F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 14 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ORLANDO DUDLEY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
No. 00-3088
v. (D.C. No. 98-CV-3132)
(Kansas)
STATE OF KANSAS,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Orlando Dudley appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas
corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and seeks a certificate of appealabilty.
We deny his request for the certificate and dismiss his appeal.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
In 1995 Mr. Dudley pled guilty in state court to involuntary manslaughter
and battery of a law enforcement officer. He subsequently brought numerous
claims for post-conviction relief in state courts, which were all denied primarily
on state procedural grounds. His appeals were either dismissed or voluntarily
withdrawn. ** He also went through approximately four public defenders, at least
three of whom he apparently fired.
Mr. Dudley eventually filed this action seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The
district court determined the petition was subject to dismissal based on Mr.
Dudley’s procedural default in the state courts, and ordered Mr. Dudley to show
cause why his petition should not be dismissed. In response, Mr. Dudley did not
dispute his procedural default in state court, but sought to overcome it by
claiming the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception to the operation of
the procedural bar, contending he is factually innocent of the crimes. See
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986). The district court denied the
**
The state claims and their dispositions, as set forth in Mr. Dudley’s brief,
are as follows. On April 1, 1996, he filed an application for state post-conviction
relief that was denied as conclusory. He appealed claiming ineffective assistance
of habeas counsel and the appeal was denied. On May 15, 1997, he filed a second
state habeas petition that was denied as successive. He filed an appeal but
voluntarily withdrew it. On January 6, 1998, he filed a third state habeas petition
claiming ineffective assistance of habeas counsel that was denied as successive.
His appeal was again voluntarily withdrawn. On April 4, 1998, he filed a fourth
state habeas petition directly with the state court of appeals that was denied as
successive.
-2-
petition unpon concluding that Mr. Dudley’s response contained neither a
colorable showing of factual innocence, nor sufficient cause and prejudice to
excuse his procedural defaults.
On appeal, Mr. Dudley again asserts his factual innocence. He claims that
witnesses, arresting officers, and investigators all lied to implicate him in the
crimes. He also contends that statements he made during his guilty plea and/or
presentence investigation regarding the motive for and circumstances of the
homicide were made “in jest”. Finally, Mr. Dudley requests DNA testing and
other physical evidence, speculating that it will prove his innocence.
The district court declined to grant Mr. Dudley a certificate of appealability
and Mr. Dudley renews his application for a certificate before this court. Because
this appeal was initiated in March of 2000, the right to appeal is “governed by the
certificate of appealability (COA) requirements now found at 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c).” Slack v. McDaniel, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1600 (2000). When, as here,
the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds
without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a
COA should issue (and an appeal of the district court’s order may be
taken) if the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find
it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of
a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.
Id. at 1600-01. The Court held that both showings must be made, id. at 1604, and
that a court may dispose of an application for habeas relief by resolving “the issue
-3-
whose answer is more apparent from the record and arguments,” id. Courts are
allowed and encouraged to resolve procedural issues first. Id. Accordingly, we
turn to the propriety of the district court’s ruling that Mr. Dudley’s claims are
barred by his failure to show either cause and prejudice for his procedural
defaults in state court or factual innocence.
Mr. Dudley has not disputed his procedural default, either in district court
or on appeal. His showing of factual innocence consists of numerous conclusory
statements to the effect that all relevant evidence was withheld, all witnesses
lied, he was prepared to give exculpatory testimony, and his various attorneys
betrayed him. Given Mr. Dudley’s guilty plea, these sweeping, conclusory, and
self-serving arguments do not establish a colorable claim of factual innocence.
The district court’s dismissal on procedural grounds is thus neither debatable nor
incorrect.
Accordingly, Mr. Dudley’s request for a certificate of appealability is
DENIED, and his appeal is DISMISSED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Chief Judge
-4-