IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-60802
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SHARON DEMETRESS HOOPER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:97-CR-28-1-LS
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October 23, 1998
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Sharon Demetress Hooper appeals her conviction of
trafficking in and using unauthorized access devices from
February 1996 until December 1996, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1029(a)(2). Hooper submitted fraudulent applications to
acquire and resell cellular telephones and cellular telephone
service provided by Century Cellunet.
Hooper argues that the district court erred in denying her
motion in limine to exclude evidence that prior to the charged
offense, she had obtained two cellular telephone service
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 97-60802
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contracts for her own use by submitting fraudulent applications.
It is not clear whether Hooper properly preserved the issue
raised on appeal in her motion in limine. The record does not
contain a copy of Hooper’s motion in limine. Although the
transcript indicates that a motion in limine was presented in
open court and discussed at trial, the record is vague as to the
specifications of the motion. Hooper failed to provide record
cites in her brief showing that she objected when the evidence
was introduced at trial. See Moore v. FDIC, 993 F.2d 106, 107
(5th Cir. 1993); Wilson v. Waggener, 837 F.2d 220, 222 (5th Cir.
1988). Regardless whether the issue was properly preserved or
briefed, Hooper’s argument is without merit.
Although the district court did not determine whether the
evidence was intrinsic or extrinsic, it not abuse its discretion
in admitting the evidence. Even if the evidence were considered
extrinsic, evidence that Hooper fraudulently obtained cellular
phones and service in the past is admissible under Fed. R. Evid.
404(b) to establish knowledge and intent. See United States v.
Leal, 74 F.3d 600, 606 (5th Cir. 1996)(extrinsic evidence that
defendant engaged in similar crimes can be relevant to
establishing her knowledge or intent to commit the crime
charged).
The probative value of the evidence is not substantially
outweighed by undue prejudice. Hooper’s acts were similar to
those for which she was charged and occurred close in time to the
charged offense. The Government’s other evidence sheds little
light on Hooper's intent; thus, the probative value of the
No. 97-60802
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extrinsic offense is great. United States v. Chavez, 119 F.3d
342, 346 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 615 (1997).
Hooper also argues that the district court erred in denying
her motion for a judgment of acquittal challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence establishing her intent to defraud.
Hooper’s codefendant testified that the applications for
telephones and service were completed with false information,
that he was directed to forge signatures on the applications, and
that he and Hooper resold the cellular telephones. A handwriting
expert testified that Hooper filled out a large number of the
applications herself and that she probably signed the customer’s
signatures on a number of the applications. A Century Cellunet
representative also testified that numerous charges were incurred
on the contracts Hooper sold but the customers could never be
located. Hooper admitted that she had previously obtained
cellular phones and service for her personal using by submitting
fraudulent applications. Based on this evidence, a rational
trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Hooper had intent to defraud. See United States v. Resio-Trejo,
45 F.3d 907, 910 (5th Cir. 1995).
AFFIRMED.