F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 30 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOE LEWIS HOSKINS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 00-5063
(N.D. Okla.)
STEVE HARGETT, (D.Ct. No. 97-CV-231-K)
Respondent-Appellee.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Joe Lewis Hoskins, a state inmate appearing pro se, appeals the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
district court’s decision denying his habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254. We deny Mr. Hoskin’s request for a certificate of appealability
and dismiss his appeal.
A jury convicted Mr. Hoskins of first degree murder of Bobbie Lee Smith,
and the court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Evidence at trial established Mr. Hoskins brutally beat Ms. Smith with a lead pipe
and a metal crutch for approximately an hour with such force that the metal crutch
broke into pieces. At trial, Mr. Hoskins did not deny killing Ms. Smith, but
contended he acted in self-defense. Following his conviction, Mr. Hoskins filed a
direct appeal with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, raising multiple
grounds of error. The court affirmed Mr. Hoskins’ conviction on the merits.
Following his direct state appeal, Mr. Hoskins filed his federal § 2254
petition, raising several grounds for error. The district court denied Mr. Hoskins’
§ 2254 petition. On appeal, Mr. Hoskins raises two of the grounds of error raised
in his petition and addressed by the district court. Specifically, he contends the
state trial court (1) materially suppressed his right to present a defense when it
admonished the jury to disregard his statement Ms. Smith killed her boyfriend,
and (2) committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on the lessor
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offenses of First Degree Manslaughter by Resisting Criminal Attempt and Second
Degree Murder.
Our review of Mr. Hoskins’ appeal begins with our standard of review. We
review the legal basis for the district court’s denial of Mr. Hoskins’ § 2254
petition de novo and its factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard. See
Rogers v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 1999,) cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
944 (2000). Because this is a habeas review, we will not disturb the state court’s
evidentiary rulings unless Mr. Hoskins demonstrates the court’s error was “so
grossly prejudicial it fatally infected the trial and denied [him] the fundamental
fairness that is the essence of due process.” Fox. v. Ward, 200 F.3d 1286, 1296
(10th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct.
___, 2000 WL 1281480 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 00-5995). Because we are
reviewing a § 2254 petition, we may not grant habeas relief unless the state
court’s decision was:
“(1) ... contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established federal law ...; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.”
Rogers, 173 F.3d at 1282 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (2)). In order to
obtain a certificate of appealability, Mr. Hoskins must make “a substantial
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showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
Under these standards and the circumstances presented, we conclude Mr.
Hoskins fails to make substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as
required by § 2253(c)(2). We make this determination after carefully reviewing
the pleadings, record on appeal, and the district court’s decision.
We begin by noting the district court conducted a well-explained discussion
of the issues Mr. Hoskins raises on appeal. Applying the controlling Supreme
Court and Tenth Circuit authority, the district court addressed Mr. Hoskins’ claim
the trial court erroneously prohibited him from testifying Ms. Smith previously
killed another individual. The district court, like the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals, concluded that even if the trial court erred in prohibiting this evidence,
it did not significantly influence the jury’s decision in light of the other evidence
admitted concerning Ms. Smith’s reputation as a violent person. We agree. At
trial, Mr. Hoskins testified the victim, Ms. Smith, maintained a reputation in the
community for violence and he feared she would kill him. When asked why he
was afraid, he answered “[b]ecause awhile back, she had killed her boyfriend.”
The state trial court sustained the state’s objection to this statement and
admonished the jurors not to consider it. As both the Oklahoma Court of
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Criminal Appeals and district court recognized, the colloquy between defense
counsel and Mr. Hoskins immediately following the admonishment shows
introduction of evidence concerning Ms. Smith’s volatility and relating to Mr.
Hoskins’ self-defense theory that he feared Ms. Smith would kill him:
Q: (By Ms. Johnson) ... Why were you afraid?
A: Because I have seen stuff with her former boyfriends that she hurt.
Q: Have you ever seen her injure another man.
A: Yes.
...
Q: (By Ms. Johnson) Have you ever seen her injure another man
with a weapon, Joe?
A: Yes, I have.
Q: Were you thinking about that at the time this fight occurred?
...
A. Yes.
As the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals further ascertained, Mr.
Hoskins also presented other evidence concerning Ms. Smith’s volatility through
the testimony of his common-law wife, Gladys Verner. 1 Moreover, the Oklahoma
1
For example, when asked what Ms. Smith’s reputation in the community was,
Ms. Verner said “when she drinks she get[s] out of control.” Ms. Verner also testified she
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Court of Criminal Appeals pointed out the brutal one-hour beating of Ms. Smith
did not support Mr. Hoskins’ self-defense theory. Consequently, it determined
the excluded testimony “could have added nothing to the evidence presented.” In
other words, even if the trial court erred in excluding Mr. Hoskins’ statement, its
exclusion did not prejudice his defense or the outcome of his trial. Given our
review of the evidence, we cannot say the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’
ruling on the exclusion of Mr. Hoskins’ statement resulted in a decision contrary
to clearly established federal law or was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented at trial. See 28 U.S.C. §§
2254(d)(1), (2); Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1229 (10th Cir. 2000); Rogers,
173 F.3d at 1282.
As to the trial court’s failure to provide instructions on First Degree
Manslaughter by Resisting Criminal Attempt and Second Degree Murder, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals concluded the evidence and Oklahoma
statutory law did not support giving such instructions. The Oklahoma court first
determined the fact Mr. Hoskins brutally beat Ms. Smith for over an hour, with
such severity it broke a metal crutch into pieces, did not meet the statutory
and Ms. Smith previously fought with each other and on one occasion after drinking, Ms.
Smith hit her.
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requirements for First Degree Manslaughter by Resisting Criminal Attempt, which
required a showing of honest but unreasonable belief that Mr. Hoskins was in
danger of injury or that slaying was the only way to prevent injury to himself.
Next, it found Mr. Hoskins’ theory of intentional killing due to self-defense
inconsistent with the act of second degree murder which requires no premeditated
intent to kill. The federal district court afforded the state courts’ ruling on these
issues a presumption of correctness.
Mr. Hoskins incorrectly contends the district court’s decision is contrary to
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) and our
decision in Hogan v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, ___ S.
Ct. ___, 2000 WL 794991 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 99-6147). First, the
principles announced in those decisions do not affect Mr. Hoskins’ appeal
because they concern capital conviction cases, not noncapital cases like Mr.
Hoskins’. See Beck, 447 U.S. at 627, 638 n.14; Hogan, 197 F.3d at 1302-04. In
addition, in Hogan the evidence supported giving instructions on the lesser
offense of first degree manslaughter. Id. at 1303-05, 1308-12. In this case, the
state court clearly determined the evidence and the applicable state statutory law
did not support Mr. Hoskins’ request for instructions on First Degree
Manslaughter by Resisting Criminal Attempt or Second Degree Murder. Even if
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we disagreed, we have held a petitioner in noncapital cases is not entitled to a
lesser-included offense instruction, regardless of whether we believe sufficient
evidence supports it. See Lujan v. Tansy, 2 F.3d 1031, 1036 (10th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1120 (1994).
Thus, as the federal district court acknowledged, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeal’s determination on this issue is entitled to a presumption of
correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which Mr. Hoskins failed to
sufficiently overcome. See Valdez, 219 F.3d at 1229. In sum, Mr. Hoskins fails
to show the Oklahoma court’s ruling on the requested lessor instructions resulted
in a decision contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented at trial. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (2); Valdez, 218
F.3d at 1229-30; Rogers, 173 F.3d at 1282. In other words, Mr. Hoskins fails to
show the state court’s ruling was unreasonable. Cf. Valdez, 219 F.3d at 1229-31.
Accordingly, for substantially the same reasons set forth in the district
court’s March 29, 2000 Order, we deny Mr. Hoskins’ request for a certificate of
appealability and DISMISS his appeal.
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Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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