F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 6 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-5190
(D.C. No. 99-CR-6-C)
GROVER STANLEY (N.D. Okla.)
MONHOLLAND,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , ANDERSON , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Defendant appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, of possession of a
firearm after former conviction of a felony (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), possession of
a machine gun (18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1)), and two counts of possession of an
unregistered firearm (26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)). He was sentenced to a total prison
term of 151 months. On appeal he raises two claims: error by the trial court in
declining to instruct the jury on the issue of entrapment, and the improper
overruling of his motion in limine to exclude evidence of his prior rape
conviction. We affirm.
The facts underlying the convictions are as follows. Defendant was
introduced to the government’s chief witness, Ace Wright, in October of 1998.
The initial contact between the two men concerned scuba diving, apparently in an
attempt to locate some money supposedly under water. Defendant initiated the
subject of purchasing a gun. Thereafter the pair had several conversations
primarily about defendant’s desire to purchase an Uzi machine gun. After the
second discussion, Wright decided to record the conversations. Wright presented
the tape to his attorney, 1
who contacted an agent of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF).
1
At the time, Wright was awaiting sentencing on his conviction of a
gambling charge.
-2-
Subsequent contacts between defendant and Wright were recorded under
the supervision of the ATF agent. After continued negotiations, Wright delivered
an Uzi, along with a .22 caliber pistol and two silencers to defendant, at which
point defendant was arrested.
Defendant first contends that he was entitled to an instruction on
entrapment. Whether there is sufficient evidence to constitute a triable issue of
entrapment is a question of law which we review de novo. See United States v.
Fadel , 844 F.2d 1425, 1434 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Ortiz , 804
F.2d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir. 1986)).
The defense of entrapment prohibits law enforcement conduct
which implants a criminal design in an innocent person’s mind and
induces that person to commit a crime he is otherwise not
predisposed to commit. The inquiry in an entrapment defense has
two parts: (1) the lawfulness of the government’s conduct, and
(2) the defendant’s predisposition to engage in the criminal activity.
United States v. Lampley , 127 F.3d 1231, 1242 (10th Cir. 1997) (further citations
omitted). Predisposition is the principal element, and this focuses on whether the
defendant was an “unwary innocent” or an “unwary criminal.” See id. (further
quotations and citations omitted). Although the question of entrapment is
generally one for the jury, see id. , “[t]he defendant must point to evidence of both
lack of predisposition and government inducement before the trial judge can
determine whether entrapment has been shown sufficiently to present it to the
jury.” Ortiz , 804 F.2d at 1165. See also United States v. Fedroff , 874 F.2d 178,
-3-
181-82 (3d Cir. 1989) (trial court will not instruct on entrapment unless defendant
has produced sufficient evidence on both prongs of defense and must evaluate
quantum of evidence for each element to determine if entrapment instruction is
warranted as matter of law). A defendant is entitled to present an entrapment
defense to the jury “only if he can identify evidence ‘from which a reasonable
juror could derive a reasonable doubt as to the origin of criminal intent. . . .’”
Ortiz , 804 F.2d at 1165 (quoting United States v. Nations , 764 F.2d 1073, 1080
(5th Cir. 1985)).
“The focal point in entrapment, therefore, centers on the defendant’s intent
or predisposition to engage in the offense rather than the degree of government
involvement.” See United States v. Mendoza-Salgado , 964 F.2d 993, 1002 (10th
Cir. 1992). Indeed, defendant recognizes this, but argues that there was sufficient
evidence to warrant submitting the issue to the jury. We disagree. Although
defendant’s predisposition must be “viewed at the time the government agent first
approached the defendant, inferences about that predisposition may be drawn
from events occurring after the two parties came in contact.” United States v.
Garcia , 182 F.3d 1165, 1169 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 120 S. Ct. 448 (1999).
“Entrapment does not occur when government officials merely offer a
person the opportunity and means to commit an offense.” United States v. Beal ,
961 F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1992); see also , United States v. Dozal-Bencomo ,
-4-
952 F.2d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Merely providing a person ready and
willing to violate the law an opportunity to engage in the illegal acts is not
entrapment.”) (further citation omitted). The evidence in this case, particularly
the conversations between defendant and Wright, clearly reflect that the
defendant’s possession of the weapons was not the product of the creative activity
of the government. Beal , 961 F.2d at 1516 (quotation omitted). The record
shows that the issue of gun purchase was initiated by the defendant, and
defendant indicated in subsequent conversations with Wright that he remained
interested in obtaining a gun, particularly an Uzi. The evidence in this case failed
to “create a genuine factual issue that properly [could] be resolved only by a jury
as the finder of fact.” Ortiz , 804 F.2d at 1166.
Defendant also contends the district court erred in overruling his motion in
limine to exclude evidence of a prior rape conviction. Counsel had argued that
the conviction was nearly ten years earlier in time and that the prejudicial effect
would outweigh the probative value. However, the district court determined that
admitting this particular conviction would not be any more prejudicial than
admitting any other prior conviction. On appeal defendant contends he “chose not
to testify for fear of the prejudice that the revelation of the rape conviction would
cause.” Appellant’s Br. at 7. He further states that because the rape conviction
-5-
was nearly ten years old and unrelated to the weapons charges, it “was not
probative as to the veracity or truth of the defendant as a witness.” Id. at 8.
In Luce v. United States , 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984), the Supreme Court
recognized the difficulty a reviewing court encounters in attempting “to rule on
subtle evidentiary questions outside a factual context,” noting that “[a]ny possible
harm flowing from a district court’s in limine ruling permitting impeachment by a
prior conviction is wholly speculative.” Id. For this reason the Court held “that
to raise and preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with a prior
conviction, a defendant must testify.” Id. at 43. We have also recognized this
requirement. See United States v. Powell , 982 F.2d 1422, 1434 (10th Cir. 1992)
(declining to review denial of pretrial motion to exclude evidence of prior
convictions where defendant did not testify at trial); see also United States v.
Martinez , 76 F.3d 1145, 1151 (10th Cir. 1996) (recognizing Luce requirement that
defendant testify in order to preserve claim of improper impeachment with prior
conviction). Here, because defendant did not testify, we are unable to review this
claim.
-6-
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
-7-