F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JAN 8 2001
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-2186
TERRANCE DEWAYNE HECKARD,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. CR-98-513-MV)
Todd B. Hotchkiss of Frechette & Associates, P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico,
for Defendant-Appellant.
Sarah Y. Vogel, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Norman C. Bay, United States Attorney
for the District of New Mexico, with her on the brief), Las Cruces, New Mexico,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before KELLY, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
McKAY , Circuit Judge.
Defendant Terrance Heckard appeals his conviction on three counts. Count
I charged conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count II charged possession with intent
to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
and (b)(1)(B), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Count III charged felon in possession of a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) and 2. He was
sentenced to 168 months of incarceration plus five years of supervised release.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
I. Background
Defendant was one of dozens of individuals targeted in a three-year
investigation into cocaine trafficking in Hobbs, New Mexico. On August 6, 1997,
he sold a small quantity of cocaine to an undercover agent. Authorities
discovered that his cocaine was transported by Texan Richard Baeza to New
Mexico residents Mark Sanders and Andrew Pompey, using one Anthony Flores
as a courier. Once Sanders received shipments, he sold smaller quantities to
Defendant for resale on the street. Flores came to know Defendant because he
had seen Defendant with Sanders at Defendant’s house on several occasions, and
knew that he was one of Sanders’ distributors. Sanders left a scale used for
weighing drugs at Defendant’s house, and he even lent him a Colt .357 revolver.
On September 29, 1997, Flores was transporting a large quantity of cocaine
to Sanders, but was unable to locate him. Nervous at the thought of holding onto
that much cocaine himself, Flores went to Defendant’s house. He told Defendant
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that he had a kilogram of cocaine, and he asked if Defendant could keep it safe
until Sanders could be located. Defendant took the cocaine and hid it in the back
room of the house, then went with Flores to find Sanders. When Defendant found
Sanders, he told him that he was holding the cocaine for him at his house. Later,
Pompey was upset with Flores for letting Defendant keep the cocaine at his house,
but all convened at Defendant’s home and nothing more was said.
At 6:00 a.m. on October 23, 1997, law enforcement officers executed
search and arrest warrants at Defendant’s home. After knocking, they forcibly
entered, finding Defendant awake and standing within a few feet of the Colt .357.
Other individuals were in the home and asleep. Agents seized the gun, scale, and
documents indicating Defendant’s ownership of the home.
Sanders and Flores agreed to testify against Defendant. Aware of Flores’
potentially damaging testimony in court, Defendant approached Flores in prison
with a prepared affidavit for Flores to sign. The affidavit stated that Flores had
no knowledge of any illegal activity conducted by Defendant. Fearing for himself
and his family, Flores signed the affidavit. After some hesitation, Flores still
testified against Defendant. Neither the threats nor the affidavit were introduced
into evidence, except that Defendant’s counsel on cross examination questioned
Flores’ initial hesitance to testify.
At trial, the government played nine recorded telephone conversations from
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wire intercepts it had used. Sanders and Flores identified the voices on tape and
verified the accuracy of the conversations, and the court was satisfied that they
qualified for admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). After a
rule 403 objection was withdrawn, the tapes were admitted without objection.
The conversations discussed the September 29th transport of cocaine in which
Flores had left a large amount at Defendant’s home.
Before instructing the jury, the court provided copies of the Proposed
Instructions to each party and asked for objections. Neither Defendant nor the
government objected. The Instructions included a comprehensive instruction on
the elements of conspiracy, taken in its entirety from 1997 Fifth Circuit Pattern
Instruction 2.89. Defendant requested that Count III, felony firearm possession,
be severed from Counts I and II, but that request was denied. The jury convicted
Defendant on all three counts.
At sentencing, Defendant received a two-level enhancement for obstructing
justice pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 3C1.1
because of his jailhouse contact with Flores. He also received an enhancement
for possession of a dangerous weapon under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). Finally, the
court refused to reduce Defendant’s sentence for minor or minimal role in the
conspiracy under U.S.S.G. §3 B1.2. The court determined for Counts I and II that
Defendant had possessed 1028.62 grams of cocaine. Defendant was sentenced to
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168 months of incarceration, followed by five years of supervised release. This
timely appeal followed.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support conviction
on any of the three counts against him. A defendant’s claim of insufficient
evidence is reviewed de novo. See United States v. Jackson , 213 F.3d 1269, 1283
(10th Cir. 2000). In order to conclude that the evidence was insufficient as a
matter of law, we must view the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in
the light most favorable to the government and then determine that no rational
jury could have found Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See United
States v. Jenkins , 175 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir.) cert. denied , 528 U.S. 913
(1999).
A. Felony Firearm Possession
Defendant first alleges that the evidence was insufficient to establish that
he possessed the Colt revolver seized from his home on October 23, 1997. To
sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove a
defendant: (1) “was convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding
one year;” (2) “thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) the possession
was in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” United States v. Adkins , 196
F.3d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 1999). Defendant challenges only the second element:
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knowing possession. (Def.’s Br. at 59-60).
Constructive possession is sufficient for conviction under this statute. See
United States v. Wilson , 107 F.3d 774, 779 (10th Cir. 1997). “In cases of joint
occupancy, where the government seeks to prove constructive possession by
circumstantial evidence, it must present evidence to show some connection or
nexus between the defendant and the firearm or other contraband.” United States
v. Mills , 29 F.3d 545, 549 (10th Cir. 1994). Constructive possession requires a
showing that a defendant knowingly holds the power to exercise dominion or
control over the firearm. See Wilson , 107 F.3d at 779. Dominion or control are
properly inferred from exclusive possession of the premises, but when there is
evidence of joint occupancy, the government must offer “some evidence
supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of and
access to the weapon.” Mills , 29 F.3d at 550 (quoting United States v.
Mergerson , 4 F.3d 337, 349 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 1198 (1994)).
The government demonstrated that Defendant was the owner of the
residence where the revolver was found, that he was awake and near the gun at
the house when the gun was discovered, and that he had received the gun no more
than a few months prior to his arrest. It was certainly not irrational for the jury to
conclude that Defendant knowingly held the power to exercise dominion and
control over the revolver. Thus, Defendant’s conviction for firearm possession
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does not fail for want of evidence.
B. Cocaine Possession
Defendant next asserts that the government introduced insufficient evidence
to sustain his conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine under 21
U.S.C. § 841. Specifically, he claims that there was no proof that he knew the
true nature of the contents of the bag he received from Flores on September 29,
1997. A conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 requires proof
that a defendant: “(1) possessed a controlled substance; (2) knew that he
possessed a controlled substance; and (3) intended to distribute the controlled
substance.” United States v. Dozal , 173 F.3d 787, 797 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Wilson , 107 F.3d at 778). Again, Defendant challenges only the second element:
knowing possession. (Def.’s Br. at 67). Defendant’s claim that there was no
evidence of his knowledge is directly belied by the trial testimony of Flores and
Sanders, who both testified that Defendant knew the substance in the bag was
cocaine.
Flores testified that he expressly informed Defendant that the bag contained
Sanders’ cocaine before giving it to Defendant. In addition, Defendant
immediately hid the bag in the back of his house and then left to find Sanders,
further indicating his knowledge of the illicit nature of the bag’s contents. When
Defendant did locate Sanders, he explicitly told Sanders that he was holding a
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kilogram of cocaine, and they went together to retrieve it. From this testimony,
the jury could reasonably conclude that he knew there was cocaine in the bag, he
possessed the cocaine, and he intended to redistribute it. See, e.g. , United States
v. Ivy , 83 F.3d 1266, 1287 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 519 U.S. 901 (1996)
(sustaining conviction for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine based
solely on informant testimony that the defendant was a dealer). Thus, the
evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for cocaine possession under 21
U.S.C. § 841.
C. Cocaine Conspiracy
Finally, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. To prove a conspiracy in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, the evidence must establish: “(1) an agreement with
another person to violate the law, (2) knowledge of the essential objectives of the
conspiracy, (3) knowing and voluntary involvement, and (4) interdependence
among the alleged conspirators.” United States v. Carter , 130 F.3d 1432, 1439
(10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 523 U.S. 1144 (1998). Defendant contends that the
government failed to establish any of these elements, instead relying only on
“inference upon inference.” (Def.’s Br. at 65) (citing United States v. Anderson ,
981 F.2d 1560, 1564 (10th Cir. 1992). He claims that the jury’s guilty verdict on
conspiracy was unreasonable, because keeping the cocaine on September 29,
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1997, was not initially Defendant’s idea, and because Pompey was later unhappy
about it. ( Id. at 60-65).
The evidence at trial established that Defendant and Sanders repeatedly
collaborated to distribute cocaine on the streets of Hobbs, with Sanders giving
Defendant cocaine for resale. Sanders’ testimony at trial was corroborated by the
scale found at Defendant’s apartment, by the August transaction, and by Flores’
testimony. Defendant’s safekeeping of the cocaine on September 29th may have
broken the normal chain of distribution and upset Pompey; however, Defendant
willingly assisted in preserving the acts of the conspiracy by conserving a
substantial shipment of cocaine. The abnormality of this act certainly did not
negate the substantial evidence pointing to Defendant as an active participant in
the acquisition and distribution of the cocaine. Therefore, the first three elements
of conspiracy were met. The jury was not irrational in concluding that Defendant
had knowing and voluntary agreements with Sanders and Flores to violate the law
by transporting and distributing cocaine, the “essential objective of the
conspiracy.” Carter , 130 F.3d at 1439.
In addition, interdependence among the coconspirators was adequately
supported. “A defendant’s activities are interdependent if they ‘facilitated the
endeavors of other alleged conspirators or facilitated the venture as a whole.’”
Ivy , 83 F.3d at 1286 (quoting United States v. Horn , 946 F.2d 738, 740-41(10th
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Cir. 1991)). Evidence at trial showed that Defendant’s actions as a regular
retailer benefitted not only himself, but also Sanders, Pompey, and Flores.
Defendant’s agreement to keep the kilogram of cocaine was beneficial to all as
well: it fulfilled their shared goal of safely transporting the cocaine to Hobbs so
that Sanders and Pompey could resell it to their street distributors, such as
Defendant. In sum, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a jury finding of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine.
III. Admission of Coconspirator Statements
Defendant next objects to the district court’s determination that nine
recorded conversations were coconspirator statements, admissible as nonhearsay
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). Defendant claims that their
admission was clear error and a violation of his constitutional right to confront
witnesses against him.
Coconspirator statements are constitutionally admissible when the trial
court determines: “(1) a conspiracy is proven by a preponderance of the
evidence; (2) the declarant and the defendant were both members of the
conspiracy; and (3) the statements were made in the course and furtherance of the
conspiracy.” United States v. Powell , 982 F.2d 1422, 1432 (10th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied , 508 U.S. 917 (1993). Defendant contests the third element, the
determination that the nine recorded statements were “made in the course and
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furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id. Defendant in essence repeats his
insufficiency claim to bar the admission of these statements.
As discussed above, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Defendant was a participant in the conspiracy to transport, resell, and distribute
the cocaine involved. The evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain this verdict.
Moreover, the nine telephone calls introduced at trial were made during this
transportation, resale, and distribution, and were crucial in achieving the goals of
the conspiracy: getting the cocaine to Sanders, where it could be parceled out and
resold. The district court’s admission of the phone calls as 801(d)(2)(E)
nonhearsay was not clearly erroneous.
IV. Admission of Rule 404(b) Evidence
Defendant next claims that the district court abused its discretion in
admitting “irrelevant” rule 404(b) evidence at trial. Defendant’s brief fails to
identify what evidence he is referring to, where in the record it was admitted, or
why the testimony is irrelevant, as required by Tenth Circuit Rule 28.2(C)(2).
While Defendant alludes to testimony by Mr. Flores that Defendant threatened
him not to testify against Defendant, the government maintains that the only such
testimony in the record was elicited by Defendant’s counsel on cross-examination.
In any case, we decline to search the record for support of Defendant’s contention
when he has failed to locate the supporting references required by rule 28.2(C)(2).
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See United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre , 108 F.3d 1228, 1237 n.8 (10th Cir.
1997).
V. Severing Firearm Count
Defendant further claims that the district court abused its discretion in not
severing Count III – possession of a firearm by a convicted felon – from Counts I
and II. Defendant asserts that since the gun was found twenty-four days after his
last known drug trafficking activity, his possession was not “inextricably
connected” with charges against him for conspiracy and cocaine possession. (Op.
Br. at 58; Reply Br. at 6-7). However, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a)
broadly allows joinder of offenses “of the same or similar character or . . . based
on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.” The district court’s
decision to refuse severance under rule 14 will not be reversed absent a strong
showing of prejudice. See United States v. Johnson , 130 F.3d 1420, 1427 (10th
Cir. 1997).
In Johnson , the defendant similarly contended that firearms counts should
be severed from a narcotics count. We there held that a joint trial was proper
“because the handgun was arguably related to and part of Johnson’s drug
trafficking scheme.” Id. The court noted that “there was no evidence that
Johnson actually used or carried the handgun when he sold cocaine;” however,
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“[i]t was reasonable for the jury to infer the handgun aided or assisted him in
those transactions.” Id. Here, Defendant procured the revolver from his cocaine
supplier and kept it in a location where drug transactions occurred. Defendant
neglects to show that he was unduly prejudiced by the district court’s refusal to
sever his firearm and narcotics charges, and thus this issue must fail.
VI. Jury Instruction on Conspiracy
Defendant next argues that the integrity of his trial was affected by an
inadequate jury instruction on the conspiracy charge. While the district court
gave an elaborate explanation of the crime, it did not identify one of its elements
as “interdependence” among the coconspirators, as enunciated in our cases. See
United States v. Evans , 970 F.2d 663, 668 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied , 507 U.S.
922 (1993); United States v. Fox , 902 F.2d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir.) cert. denied ,
498 U.S. 874 (1990).
Since Defendant’s counsel did not object to the instruction at trial, we
review it for plain error. See United States v. Kennedy , 64 F.3d 1465, 1478 (10th
Cir. 1995). “Plain error exists if the contested instruction was so prejudicial or
lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been served.” Id. at 1479. When
reviewing jury instructions, “the instructions must be read and evaluated in their
entirety.” United States v. Denny , 939 F.2d 1449, 1454 (10th Cir. 1991). A
judge has “substantial discretion in formulating the instructions, so long as they
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are correct statements of the law and adequately cover the issues presented.”
United States v. Vasquez , 985 F.2d 491, 496 (10th Cir. 1993). We have held that,
in order to prove a conspiracy, the government must prove “‘“(1) agreement with
another person to violate the law; (2) knowledge of the essential objectives of the
conspiracy; (3) knowing and voluntary involvement; and (4) interdependence
among the alleged coconspirators.”’” United States v. Edwards , 69 F.3d 419, 430
(10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Pedraza , 27 F.3d 1515, 1524 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 941 (1994) (quoting United States v. Johnson , 12
F.3d 1540, 1545 (10th Cir. 1993)). We have discussed in previous cases the
meaning of the interdependence requirement. “[I]nterdependence exists where
‘each coconspirator’s activities “constituted essential and integral steps toward
the realization of a common, illicit goal.”’” Edwards , 69 F.3d at 431 (quoting
United States v. Fox , 902 F.2d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 874
(1990) (quoting United States v. Brewer , 630 F.2d 795, 799 (10th Cir.1980))).
We have also described the element of interdependence as requiring “proof that
[the conspirators] intended to act together for their shared mutual benefit within
the scope of the conspiracy charged.” United States v. Evans , 970 F.2d 663, 671
(10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied , 507 U.S. 922 (1993).
Utilizing Fifth Circuit Pattern Instruction 2.89 (1997) in its entirety, the
court instructed:
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A “conspiracy” is an agreement between two or
more persons to join together to accomplish some
unlawful purpose. It is the kind of “partnership in
crime” in which each member becomes the agent of
every other member.
For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime,
you must be convinced that the government has proved
each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
First: That two or more persons made an
agreement to commit the crime of possession with intent
to distribute 500 grams and more of cocaine, as charged
in the indictment; and
Second: That the defendant knew the unlawful
purpose of the agreement and joined in it willfully, that
is, with the intent to further the unlawful purpose.
(Trial Tr. at 333-34).
It might have been preferable for the district court to have used the word
“interdependence” in its conspiracy instructions. However, given our standard of
review, we only inquire whether the contested instruction as a whole was “so
prejudicial or lacking in [their] elements that justice cannot have been served.”
Kennedy , 64 F.3d at 1479. We think the instructions as a whole adequately
apprized the jury of the need to find interdependence. The first part of the given
instruction informed the jury that conspirators must “join together,” and that they
are “partners in crime” for the achievement of their unlawful purpose. (Trial Tr.
at 333). Moreover, the instruction continues for five more paragraphs discussing
such issues as “formal agreement,” “mere presence” and “buyer-seller
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relationship.” (Trial Tr. at 334-35).
We have previously held that the omission of “interdependence” as a
separately numbered element in the conspiracy instruction was not error. See
United States v. Russell , 109 F.3d 1503, 1513-14 (10th Cir. 1997). In Russell , as
here, the jury instruction consisted of two elements instead of four, and did not
specify “interdependence” in either. However, the court found the essential
aspects of the necessary four elements subsumed within the two-part instruction.
Specifically, “interdependence” was satisfied in the instruction that the jury find
“two or more persons in some way or manner, positively or tacitly, came to a
mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, as
charged in the Indictment.” Id. at 1513. There, as here, the instruction provided
an additional five paragraphs of particularized instruction.
Given the extensive instruction and the ample evidence concerning the
Defendant’s mutually beneficial relationship with the coconspirators, the jury was
not misled about the necessary elements for conviction on conspiracy. We see no
plain error in the court's instructions to the jury.
VII. Obstruction of Justice Enhancement
Defendant next claims that the district court clearly erred in ordering a two-
level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
Defendant alleges that in giving Flores an exculpatory statement for Flores to
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sign, he made no overt threat and did not directly tell Flores to lie, but was merely
exercising “his constitutional rights to prepare a defense against the charges and
seek prospective witnesses in his behalf.” (Reply Br. at 22). However, the
district court found that Defendant had prepared a false “sworn statement” for
Flores in “an effort to block Mr. Flores out as a witness,” and that, as a result,
Flores felt threatened and fearful for himself and his family. (Sent. Tr. at 49-50,
91-92). We see no clear error in the district court’s findings. See United States
v. Hankins , 127 F.3d 932, 934 (10th Cir. 1997). The district court could easily
have found Defendant’s act to be an unlawful attempt to influence a witness,
suborn perjury, or produce a false document during an official investigation. See
U.S. S ENTENCING G UIDELINES M ANUAL § 3C1.1, cmt. n.4 (1998). Defendant’s act
fell squarely within the sentencing guidelines’ mandate for an upward adjustment,
as found by the district court.
VIII. Firearm Possession Enhancement
Defendant next claims that the district court clearly erred in ordering a two-
level upward adjustment for possessing a firearm during a drug trafficking crime
under U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(1). Defendant asserts that the weapon had no physical
proximity to the drug offense, as required by United States v. Gomez-Arrellano ,5
F.3d 464, 466 (10th Cir. 1993), since it was found in Defendant’s apartment
twenty-four days following Defendant’s last documented drug activity.
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In United States v. Smith , 131 F.3d 1392 (10th Cir. 1997), we declared that
an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)
“should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it
is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected
with the offense.” USSG § 2d1.1, comment., (n.3). The
government bears the initial burden of proving
possession by a preponderance of the evidence, and
possession may be satisfied by showing mere proximity
to the offense. See United States v. Roberts , 980 F.2d
645, 647 (10th Cir. 1992). The enhancement is then
appropriate unless the defendant proves the
exception—that it is clearly improbable the weapon was
connected with the offense. See id.
Smith , 131 F.3d at 1400. The government’s initial burden is met “when it shows
that a weapon was located near the general location where at least part of a drug
transaction occurred.” United States v. Vaziri , 164 F.3d 556, 568 (10th Cir.
1999) (citing United States v. Flores , 149 F.3d 1272, 1280 (10th Cir. 1998), and
United States v. Roederer , 11 F.3d 973, 982-83 (10th Cir. 1993)).
At trial, testimony established that Defendant possessed the gun on October
23, 1997, in a location that was repeatedly the locus for drug trafficking, next to
drug paraphernalia and physically near Defendant. In addition, the gun was
originally procured from Sanders, Defendant’s regular source of cocaine during
the same period. By demonstrating these facts, the government thus met its
burden of proof regarding possession in proximity to the offense.
The burden thus shifted to Defendant to show that it was “clearly
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improbable” that the weapon was connected to the offense. However, Defendant
merely reiterated his denial of knowing possession of the gun at sentencing.
(Sent. Tr. at 99-103). Only now does Defendant assert that discovery of the gun
twenty-four days after the last known drug activity was too distant to allow an
upward adjustment. This assertion would not have demonstrated clear
improbability even if it had been timely presented. Defendant has thus not
demonstrated such clear error that we are “left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.” Manning v. United States , 146 F.3d 808, 812
(10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Cowles v. Dow Keith Oil & Gas, Inc. , 752 F.2d 508,
511 (10th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted)).
IX. Reduction for Minor Role
Defendant next argues that the district court clearly erred in refusing to
reduce his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 for minimal participation in the
alleged conspiracy. Defendant asserts that because he was not a regular
participant in the larger trafficking chain, his sentence should be adjusted
accordingly. Indeed, it does not appear that Defendant was a significant player in
that larger conspiracy. He purchased drugs regularly from Sanders, but generally
had infrequent contact with other members of the group. Only once did he
involve himself in the transportation or sale of drugs to or with other members.
While these facts might support an adjustment, our review is for clear error.
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“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice
between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City ,
470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). We find the district court’s evaluation of the evidence
plausible. See id. The district court noted that, while Defendant was obviously
not a major participant, the evidence showed that he sold the conspiracy’s drugs
to an undercover agent, he received a large quantity of their drugs soon after its
arrival, he kept scales used for weighing drugs at his residence, and assisted
directly in holding the drugs for a coconspirator when the normal chain of
production broke down. Thus, the court concluded that “his role fell somewhat in
the middle of all of this and that the Probation Service correctly determined that
there should be neither an increase nor a decrease in the offense levels because of
his role.” (Sent. Tr. at 98). This was a permissible view in light of the record as
a whole, and we do not reverse it.
X. Apprendi Effect on Drug Quantity Findings
Defendant’s next claim comes to us months after oral argument. Defendant
asserts that, because the jury did not make a specific finding as to the amount of
cocaine he possessed, his convictions and sentences should be overturned based
on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. __,
120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). Although Apprendi was decided after Defendant’s brief
had been filed, the government concedes its application here. More importantly,
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Apprendi presents a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure, and thus
should be applied retroactively to cases pending on direct review. See Griffith v.
Kentucky , 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987); see also Powell v. Nevada , 511 U.S. 79, 80
(1994).
In Apprendi , the Court reviewed the increased penalty given to a defendant
following his jury conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm under New
Jersey law. After conviction, the judge sentenced the defendant to an additional
two years beyond the maximum penalty for that crime, based on the defendant’s
violation of a separate New Jersey hate crime—entitled a “sentence enhancement”
law—that had not been included in his indictment or presented to the jury at trial.
The Court reversed the decision, citing a violation of Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process. The Court then established the rule that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. at 530 U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. In doing so, the Court was
careful to state that “nothing . . . suggests that it is impermissible for judges to
exercise discretion . . . in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by
statute.” Id. at 530 U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. at 2358.
Apprendi involved the constitutionality of a state statute under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, but its underlying principles are
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equally applicable to federal criminal proceedings. See Jones v. United States ,
Nos. 97-1377 and 97-1463, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33133, at *9 (10th Cir. Dec.
19, 2000). Since Apprendi , we have had opportunity to examine the very issue
Defendant appeals. In Jones , we addressed on remand whether the quantity of
drugs involved in an offense under § 841 is an “essential element” which must be
charged in an indictment and submitted to the jury. We answered that question in
the affirmative. See id. at *10. Noting that the jury in that action had not made a
determination as to the amount of drugs used, we reviewed the relevant statute for
direction regarding situations in which no finding is made. Subparagraph
841(b)(1)(C) states that “[i]n the case of a controlled substance in schedule I or
II, . . . except as provided in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (D), such person shall
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 20 years.” 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(C). 1
Subparagraphs (A) and (B) provide higher penalty ranges for
specified drug quantities, while (D) refers to drugs other than cocaine. See 21
U.S.C. § 841(b). Thus, we held that unless a specific drug quantity is charged in
the indictment and found by the jury, a defendant charged with violating § 841(a)
may only be sentenced to a maximum of twenty years. See id. at *14.
Our holding in Jones guides our conclusions here. While explicitly set
forth in the indictment, the amount of cocaine involved in Defendant’s
1
Cocaine is a schedule II controlled substance under § 841.
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convictions under § 841(a)(1) and § 846 2
was not determined by the jury below. 3
This was error under Apprendi and Jones . However, since Defendant did not
object to the court’s quantity determination until his supplemental brief on appeal,
we review the district court’s sentence for plain error. F ED . R. C RIM . P. 52(b);
see also Johnson v. United States , 520 U.S. 461, 466-68 (1997) (applying the
plain error standard of review where the decision not to object was based on “near
uniform precedent both from th[e] Court and from the Courts of Appeals”).
Under . . . [plain error review], before an appellate court
can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1)
“error,” (2) that is “plain,” and (3) that “affect[s]
substantial rights.” If all three conditions are met, an
appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice
a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error “seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.”
Johnson , 520 U.S. at 466-67 (quoting United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 732
(1993) (further citations omitted)). In light of Apprendi and our recent decision
in Jones , we hold that the district court’s ruling is now error that has been made
2
Title 21 U.S.C. § 846, the Attempt and Conspiracy statute, makes the
penalty for conspiring to commit certain offenses the same as the penalty for
those offenses; hence, we look to § 841 for sentencing determinations under §
846.
3
In fact, the jury was specifically instructed: “The evidence in this case
need not establish that the amount or quantity of controlled substance was as
listed in the Indictment, but only that a measurable amount of the controlled
substance was in fact the subject of the acts charged in the Indictment.” (Trial Tr.
at 336.)
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plain. However, no substantial rights have been affected in this instance.
Defendant was sentenced to fourteen years, well below the twenty-year limit of §
841(b)(1)(C). If Defendant had received a sentence greater than twenty years, we
would have considered whether to exercise our plain error discretion. Here, there
is no need to do so. This decision is in accord with other circuits that have
addressed this issue. See, e.g. , In re Merrick , No. 00-3074, 2000 WL 1683478, at
*1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 10, 2000) (per curiam) (holding that Apprendi is not implicated
when a defendant’s sentence falls below the basic statutory maximum); United
States v. Meshack , 225 F.3d 556, 576 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that no Apprendi
error exists when the imposed sentence for a crack cocaine conviction was within
the twenty-year maximum statutory range of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)); United States v.
Corrado , 227 F.3d 528, 542 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that enhanced sentences for
RICO conspiracy convictions did not trigger Apprendi because they came short of
an unenhanced twenty-year maximum).
In addition, despite Defendant’s contention, the district court did not err in
considering drug amount as an aggravating or mitigating factor in establishing
Defendant’s offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. Not all facts that
affect a defendant’s sentence are essential elements, requiring prosecutorial proof
and jury finding. The Apprendi court noted that judges may still “exercise
discretion – taking into consideration various factors relating to both offense and
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offender – in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute.”
Apprendi , 530 U.S. __, __, 120 S. Ct. at 2358. In fact, the Court specifically
avoided disrupting the use or adequacy of the Sentencing Guidelines, noting that
“[t]he Guidelines are, of course, not before the Court. We therefore express no
view on the subject beyond what this Court has already held.” Id. at 2366 n.21.
Judges may still ascertain drug quantities by a preponderance of the evidence for
the purpose of calculating offense levels under the Sentencing Guidelines, so long
as they do not sentence above the statutory maximum for the jury-fixed crime.
See United States v. Angle , 230 F.3d 113, 123 (4th Cir. 2000) (interpreting §§
841 and 846 in light of Apprendi ). Thus, while the district court’s drug quantity
finding increased Defendant’s offense level and hence his sentence, it did not
increase the maximum sentence he faced, and as such did not infract Apprendi .
Defendant further contends that his conviction should fail since he was
charged under subparagraph (b)(1)(B) instead of (b)(1)(C). Because weight is an
essential element of § 841(b)(1)(B), and was not presented at trial and determined
by the jury, Defendant claims that his convictions on Counts I and II should be
overturned. However, Defendant fails to note that Counts I and II also charge
violations of § 841(a), the subsection of § 841 entitled “Unlawful Acts.” For the
punishment of these unlawful acts, § 841(a) directs us to § 841(b), entitled
“Penalties.” After surveying § 841(b), we have held that § 841(b)(1)(C) is the
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appropriate penalty in this case, as discussed above. Failure to cite to the correct
corresponding subparagraph in the indictment and sentence was thus harmless
error. See United States v. Swatzie , 228 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that
a defendant charged under § 841(a) and §8 41(b)(1)(B) without a jury
determination as to cocaine weight should be sentenced under § 841(b)(1)(C) in
light of Apprendi ).
XI. Supervised Release
Lastly, Defendant argues that the district court committed plain error by
sentencing him to concurrent five-year terms of supervised release following his
prison stay. Defendant points out that 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) is a Class C
felony, and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2) only allows a maximum of three years’
supervised release for Class C felonies. This is a familiar argument, adopted by
some of our sister circuits. See United States v. Good , 25 F.3d 218, 221 (4th Cir.
1994) (holding that a term of supervised release under § 841 cannot exceed the
maximum term authorized by § 3583(b)); United States v. Kelly , 974 F.2d 22, 24-
25 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (same).
The issue becomes more complex in comparing the two relevant statutes.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2), which sets standards for supervised release:
“Except as otherwise provided, the authorized terms of supervised release are . . .
(2) for a Class C or D felony, not more than three years . . . .” Yet Defendant
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violated 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), which requires under § 841(b)(1)(C) that “[a]ny
sentence imposing a term of imprisonment under this paragraph shall, in the
absence of a prior conviction, impose a term of supervised release of at least 3
years in addition to such term of imprisonment.” At first blush, this seems to
suggest that the only supervised release available for an § 841(b)(1)(C) offense is
a three-year term. However, because Congress inserted the language “except as
otherwise provided” in § 3583(b)(2) when § 841 was enacted, we have held that
Congress carved out an exception to § 3583(b)(2) for the supervised release term
under § 841. See United States v. Orozco-Rodriguez , 60 F.3d 705, 707-08 (10th
Cir. 1995); accord United States v. Abbington , 144 F.3d 1003, 1006 (6th Cir.
1998); United States v. Bongiorno , 139 F.3d 640, 641 (8th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam); United States v. Garcia , 112 F.3d 395, 397-98 (9th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Eng , 14 F.3d 165, 172-73 (2d Cir.) cert. denied , 513 U.S. 807 (1994).
It is true, as Defendant points out, that U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a) has been
amended since our decision in Orozco-Rodriguez . Previously, § 5D1.2(a)
declared: “If a defendant is convicted under a statute that requires a term of
supervised release, the term shall be at least three years but not more than five
years, or the minimum period required by statute, whichever is greater.” U.S.
S ENTENCING G UIDELINES M ANUAL § 5D1.2(a) (1994)). At the time of
Defendant’s trial, that guideline stated: “[I]f a term of supervised release is
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ordered, the length of the term shall be . . . (2) at least two years but not more
than three years for a defendant convicted of a Class C or D felony.” U.S.
S ENTENCING G UIDELINES M ANUAL § 5D1.2(a) (1998). As contrasted to the
present guideline, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) provides that the supervised release
shall be “at least three years.” We have previously declared that statutes trump
guidelines when the two conflict. See United States v. Allen , 16 F.3d 377, 379
(10th Cir.1994); United States v. Campbell , 995 F.2d 173, 175 (10th Cir. 1993);
accord Edwards v. United States , 523 U.S. 511, 514 (1998) (stating that “a
maximum sentence set by statute trumps a higher sentence set forth in the
Guidelines”); see also United States v. Holloway , 991 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir.
1993); United States v. Dow , 990 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v.
Sharp , 883 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); United States v. Donley ,
878 F.2d 735, 740-41 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Savage , 863 F.2d 595, 600
(8th Cir. 1988). In fact, the Sentencing Commission itself noted: “If the statute
requires imposition of a sentence other than that required by the guidelines, the
statute shall control.” See U.S. S ENTENCING G UIDELINES M ANUAL § 5G1.1 cmt.
(1998). Therefore, we hold that § 841(b)(1)(C) is not restricted by U.S.S.G. §
5D1.2(a) or § 3583(b)(2) from establishing terms of supervised release greater
than three years.
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s convictions and sentences are
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AFFIRMED .
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