F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 31 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MARY A. DEAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 99-8028
(D. Ct. No. 98-CV-44)
STATE FARM MUTUAL (D. Wyo.)
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee.
--------------------------------
ELTON DEAN,
Intervenor.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, TACHA, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff appeals the district court’s order of summary judgment. We
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
*
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
I. Facts
Appellant Mary Dean and her husband Elton Dean were involved in an
automobile accident near Dallas, Texas on August 16, 1996. While driving in a
construction zone, the Deans allege that a vehicle pulled in front of their vehicle
and hit its brakes. Mr. Dean’s braking reaction resulted in the brakes locking.
The Deans allege that their van slid sideways, demolished several reflector poles,
collided with a concrete barrier, and came to a stop. The Deans could not
describe the vehicle that pulled in front of them and caused them to lose control.
The vehicle did not stop and may have been unaware of the accident. Mrs. Dean
was apparently injured by a small cooler that flew forward and struck her on the
shoulder during the accident.
Mr. Dean stepped out of the vehicle to inspect the damage. He concluded
that the vehicle could be driven and, because traffic was heavy enough that it did
not seem safe to wait and because Mrs. Dean’s injuries did not seem serious, they
continued home without notifying law enforcement.
The Deans were insured by defendant State Farm. The insurance policy
requires that a person suffering bodily injury and making a claim “under the
uninsured motor vehicle coverage, report a ‘hit-and-run’ accident to the police
within twenty-four hours or as soon as reasonably possible” and to State Farm
within thirty days. The policy also requires independent verification by a
-2-
“disinterested witness” when the other driver remains unknown.
After returning to their home in Casper, Wyoming, the Deans reported their
claim to their insurer, State Farm. On August 22, 1996, the Deans met with Kurt
Neibauer, an employee of State Farm. At that meeting, Mr. Neibauer informed
the Deans of the policy provision requiring that the police be notified within
twenty-four hours of an accident or as soon as reasonably possible. The Deans
still had not notified law enforcement.
In a letter dated September 19, 1996, State Farm denied the Deans’ claim
under the policy for uninsured motor vehicle coverage because the Deans still had
not contacted law enforcement and had not provided a disinterested witness. Mr.
Dean called the Dallas police on September 20, 1996 and reported the accident.
State Farm continued to deny the Deans’ claim.
Mrs. Dean brought the instant action against State Farm. The district court
granted summary judgment to State Farm on the basis that the Deans did not
report the accident to law enforcement within twenty-four hours or as soon as
reasonably possible. The district court did not reach the disinterested witness
issue. Mrs. Dean appealed to this court.
II. Discussion
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. 186 F.3d 1301, 1313 (10th Cir. 1999).
-3-
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court does
not weigh evidence; instead, the relevant inquiry is “‘whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is
so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Jeffries v. Kansas
Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 147 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Bingaman v. Kansas city Power & Light Co., 1 F.3d 976, 980 (10th Cir. 1993)).
It is undisputed that Mr. Dean did not report the accident within twenty-
four hours. We agree with the district court that Mr. Dean also did not report the
accident “as soon as reasonably possible.” Over one month passed between the
accident and Mr. Dean’s report to police. Three weeks passed between the date
the Deans were put on notice of the provision requiring police notification and the
report of the accident. The Deans do not offer any reasonable explanation for this
delay. Under these circumstances, Mr. Dean clearly did not report the accident to
police “as soon as reasonably possible.” Consequently, Mrs. Dean’s breach of
contract claim must fail. 1
1
Mrs. Dean also argues that State Farm must show that it would be
prejudiced by the violation of a provision in the policy. She has not, however,
pointed us to any Wyoming authority supporting that proposition. Absent such
-4-
Mrs. Dean also brought a tort claim arguing that State Farm denied her
benefits in bad faith. Under Wyoming law, to prove bad faith a plaintiff must
prove that the denial of a claim was not “fairly debatable.” State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 825 (Wyo. 1994). To demonstrate that
the denial was not “fairly debatable,” the plaintiff must show the absence of any
reasonable basis for denying the claim. Id. Because we find that State Farm had
a conclusive basis for denying uninsured motorist coverage to Mrs. Dean in this
case, Mrs. Dean’s bad faith claim must also fail.
We find that summary judgment was properly granted because of the
Deans’ failure to report the accident to police as soon as reasonably possible. We
need not decide whether State Farm’s disinterested witness requirement violates
public policy or whether Mr. Dean could be considered a disinterested witness.
The district court’s order of summary judgment is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
authority, we will not attempt to predict the development of Wyoming law on this
issue.
-5-