F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 19 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TYRONE LESLIE FARRIS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 00-6034
DAYTON J. POPPELL, Warden, (D.C. CV-99-0654-L)
Lawton Correctional Facility; JAMES (W. D. Okla.)
SAFFLE, Director of Department of
Corrections of the State of Oklahoma;
FRANK KEATING, Governor of the
State of Oklahoma,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK, HENRY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Tyrone L. Farris seeks to appeal the district court’s order
dismissing his claims regarding the conditions of his confinement without
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
prejudice to the filing of an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, dismissing as
frivolous his claims to the extent they are based on 18 U.S.C. § 242, and
dismissing as untimely his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below, we deny Mr. Farris’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis and his application for a certificate of appealability and
dismiss this appeal. 1
In August 1986, Mr. Farris was convicted of first degree rape in the District
Court for Comanche County, Oklahoma. In August 1988, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction.
On May 14, 1999, Mr. Farris filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, alleging that the respondents had conspired to deprive him of the benefits
of Oklahoma’s Truth in Sentencing Act, 1997 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 133. Mr.
Farris also maintained that he was incarcerated in overcrowded conditions and
had been provided with inadequate medical care. In his petition, Mr. Farris cited
18 U.S.C. § 242 (along with 28 U.S.C. § 2254) as a basis for relief. In his prayer
for relief, he sought immediate release from custody. See Rec. doc. 1 at 24-25.
The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge. Noting that 18
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
2
U.S.C. § 242 provides for criminal sanctions for civil rights violations but does
not establish a private right of action, the magistrate judge recommended
dismissal of Mr. Farris’s allegations as frivolous to the extent that they were
based on 18 U.S.C. § 242. He further concluded that Mr. Farris’s allegations as
to conditions of confinement should be dismissed without prejudice to the filing
of an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Additionally, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal of Mr. Farris’s
challenges to his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on the grounds that they
were time-barred. He reasoned that the provisions of Oklahoma’s Truth in
Sentencing Act invoked by Mr. Farris went into effect on July 1, 1997.
Accordingly, “the factual predicate for the Petitioner’s claims became available,
at the latest, on that date.” Rec. doc. 16, at 6 (Report and Recommendation, filed
July 12, 1999). Section 101 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) provides that petitions for a writ of habeas corpus must be filed within
one year of certain dates, including “the date on which the factual predicate of the
claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Because Mr. Farris filed his petition more
than one year after July 1, 1997, the magistrate judge concluded that it was
untimely.
Finally, the magistrate judge rejected Mr. Farris’s argument for equitable
3
tolling. He observed that Mr. Farris had failed to set forth specific allegations to
support his broad assertion that “officials adopted a plan to keep the prisoners and
the public from learning of the passage of [The Truth in Sentencing] Act.” Rec.
doc. 16 at 6.
In his submissions to this court, Mr. Farris does not address the
magistrate’s application of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. The magistrate’s
reasoning, adopted by the district court, is sound, and we are persuaded by it.
Accordingly, for substantially the same reasons as set forth in the magistrate’s
report and recommendation, we conclude that Mr. Farris’s challenges to the
calculation of his sentence are time-barred and that the district court properly
dismissed Mr. Farris’s claims as frivolous to the extent that they were based on 18
U.S.C. § 242. Further, the district court properly dismissed Mr. Farris’s claims
regarding the conditions of confinement without prejudice to the filing of an
action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
We therefore DENY Mr. Farris’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and
we DENY Mr. Farris’s application for a certificate of appealability. We
4
DISMISS this appeal.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
United States Circuit Judge
5