F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
AUG 7 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
DAVID C. MUNOZ, M.D.
Plaintiff-Appellant-
Cross-Appellee,
v. Nos. 99-1377 & 99-1391
ST. MARY-CORWIN HOSPITAL;
ST. MARY-CORWIN REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER OF PUEBLO,
COLORADO, a Colorado nonprofit
corporation; SISTERS OF CHARITY
HEALTH SERVICES COLORADO,
a Colorado corporation; CENTURA
HEALTH CORPORATION,
a Colorado corporation,
Defendants-Appellees-
Cross-Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 96-WM-2346)
Submitted on the briefs:
Diane MacArthur Brown of Olsen & Brown, L.L.C., Niwot, Colorado,
for Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
Glenn H. Schlabs and William L. Sasz of Sherman & Howard, L.L.C.,
Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants.
Before TACHA , PORFILIO , and EBEL , Circuit Judges.
TACHA , Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff David C. Munoz, M.D., appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to St. Mary-Corwin Hospital, St. Mary-Corwin Regional
Medical Center of Pueblo, Colorado, Sisters of Charity Health Services Colorado,
and Centura Health Corporation (defendants) on his complaint alleging that
defendants illegally discriminated against him on the basis of his age and national
origin. Plaintiff brought his federal claims under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. Plaintiff also asserted state law
claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. In a cross-appeal,
defendants challenge the district court’s denial of their request for an award of
costs. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment on behalf of defendants and reverse
and remand as to defendants’ appeal of the court’s denial of costs. 1
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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I. Background
In the summer of 1994, plaintiff entered a three-year residency program at
St. Mary-Corwin Hospital in Pueblo, Colorado, under the direction of Dr. Charles
Raye. Residents in the program received quarterly performance evaluations from
the faculty. Upon starting the program, plaintiff signed an employment agreement
setting out the obligations and expectations of the residents and the hospital. The
agreement provided that a resident could only be terminated for cause, and set out
a grievance process whereby a resident subjected to an adverse employment
action would receive written notice of the action and a right to appeal the action
to the Graduate Medical Education Committee (the Committee). Any appeal of an
adverse employment action was to be conducted according to the program’s due
process policy which provided for a hearing at which the resident could present
information relevant to the appeal. The resident was to receive a written decision.
Plaintiff claims that soon after he started the residency program, Dr. Raye
targeted him for criticism. Following plaintiff’s first evaluation, considered
good, although it expressed concern with plaintiff’s failure to thoroughly check
out every patient and his performance of procedures without required supervision,
Dr. Raye began to closely supervise plaintiff’s performance. In November 1994,
plaintiff performed a circumcision without faculty supervision. The procedure
was not done correctly and a urologist was required to correct the circumcision.
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Plaintiff was directed not to perform any more unsupervised procedures. Later
that day, plaintiff violated this directive and was observed doing another
unsupervised circumcision.
On February 22, 1995, plaintiff was placed on probation. He did not avail
himself of the program’s grievance process regarding the warning for performing
unsupervised procedures or the probation action. Plaintiff was ultimately
terminated from the program on April 10, 1995. In Dr. Raye’s memorandum to
plaintiff’s file regarding termination, he detailed numerous other infractions of
the rules regarding patient care by plaintiff. See Appellant’s App. Vol. III
at 611-12. Plaintiff grieved his termination and was present at a hearing before
the Committee. The Committee upheld plaintiff’s termination.
Because some faculty members expressed concern that plaintiff’s trouble
with the program may have been caused by psychological problems, the
committee agreed to meet to reconsider plaintiff’s termination based on the
outcome of a voluntary psychiatric evaluation. Plaintiff was told that he may or
may not be included in this second meeting. Following consideration of the
plaintiff’s psychiatric evaluation, the committee met without plaintiff in
attendance and affirmed its decision to terminate him from the residency program.
Plaintiff appealed the Committee’s termination decision to the hospital’s
acting CEO, Dr. William Turman. Following a meeting with plaintiff and
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consideration of all the information he had been given regarding plaintiff’s
performance in the program, Dr. Turman denied plaintiff’s appeal, finding that it
would be “inappropriate for [plaintiff] to continue in the Residency.” Id. at 667.
Plaintiff brought this action in federal court alleging that his termination
was based on age and national origin discrimination. Plaintiff also asserted state
law claims for breach of contract, alleging that his termination was without cause
and violated due process--and promissory estoppel, claiming he reasonably relied
on defendants’ affirmative action policy. The district court granted defendants’
motion for summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the district court erred in (1) granting
defendants summary judgment on his breach of contract and estoppel claims;
(2) granting defendants summary judgment on his claims of age and national
origin discrimination; (3) striking plaintiff’s expert rebuttal witness; and
(4) denying plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery. We will address each of
these in turn.
II. Discussion - No. 99-1377
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard as the court below. Bullington v. United Air
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Lines, Inc. , 186 F.3d 1301, 1313 (10th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is
appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In applying this standard,
we examine the factual record and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bullington , 186 F.3d at 1313.
As the moving parties, defendants shoulder “the initial burden to show that there
is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Thomas v.
IBM , 48 F.3d 478, 484 (10th Cir. 1995) (further quotation omitted). If defendants
meet this burden, it falls to plaintiff to “identify specific facts that show the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. “The party opposing the
motion must present sufficient evidence in specific, factual form for a jury to
return a verdict in that party’s favor.” Id. (further quotation omitted).
B. Breach of Contract and Promissory Estoppel Claims
Plaintiff asserted state law breach of contract claims alleging defendants
breached the provisions of the employment agreement. Applying Colorado law,
we have held that an employer’s personnel policies and procedures can form an
implied contract. See Bullington , 186 F.3d at 1322. Policies and procedures that
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“are nothing more than ‘vague assurances’ by the employer will not suffice.” Id.
(quoting Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp ., 29 F.3d 1460, 1465 (10th Cir. 1999)).
Plaintiff also asserted a claim of promissory estoppel premised on his
alleged reliance on defendants’ affirmative action policy. In order to sustain
a claim under the theory of promissory estoppel, plaintiff “must demonstrate that
the employer should have reasonably expected the employee to consider the
policy as a commitment from the employer, that the employee reasonably relied
on the statements to [his] detriment, and that injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the policy.” Id.
In rejecting these claims, the district court provided a thorough analysis of
the facts and the law. In plaintiff’s sixty-three page appellate brief, he devotes
only one short page to these issues and does not point this court to any error in the
district court’s analysis or conclusions. 2
This court is “not required to
manufacture a party’s argument on appeal when it has failed in its burden to draw
our attention to the error below.” National Commodity & Barter Ass’n Nat’l
Commodity Exch. v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 1989); see also
2
In their appellate brief, defendants assert that “[t]here is no ‘affirmative
action program’ applicable to the residency program, and it had none when
Dr. Munoz was a resident.” Appellees’ Br. at 6. Plaintiff does not rebut this
factual assertion on appeal. Moreover, plaintiff’s entire argument to this court
on the estoppel issue states: “Even were there no contractual documents in
this case, the promissory elements of estoppel were present in abundance.”
Appellant’s Br. at 63.
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Murrell v. Shalala , 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that
perfunctory complaints which fail to frame and develop an issue are insufficient
to invoke appellate review). Therefore, we affirm the district court on plaintiff’s
breach of contract and promissory estoppel issues for substantially the reasons
stated in its August 4, 1999 order.
C. ADEA and Title VII Claims
This court analyzes ADEA claims under the three-step framework set forth
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). See Bolton
v. Scrivner, Inc. , 36 F.3d 939, 944 (10th Cir. 1994); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc. , No. 99-536, 2000 WL 743663, at *5 (U.S. June 12, 2000)
(assuming, without deciding, that McDonnell Douglas framework is applicable to
ADEA cases). In the very recent case of Perry v. Woodward , 199 F.3d 1126
(10th Cir. 1999), we stated:
A plaintiff relying on McDonnell Douglas bears the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence.
One way a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of wrongful
termination is by showing that: (1) []he belongs to a protected class;
(2) []he was qualified for [his] job; (3) despite [his] qualifications,
[]he was discharged; and (4) the job was not eliminated after [his]
discharge. If the plaintiff establishes [his] prima facie case, a
rebuttable presumption arises that the defendants unlawfully
discriminated against [him]. The defendants must then articulate
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action suffered by the plaintiff. If the defendant is able to articulate
a valid reason, the plaintiff can avoid summary judgment only if []he
is able to show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to
whether the defendant’s articulated reason was pretextual.
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Id. at 1135 (citations omitted). 3
The Perry court further stated that “the fourth
test of the prima facie case is met if the discharged plaintiff can show that
someone was hired to replace [him]” and plaintiff is not required to prove that the
person hired to replace him belonged to the protected group. Id. at 1138.
Applying O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. , 517 U.S. 308
(1996), the district court concluded that plaintiff had not established the fourth
element of his prima facie case. 4
Here, plaintiff was terminated at age forty-three.
He was replaced by a resident who was age forty-one. Thus, both were forty or
older and members of the protected class. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (ADEA
protection is afforded to those “individuals who are at least 40 years of age”). In
3
In its summary judgment order, the district court applied the prima facie
case test articulated by this court in Sanchez v. Denver Public Schools , 164 F.3d
527, 531 (10th Cir. 1998), stating in order to establish the fourth element, a
plaintiff must show that “(4) [he] was treated less favorably than others not in the
protected class.” We recognize that this element was modified by this court’s
decision in Perry and that no panel of this court has addressed the question of
whether the Perry test applies to ADEA claims. Because plaintiff here cannot
establish a prima facie case under either test, we do not, at this time, address the
applicability of Perry to ADEA cases.
4
We recognize that although the district court granted defendants summary
judgment on plaintiff’s ADEA claim based on plaintiff’s failure to establish a
prima facie case, the district court proceeded to address pretext in relation to
plaintiff’s ADEA claim in conjunction with its discussion of pretext in relation to
plaintiff’s Title VII claim. While we affirm the district court’s decision on the
basis of plaintiff’s failure to establish a prima facie case, we note that our
subsequent discussion of pretext in relation to plaintiff’s Title VII claim is
applicable to his ADEA claim as well.
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O’Connor , the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff does not have to prove that he
was replaced by someone outside the protected class to establish the fourth
element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. See id. at 312 (“The fact
that one person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the
protected class is . . . irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age.”).
The Court held that a prima facie case of age discrimination “requires ‘evidence
adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a[n]
[illegal] discriminatory criterion,’” id. (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters.
v. United States , 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977)), and this inference of age
discrimination “cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another
worker insignificantly younger” id. at 313. Here, we agree with the district court
that because plaintiff’s replacement was only two years his junior--an obviously
insignificant difference--the necessary inference of discrimination was precluded,
and he failed to establish his prima facie case. See Perry, 199 F.3d at 1136 (“It is
undeniable that the Court in O’Connor reiterated that there must be a logical
connection between each element of the prima facie case and the inference of
discrimination.”).
Finally, plaintiff claims that defendants discriminated against him on the
basis of national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Plaintiff contended that the heightened scrutiny and increased restrictions placed
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on his work and performance were evidence of pretext. Moreover, he contended
that other residents with similar or worse infractions of the rules were not
subjected to heightened scrutiny. Specifically, plaintiff claims that “numerous
non-Hispanic and younger comparators who committed comparable alleged
misdeeds and were in identical or comparable circumstances . . . were not fired,
disciplined or treated the same as plaintiff.” Appellant’s Br. at 58.
A plaintiff alleging violations of Title VII must present either direct or
indirect evidence sufficient to show intentional discrimination. See Shorter v.
ICG Holdings, Inc. , 188 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999). Here, it appears that
plaintiff is attempting to assert a disparate treatment claim. “Because disparate
treatment is a form of intentional discrimination, the plaintiff must prove that
[his] employer acted with a discriminatory intent or motive.” Bullington ,
186 F.3d at 1315. The same prima facie elements reiterated above apply to
plaintiff’s national origin discrimination claim. See Perry , 199 F.3d at 1135.
Because the district court assumed that plaintiff established a prima facie case
of national origin discrimination and applied the burden shifting analysis of
McDonnell Douglas , we do likewise.
Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the
defendants must offer legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for their adverse
employment decision. See Bullington , 186 F.3d at 1316. Plaintiff then bears the
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ultimate burden of establishing that defendants’ proffered reasons are pretext for
national origin discrimination. Id. Plaintiff must demonstrate pretext by
establishing “either that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or . . . that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.” Id. at 1317 (further quotation omitted) (alteration in original).
The Supreme Court has recently held that a prima facie case of
discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence of pretext, is sufficient as
a matter of law to show intentional discrimination. See Reeves , 2000 WL 743663,
at *9. “Pretext can be shown by such weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered
legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find
them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the
asserted non-discriminatory reasons.” Hardy v. S.F. Phosphates Ltd. , 185 F.3d
1076, 1080 (10th Cir. 1999) (further quotation omitted).
In their brief supporting their motion for summary judgment, defendants
stated that plaintiff was terminated from the residency program for performing
unsupervised procedures, failing to adhere to supervisory directives, failing to
respond to faculty, failing to address the complaints of an emergency room
patient, treating an emergency room patient in a manner that caused the patient to
leave the hospital, failing to follow instructions regarding contacting a surgeon
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about a patient, and planning an improper treatment program for a patient.
Dr. Raye determined that these incidents indicated poor judgment on plaintiff’s
part. 5 The district court concluded that these constituted legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for plaintiff’s termination from the residency program.
The burden of persuasion then shifted back to plaintiff to show that
defendants’ claimed reasons for terminating him were pretextual, that is,
“unworthy of credence.” Bullington , 186 F.3d at 1317 (further quotation omitted).
Although plaintiff cites us to the seemingly inexhaustible litany of “undisputed
facts” listed in his response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment and his
appellate brief, he fails to support his allegations of pretext with any specific
facts or empirical evidence other than his general statements that other residents
were treated more favorably. 6
He has not only failed to prove that he was treated
5
The record indicates that several of these incidents formed the basis for the
Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners’ action in placing plaintiff’s license
on five-years probation. In the probation agreement, plaintiff admitted that he
performed an unsupervised circumcision which required further corrective surgery
and that he discharged a patient without needed oxygen. See Appellant’s App.
Vol. III at 622. He also admitted that these incidents “establish[] that [plaintiff]
has engaged in unprofessional conduct.” Id.
6
In response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, plaintiff
submitted more than one thousand “Undisputed Facts in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.” See Appellant’s App. Vol. III,
at 750-913. Both in the district court and on appeal, plaintiff cites to large
numbers of these “undisputed facts” to support his allegations. The district court
refused to sift through these facts in order to determine which, if any, may
contradict defendants’ proffered reasons. On appeal, plaintiff submitted over
(continued...)
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less favorably than other residents because of his national origin, he has failed to
prove that defendants acted with discriminatory intent or motive. See id. at 1315.
Moreover, he offers no evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, indicating that there
was any nexus between defendants’ decision to terminate his residency and his
Hispanic origin. See Shorter , 188 F.3d at 1210 (holding that plaintiff must
establish nexus between discriminatory intent and discharge determination).
In conclusion, we agree with the district court that plaintiff has not presented
sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the
defendants’ proffered reasons are pretext for national origin discrimination.
See Bullington , 186 F.3d at 1316. Therefore, summary judgment for defendants
was appropriate. See Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass’n , 14 F.3d 526, 530
(10th Cir. 1994) (“Even though all doubts must be resolved in [plaintiff’s] favor,
allegations alone will not defeat summary judgment.”).
D. Striking Plaintiff’s Rebuttal Witness
6
(...continued)
2000 pages of appendix. In his brief, he cites to depositions and exhibits without
providing this court with any indication of where in this voluminous record we
may be able to find these documents. Therefore, we also decline to “search the
record in an effort to determine whether there exists dormant evidence which
might require submission of the case to a jury.” Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. , 968 F.2d 1022, 1025 (10th Cir. 1992); see also SIL-FLO, Inc. v.
SFHC, Inc. , 917 F.2d 1507, 1513-14 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that not only will
the court not sift through the record to find support for an argument, the court
will not manufacture arguments for the party).
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Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in granting defendants’ motion
to strike the rebuttal opinion of his expert witness, Robert Jeffrey, Jr. “This court
reviews for an abuse of discretion a district court’s refusal to allow rebuttal
testimony.” Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc. , 203 F.3d 1202, 1224 (10th Cir. 2000),
petition for cert. filed (U.S. July 3, 2000) (No. 00-28). The court’s decisions
regarding the presentation of evidence will not be disturbed absent a showing of
manifest injustice to the parties. See Camcoa, Inc. v. NEC Tels., Inc. , 931 F.2d
655, 663 (10th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff designated Mr. Jeffrey’s opinion to rebut the opinion of
defendants’ expert witness, Dr. Wilson D. Pace. Defendants moved to strike.
In an order granting defendants’ motion, the magistrate judge concluded that
Mr. Jeffrey’s opinion did not rebut that of Dr. Pace. Plaintiff filed a lengthy
opposition to the magistrate judge’s order in the form of an appeal to the district
court. The district court overruled plaintiff’s objections.
Dr. Pace rendered an opinion on the standards and procedures applicable to
intern physicians in the area of plaintiff’s residency and family practice. He also
reviewed plaintiff’s performance during his time in the residency program and
rendered the opinion that the process leading to plaintiff’s termination comported
with the due process contained in the residency manual. Mr. Jeffrey, on the other
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hand, rendered his opinion in the areas of fundamentally fair personnel
procedures and due process and discrimination in employment.
On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the district court erred in finding that
Mr. Jeffrey’s opinion did not rebut that of Dr. Pace. He claims that the court
“somehow overlooked the actual contents of plaintiff expert’s opinion and failed
to detect the abundant, lengthy and precise analysis vis-a-vis the residency
program’s written due process procedures and documents.” Appellant’s Br. at 66.
Once again, plaintiff’s argument is woefully lacking in support. He does not
point this court to the record evidence of Dr. Pace’s opinion allegedly rebutted by
Mr. Jeffrey’s opinion. Instead, he points us to statements in Mr. Jeffrey’s opinion
where he opines that the procedures afforded plaintiff before his termination
violated Mr. Jeffrey’s own perception of due process and fundamental fairness.
It appears, as the district court found, that Mr. Jeffrey’s opinion concerned
his view of due process and fundamental fairness in the workplace and his
opinion of what constitutes discrimination. Our reading does not indicate that he,
in any way, offered rebuttal testimony to the opinion of Dr. Pace, and therefore
we cannot determine that the district court’s order striking Mr. Jeffrey’s opinion
was an abuse of the court’s discretion.
E. Discovery Claim
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Lastly, plaintiff claims that the district court erred in denying his motion
to compel. Plaintiff filed a order to compel responses to Nos. 5-8 in his first
request for production of documents, and Nos. 1-3, 5, 13-16, and 18-21 in his
second request for production of documents and interrogatories. The magistrate
judge found that because plaintiff’s discovery requests were not in compliance
with the court’s scheduling order, plaintiff was not entitled to a second set of
written discovery and therefore, the court would only consider plaintiff’s motion
to compel as to Nos. 5-8 of his first request for production of documents.
The magistrate judge accepted as sufficient defendants’ response that they
had fully complied with Nos. 5 and 6. 7
In No. 7, plaintiff requested extensive
information regarding negative intern performance over a five year period.
Although defendants asserted that this request was overly broad, they responded
that they had provided copies of all disciplinary action and performance
evaluations within the five-year time frame. Defendants also found plaintiff’s
request No. 8 for personnel files for every intern placed on or considered for
probation or terminated during the same five-year period to be equally overly
7
Following consideration of plaintiff’s objections to the magistrate judge’s
order, the district court overruled the magistrate judge’s determination that
compliance with Nos. 5 and 6 was sufficient. In so doing the court ordered
defendants to produce any documents withheld from their responses to
interrogatories Nos. 5 and 6. See Appellant’s App. Vol. I at 223. The record
does not indicate that plaintiff renewed his motion to compel as to these requests.
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broad. They did provide copies of the disciplinary actions from the requested
files. The magistrate judge found defendants’ compliance to be sufficient, and
following consideration of plaintiff’s objections, the district court sustained the
order. We review the district court’s discovery order for abuse of discretion.
Gomez v. Martin Marietta Corp ., 50 F.3d 1511, 1520 (10th Cir. 1995).
On appeal, plaintiff contends that certain notes evincing occasions when
a resident was criticized were not produced. Without any specificity or statement
of relevance, plaintiff asserts that files and documents relating to “ other
residents” were “intentionally withheld.” Appellant’s Br. at 60 (emphasis in
original). We have held that “an employer’s general practices are relevant even
when a plaintiff is asserting an individual claim for disparate treatment.” Gomez ,
50 F.3d at 1520. This grant is not, however, without limits, and the district court
“is given wide discretion in balancing the needs and rights of both plaintiff and
defendants.” Id. (quotation omitted).
When, as is apparent here, a plaintiff brings an initial action without any
factual basis evincing specific misconduct by the defendants and then bases
extensive discovery requests upon conclusory allegations in the hope of finding
the necessary evidence of misconduct, that plaintiff abuses the judicial process.
Therefore, the magistrate judge appropriately recognized that defendants’
compliance was sufficient and the likely benefit of any further attempted fishing
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expedition would be negligible. See, e.g., Jarvis v. Nobel/Sysco Food Servs. Co. ,
985 F.2d 1419, 1423 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993).
In discovery matters, we believe the district court is in the best position to
weigh the variables and determine the appropriate limits. Cf. Moothart v. Bell ,
21 F.3d 1499, 1504 (10th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the abuse of discretion
standard is appropriate in reviewing a trial court’s evidentiary rulings because the
trial court has the firsthand ability to view the witness or evidence and assess
credibility and probative value). We agree that the district court allowed plaintiff
ample discovery regarding the disciplinary treatment of other residents in the
program. See Gomez , 50 F.3d at 1520 (concluding the district court did not abuse
its discretion in limiting discovery in Title VII case where the plaintiff was
provided abundant discovery). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion to compel.
III. Discussion - No. 99-1391
In their cross-appeal, defendants challenge the district court’s denial of
their request for costs, a decision we review for an abuse of discretion. See Klein
v. Grynberg , 44 F.3d 1497, 1506 (10th Cir. 1995). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d) allows an award of costs to prevailing parties. The Rule states
that “costs other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).
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“This court has held that Rule 54(d) creates a presumption that the prevailing
party shall recover costs.” Klein , 44 F.3d at 1506. Moreover, the district court
“must provide a valid reason for not awarding costs to a prevailing party.”
Cantrell v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 69 F.3d 456, 459 (10th Cir.
1995).
Here, the district court summarily denied an award of costs to defendants
without explanation. Thus, we have no basis for judging whether the court
abused its discretion. Therefore, the part of the district court’s judgment
decreeing that each party shall bear his own costs is reversed and the matter is
remanded to the trial court for further consideration of defendants’ request for
costs.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado is in case No. 99-1377 is AFFIRMED. The denial of costs appealed in
case No. 99-1391 is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this order and judgment.
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