‘ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 98-10172
Summary Calendar
_______________________
LUCIAN R. HENDERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ABILENE REGIONAL MHMR CENTER,
WILLIAM V. LIVINGSTON, and
ROSCOE C. HOLLIDAY
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(1:97-CV-55)
_________________________________________________________________
September 25, 1998
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Appellant Henderson claims that his termination from
employment at the Abilene Regional MHMR Center was illegally
motivated by discrimination. He appeals the district court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of Appellees and the denial of his
motion for judgment as a matter of law (treated below as a motion
for summary judgment). Because we agree that Henderson has not
1
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the
limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
adduced specific facts sufficient to support a finding of
discrimination, we affirm.
We review de novo a grant of summary judgment in an
employment discrimination case. See Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1993).
Henderson was a 40-year-old black male when his
employment at the Center was terminated in June 1995. He was
replaced by a younger white female. His complaint in this suit
alleges race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. In addition, his pro se complaint and
subsequent briefs make general references to age and sex, although
these were not mentioned in the charge of discrimination he filed
with the E.E.O.C.; nor does his complaint mention the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.
Nevertheless, the procedural framework necessary to
determine this case would be the same for race, sex, or age
discrimination. See Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989,
992 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Under any of these allegations,
Henderson, as the plaintiff, has failed to prove facts sufficient
to meet his burden under the three-step McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
framework.
Under that framework, the plaintiff must first make out
a prima facie case of discrimination. See Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 992.
Then the defendant may rebut the resulting inference of
discrimination by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the discharge. Id. at 992-93. Finally, the plaintiff
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must prove not only that “the employer’s reasons were not the true
reason for the employment decision,” but also that “unlawful
discrimination was.” Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 957.
The Center has met its second-step burden of articulating
legitimate reasons for the termination. The letter notifying
Henderson of his imminent termination, and his subsequent meeting
with the executive director, focused primarily on the intimidating
statements Henderson made to a witness in a legally-required client
abuse investigation. In addition, the executive director’s
affidavit states that his determination to fire Henderson was also
motivated by the nearly simultaneous discovery that Henderson had
been convicted of a felony before he came to work for the Center
and had failed to disclose this on his employment application.2
Henderson has not adduced facts to show that these
reasons are pretexts for prohibited discrimination. He contends
that the proffered reasons are pretextual by disputing the facts
underlying the original allegation of his interference in the
client abuse investigation and by arguing that the felony was not
officially invoked as a justification until after he was fired.
Even if these arguments were sufficient to show pretext, Henderson
2
Henderson contends that the felony was an after-the-fact
rationalization for his termination because it was not explicitly
given as a reason until the grievance hearing held two months after
his termination. Although not enumerated at the time, the felony
and failure to disclose it were apparently known to the executive
director when he made the final decision (App. Record at 157-8).
Such questions, however, go to credibility, which is irrelevant in
determining the employer’s fulfillment of its second-step burden.
See Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 958 (“The employer need only articulate
a lawful reason, regardless of what its persuasiveness may or may
not be.”).
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provides insufficient facts to prove that the pretext masks
unlawful discrimination.
At bottom, Henderson’s claims of race or age
discrimination are sorely lacking in any of the “specific facts”
that are necessary to avoid summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).
Apart from broad statistics about the makeup of the Center’s small
staff and inadmissible evidence of statements by an employee not
involved in the termination decision, Henderson has provided only
conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated assertions of subjective
belief, which “are inadequate to satisfy the nonmovant’s burden.”
Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,1429 (5th Cir.
1996) (en banc). Henderson has not met his burden of producing
evidence sufficient “to allow a jury to infer that the actual
reason for the discharge was discriminatory.” Rhodes, 75 F.3d at
994. Thus, defendants’ summary judgment motion must succeed, and
Henderson’s must fail.
Henderson also presents a smorgasbord of purported abuses
of discretion or errors by the district court (e.g., “Prejudicial
supervision of this case,” “Consideration of inadmissible
evidence,” “Failing to provide Pro Se Litigant, revisions of The
Local Rules”). We have examined each of these contentions and find
no abuse of discretion or reversible error.
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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