo. See United States v. Barajas-Chavez, 162 F.3d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir.
1999) (en banc). When undertaking our review, we look to the evidence, “both
direct and circumstantial, together with all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, to determine whether a reasonable jury could find
the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” See United States
v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1140 (10th Cir. 1999). Where a defendant challenges
the government’s proof as to when an offense occurred and the time is not an
element of the offense, “there must be some evidence which tends to show that
the defendant committed the charged offense on ‘a date reasonably near to the
specified date’ alleged in the indictment.” United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d
1251, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 885
(1998)), cert. denied 120 S. Ct. 1272 (2000).
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The indictment alleged that Mr. Yazzie committed these crimes against the
child victim “[o]n or about June and July 1997.” Rec., vol. I, Indictment. The
child victim testified at trial that although he could not remember how many years
ago the incidents took place or how old he was at the time, he did recall that it
was sometime close to his birthday in July, see Rec., vol. V, Tr. at 35-36; vol. IV,
Tr. at 269, and repeatedly testified it occurred while they were herding sheep
together near the San Juan River in Fruitland, New Mexico, see id., vol. V, Tr. at
31, 33, 51, 54-56, 60, 69. Mr. Yazzie himself testified that he herded sheep with
the child victim near the San Juan River in Fruitland sometime in May or June,
1997. See id. at 230-31 (testifying he took the boys to herd sheep down near the
river while living in Fruitland), and 245 (testifying he lived in Fruitland for thirty
days beginning in April or May, 1997). This evidence together is sufficient to
show that the crimes John Doe testified to occurred reasonably near June and
July, 1997, the alleged dates set forth in the indictment. See Charley, 189 F.3d at
1272 (proof sufficient where prosecution proves offense committed within a few
weeks of the date alleged in indictment); Castillo, 140 F.3d at 885 (where
indictment alleged crimes occurred on or about June and July of 1994, testimony
that crime occurred during summer of 1994 held sufficient).
We reject Mr. Yazzie’s argument that the evidence was insufficient simply
because John Doe could not testify to the exact month and year these events took
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place. Dr. Dave Sprenger, an expert in child psychiatry, testified that children are
less able than adults to give a temporal sequence, that is, put things on a time
line. See Rec., vol.V, Tr. at 105. The child victim was able to relate a location
and event corresponding to the crime, and Mr. Yazzie’s own testimony linked that
location and event to sometime in May or June, 1997, a time reasonably near
those dates set forth in the indictment. See, e.g., Charley, 189 F.3d at 1273
(suggesting evidence sufficient where child can specifically recall an event or
incident indexed to the specific time).
Mr. Yazzie also contends the district court abused its discretion in
summarily denying his request for funds under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 18
U.S.C. § 3006A. Prior to trial, Mr. Yazzie filed a sealed ex parte motion
requesting funds for the services of a polygraph examiner. See Rec., Doc. 13. In
this motion, which did not include an attached legal brief, Mr. Yazzie’s counsel
summarily requested such funds “in order to provide Defendant Yazzie timely,
effective assistance of counsel,” see id. at ¶2, relying on no more than his
“belie[f] that this request is reasonably necessary to provide effective assistance,”
see id. at ¶3.
We review a district court’s refusal to authorize funds under the CJA for an
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Kennedy, 64 F.3d 1465, 1470 (10th Cir.
1995). “In order to obtain services under [the CJA], the defendant must do more
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than allege that the services would be helpful. The defendant bears the burden of
showing that the requested services are ‘necessary’ to present an adequate
defense.” Id. Although Mr. Yazzie presents strenuous and lengthy arguments on
appeal regarding his need for the polygraph examiner due to the credibility issue
decisive at trial and the asserted admissibility of a polygraph examiner’s
testimony, none of these arguments were presented to the district court in support
of this request. As we stated in Kennedy, it is insufficient for a defendant to
generally allege that services are necessary without specifically showing why the
services are necessary or what the defendant expects to find through the use of
such services. See id. (citing United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904, 908 (10th
Cir. 1974)). For this reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Mr. Yazzie’s conclusory motion.
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Chief Judge
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