UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-60737
Summary Calendar
AMYLOU DOUGLAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STUART C. IRBY, CO.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Mississippi
(3:95-CV-663-BrS)
October 23, 1998
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, DAVIS and JONES, Circuit Judges.
POLITZ, Chief Judge:*
Amylou Douglas appeals an adverse judgment as a matter of law in her
Title VII sex discrimination case. For the reasons assigned, we affirm.
Background
Douglas brought this action against her employer, the Stuart C. Irby
Company, alleging sexual discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
Rights Act of 1964,1 because she was denied the managerial-level position of
Director of Purchasing and Inventory Management. The position was given to a
male employee, Hugh Fonville. Vice President Al Doty, the employee responsible
for filling the position, selected Hazel Brewer, a female, as his second choice for
the position.
The case proceeded to trial before a jury. At the close of plaintiff’s evidence,
the trial court granted defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, enunciating two reasons for its decision. The trial court found that
Douglas had not demonstrated a prima facie case of gender discrimination. As
required by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,2 because she had not presented
evidence that she was equally or better qualified than the male employee actually
selected for the position and alternatively held that no reasonable juror could
conclude, under the proof presented, that Douglas was discriminated against
because of her sex. The trial court based this decision upon the lack of comparative
evidence of her qualifications and Fonville’s qualifications. Additionally, the trial
court granted judgment as a matter of law on this basis because the second choice
for the position was another female.
Analysis
We review the district court’s grant of the motion for judgment as a matter
1
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
2
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
2
of law de novo,3 applying the same standard as the district court and reviewing the
evidence presented in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.4 We will affirm
if the facts and inferences in favor of the prevailing party are so strong that no
reasonable juror could arrive at a verdict contrary to the district court’s decision
and we will reverse if there is substantial evidence upon which reasonable jurors
could differ.5
Douglas contends that the district court erred in granting defendant’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law by altering improperly the requirement that she
demonstrate a prima facie case. Specifically, Douglas asserts that the district court
required her to prove that she had superior qualifications to the promoted
employee, in contravention of the teachings of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.6
We need not and do not reach that question, however, as we agree with the district
court’s alternative rationale that plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to
permit a reasonable jury to find the proscribed discrimination. Considering
Douglas’s failure to present any comparative evidence concerning her
qualifications and those of the male selected for the job, and the evidence that
another female employee, and not Douglas, was the second choice for the job, no
reasonable juror could have concluded that in filling the managerial-level position
3
Hidden Oaks Ltd. v. City of Austin, 138 F.3d 1036 (5th Cir. 1998).
4
Gutierrez v. Excel Corp., 106 F.3d 683 (5th Cir. 1997).
5
Id. at 686.
6
491 U.S. 164 (1989).
3
defendant discriminated against Douglas because of her sex. We perceive no error
in the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and
it is therefore AFFIRMED.
4