F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
FEB 12 2001
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 00-6099
DOUGLAS CHRISTOPHER GAY,
JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 99-CR-171-R)
Timothy W. Ogilvie (Daniel G. Webber, Jr., United States Attorney, with him on
the brief), Assistant United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for
Plaintiff-Appellee.
William P. Earley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
for Defendant-Appellant.
Before BRORBY, PORFILIO and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Douglas Christopher Gay, Jr. entered a conditional guilty plea to
possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), and possession of a firearm after conviction of a felony offense, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Mr. Gay’s conditional plea reserved the right
to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The
district court sentenced Mr. Gay to 235 months imprisonment, with a four-year
term of supervised release, and a $200.00 special assessment. On appeal, Mr.
Gay challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and the court’s
sentencing calculation under United States Sentencing Guideline (U.S.S.G.)
§ 4B1.1 career offender provision. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts in this case are not in dispute. In 1997, an Oklahoma City police
officer apprehended Mr. Gay who, at the time of his arrest, held several plastic
bags containing approximately fifty-three grams of cocaine base. As the result of
an investigation, authorities determined Mr. Gay was “fronted” nine ounces, or
255.15 grams, of cocaine base from another individual, and Mr. Gay had sold all
but the fifty-three grams found in his hand at the time of his arrest. Thereafter,
Mr. Gay apparently fled while on bail, and for two years the United States
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Marshal Service made numerous attempts to locate and arrest Mr. Gay, based on
an outstanding 1997 Drug Enforcement Agency arrest warrant issued for Mr. Gay.
In 1999, Deputy McNeil, with the United States Marshal Service, learned from an
informant Mr. Gay lived with a relative – possibly his uncle – in Shawnee,
Oklahoma. Informants from the Shawnee Police Department and the District
Attorney Narcotics Task Force told Deputy McNeil the uncle was a known drug
dealer and that possibly a relative involved in the drug business lived with him.
Law enforcement agents obtained a state search warrant for the uncle’s
West Kirk Street residence, which authorized the agents to search the residence
for both Mr. Gay and any drugs and firearms. On the morning of August 3, 1999,
Deputy McNeil and other law enforcement agents 1
(hereinafter “officers”)
executed the search warrant at the West Kirk Street residence, but did not find
Mr. Gay. The same morning, a confidential informant at that residence told the
officers Mr. Gay presently dealt drugs and was “armed at all times.” 2
1
The arresting law enforcement agents include, among others, Deputy
United States Marshals and an officer with the Oklahoma County sheriff’s
department.
2
The officers engaged in a face-to-face conversation with the informant.
In addition, several other informants told the agents Mr. Gay was armed at all
times.
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Furthermore, the informant divulged Mr. Gay did not live with, but frequently
visited, his uncle at the West Kirk Street residence. The confidential informant
knew, from personal experience and numerous visits, Mr. Gay lived
approximately two miles away on Pottinger Street. Soon after disclosing the
location of Mr. Gay’s current residence, the informant accompanied the officers
to Pottinger Street, showed them the location of the house, pointed out the duplex,
and told the officers Mr. Gay was presently in his home.
Some time between nine and ten in the morning, and within five minutes of
learning the location of Mr. Gay’s current residence, Deputy McNeil knocked on
the door of the Pottinger Street residence and shouted “police.” Deputy McNeil
immediately heard a “thud” from inside the residence. After two or three
seconds, another officer twice kicked on the door to effect a forcible entry. The
officers entered the residence and found Mr. Gay standing just inside the door. A
gun was at his feet. The officers found 2.49 grams of crack cocaine in plain view
on the couch. After the officers arrested Mr. Gay and advised him of his rights,
he admitted he owned the gun and cocaine base.
A grand jury indictment charged Mr. Gay in Count 1 with possession of
cocaine base with intent to distribute on March 5, 1997, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
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§ 841(a)(1); in Count 2 with possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute
on August 3, 1999, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); in Count 3 with
possession of a firearm in connection with the 1999 drug trafficking crime; and in
Count 4 with possession of a firearm on August 3, 1999 after conviction of a
felony offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 3
Mr. Gay filed a motion in district court to suppress evidence challenging,
among other things: (1) the officers’ use of the unknown confidential informant
to form their reasonable belief that Mr. Gay resided in, and was within the
dwelling at the time of entry; and (2) the officers’ unreasonable knock and
announce before forcibly entering the Pottinger Street residence. The district
court held a suppression hearing and overruled Mr. Gay’s motion. Mr. Gay
entered a conditional guilty plea to Counts 2 and 4 of the Indictment, while
reserving the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence. The district court then sentenced Mr. Gay to 235 months imprisonment
on Count 2, a concurrent 120-month imprisonment on Count 4, a four-year term
of supervised release, and a $200.00 special assessment. Mr. Gay appeals the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, and challenges the
3
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the government dismissed Counts 1 and 3
of the Indictment, including the 1997 count.
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district court’s sentencing calculation under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 career offender
guideline.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this court considers the
totality of the circumstances and views the evidence in the light most favorable to
the government. United States v. Long , 176 F.3d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied , 528 U.S. 921 (1999). We accept the district court’s findings of facts
unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Green , 178 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir.
1999). “A district court’s factual finding is clearly erroneous only ‘if it is without
factual support in the record or if this court, after reviewing all the evidence, is
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’” United
States v. Patron-Montano , 223 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2000) (alteration
omitted) (quoting Manning v. United States , 146 F.3d 808, 812 (10th Cir. 1998)).
“The ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is a
question of law we review de novo, considering the totality of the circumstances.”
United States v. Dickerson, 195 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 1999).
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DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Suppress
Mr. Gay does not dispute the validity, or the underlying probable cause, of
his 1997 outstanding arrest warrant. Moreover, Mr. Gay acknowledges, as he
must, an officer has limited authority based on the arrest warrant to enter a
dwelling where the suspect resides. See Payton v. New York , 445 U.S. 573, 603
(1980). However, Mr. Gay suggests officers could not lawfully enter the
Pottinger Street residence without a search warrant supported by probable cause
because it was not his home, but a third person’s home. Accordingly, he asserts a
Steagald , 4 rather than Payton , analysis should apply to the facts of this case. We
disagree.
In Payton , the Supreme Court recognized the common law maxim “every
man’s house is his castle” is part of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Payton , 445 U.S. at 590, 597
n.45 (stating the Fourth Amendment draws a “firm line at the entrance to the
house [and] [a]bsent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be
crossed without a warrant”). Although searches and seizures inside a home
4
Steagald v. United States , 451 U.S. 204, 205-6 (1981).
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without a search warrant are presumptively unreasonable, “an arrest warrant
founded on probable case implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a
dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is
within.” Payton , 445 U.S. at 603.
In contrast, the Supreme Court held in Steagald that absent exigent
circumstances or consent, law enforcement officers could not legally search for
the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party without first obtaining
a search warrant. Steagald , 451 U.S. at 205-06. Nevertheless, the Steagald Court
reiterated the principle articulated in Payton that “an arrest warrant alone will
suffice to enter a suspect’s own residence to effect his arrest.” Id. at 221.
In a Payton analysis, this court recognizes a two-prong test: officers must
have a reasonable belief the arrestee (1) lived in the residence, and (2) is within
the residence at the time of entry. Valdez v. McPheters , 172 F.3d 1220, 1224-25
(10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting argument “reasonable belief” standard is the
equivalent of “probable cause”). Thus, whether Steagald or Payton applies is
resolved under the first prong of the Payton test. For the following reasons, we
conclude the Payton analysis applies.
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A. Reasonable belief arrestee lives in the residence
To satisfy the first prong of the Payton test, the officers must reasonably
believe Mr. Gay lived in the Pottinger Street residence at the time of entry. We
recognize the “officers’ belief need not prove true in fact[;] it is sufficient if the
belief was objectively reasonable at the time of entry.” Valdez , 172 F.3d at 1225.
In addition, Mr. Gay need not actually live in the Pottinger Street residence, so
long as he “possesses common authority over, or some other significant
relationship to, the residence entered by police.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
As we noted in Valdez , “people do not live in individual, separate, hermetically
sealed residences[, but] live with other people[;] they move from one residence to
another.” Id.
Mr. Gay argues an officer’s reasonable belief cannot be based on
information acquired from an unknown confidential informant. Mr. Gay cites
Florida v. J.L. , 526 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000) as support for his argument
a “bald assertion” from an unknown informant fails to demonstrate the
informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity. In J.L. , the Court held “an
anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun, without more” does not give rise to
a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop and frisk. 120 S. Ct. at 1377-79. This is
because an anonymous tip alone lacks the moderate indicia of reliability necessary
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to justify reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1379-80.
The J.L. case is legally and factually distinguishable from this one. To
satisfy the Payton test the officers must have a “reasonable belief” the arrestee
lives in the residence, not a “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify a “stop
and frisk” under Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See United States v. Clayton ,
210 F.3d 841, 844 n. 3 (8th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing “reasonable belief” from
“reasonable suspicion”). These are two different legal standards. Nevertheless,
we note the officers in this case, unlike in J.L. , rely on more than an anonymous
tip. The officers engaged in a face-to-face discussion with the informant, who
knew Mr. Gay was currently involved in criminal activity, told the officers the
location of the residence based on personal knowledge, personally accompanied
the officers to the residence, pointed at the dwelling, and presumably remained
accountable if the tip was fabricated. See United States v. Salazar , 945 F.2d 47,
50-51 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] face-to-face informant must, as a general matter, be
thought more reliable than an anonymous telephone tipster, for the former runs
the greater risk that he may be held accountable if his information proves false.”),
cert. denied , 504 U.S. 923 (1992). Based on the evidence as a whole, we find the
officers could reasonably rely on the confidential informant’s personal knowledge
concerning Mr. Gay’s residence; thus, the officers possessed an objectively
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reasonable belief Mr. Gay lived at the Pottinger Street residence at the time of
entry. 5
B. Reasonable belief arrestee is within the residence
Under the second prong of the Payton test, the officers must reasonably
believe Mr. Gay was within the residence or present at the time of entry. We
recognize we “must be sensitive to common sense factors indicating a resident’s
presence.” Valdez , 172 F.3d at 1226 (quotation marks omitted). The officers are
not required to actually view the suspect on the premises. Id. “Indeed the
officers may take into account the fact that a person involved in criminal activity
may be attempting to conceal his whereabouts.” Id.
In this case, the officers relied on the confidential informant to form their
belief Mr. Gay was within the dwelling at the time of entry. The informant, who
knew Mr. Gay personally, knew of his drug selling activities, and visited the
Pottinger Street residence on numerous occasions, explicitly told the officers Mr.
Gay was currently in his home. Soon after the confidential informant told them of
5
Although Mr. Gay admitted he lived at the Pottinger Street residence for
approximately two months prior to arrest, we will not consider the admission in
our examination of the arresting officers’ reasonable belief because it was
acquired after entry into the duplex. See Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1226 n.3.
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Mr. Gay’s presence, Deputy McNeil knocked loudly on the front door of the
residence and heard a thud from inside the home, which suggested to him a person
was inside the duplex at that time. After hearing the thud, the officers forcibly
entered the Pottinger Street residence. Here, too, because the officers received
information concerning Mr. Gay’s whereabouts in a face-to-face encounter with
the informant, we hold the officers could rely on the same informant’s tip Mr.
Gay was within the residence at the time of entry.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, as we
must, and considering the totality of the circumstances, we hold the officers
reasonably believed Mr. Gay lived in the residence and was within the residence
at the time of entry. See Long , 176 F.3d at 1307.
C. Knock and Announce Requirement
Mr. Gay asserts the officers’ failure to properly “knock and announce” their
presence and purpose before seeking entry into Mr. Gay’s residence renders the
ensuing arrest and seizure of evidence constitutionally unreasonable. The federal
“knock and announce” statute, which applies to the execution of both an arrest
and search warrant, provides:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window
of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a
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search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is
refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person
aiding him in the execution of the warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 3109; see Miller v. United States , 357 U.S. 301, 308-309 (1958). “If
the occupants do not admit the officers within a reasonable period of time, the
officers may be deemed to be constructively refused admittance, and they may
then enter by force.” United States v. Moore, 91 F.3d 96, 98 (10th Cir. 1996)
(questioning whether, in the absence of exigent circumstances, three seconds
between announcement and entry is constructive refusal); but see United States v.
Jenkins , 175 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir.) (dismissing a bright-line rule for time
that must elapse between announcement and entry), cert. denied , 528 U.S. 913
(1999). In this case, we need not decide whether the two or three seconds that
elapsed between the officers’ announcement and their entry was a reasonable
period of time under 18 U.S.C. § 3109 because we agree with the district court
that exigent circumstances permitted the officers’ immediate entry.
D. Exigent Circumstances
Unquestionably, the presumption in favor of announcement gives way when
exigent circumstances exist. United States v. King , 222 F.3d 1280, 1285 (10th
Cir. 2000). Exigent circumstances exist when officers are presented with an
emergency situation, including threat of physical violence. See Moore , 91 F.3d at
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98. “In order to justify a ‘no-knock’ entry, the police must have a reasonable
suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular
circumstances, would be dangerous or futile.” Richards v. Wisconsin , 520 U.S.
385, 394 (1997). We are mindful “[t]he mere statement that firearms are present,
standing alone, is insufficient. The government must go further and demonstrate
that the presence of firearms raised a concern for the officers’ safety.” Moore , 91
F.3d at 98.
In this case, the district court held exigent circumstances existed because
the arresting officers obtained information from multiple informants that Mr. Gay
carried a weapon at all times, currently dealt drugs, and recently parrticipated in a
shootout with the police . According to the district court, these facts suggest the
officers faced a threat of physical violence such that knocking and announcing
their presence may have jeopardized their lives and safety.
On appeal, Mr. Gay argues the officers did not possess reasonable
suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence would be dangerous. He
contends the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of his dangerousness because
the only information available to the officers involved his past shoot out with
police and unsubstantiated hearsay from multiple informants. As support for his
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argument, Mr. Gay cites to United States v. Stewart , 867 F.2d 581, 584 (10th Cir.
1989), in which we stated:
The conclusion of exigency ... must be especially clear ... where there
was no knock or warning whatsoever, where there was no
information as to who was in the house, where the destruction of
physical property took place, and where the occupants of the
residence could be injured as a result of the entry.
Id. In Stewart, the officers believed the defendant was dangerous because an
informant under the influence of marijuana told another informant he once saw
the defendant with a semi-automatic pistol. Id. at 585. Based on little more than
that statement, the Denver S.W.A.T. team forcibly entered the defendant’s home,
without knocking and announcing their presence, used a battering ram and
detonated a stun grenade upon entry. Id. at 583.
The facts in this case, to say the least, are distinguishable. The quality and
quantity of the officers’ information regarding Mr. Gay’s dangerousness is
significantly greater than the information in Stewart . Here, the officers relied on
at least four informants who each corroborated that Mr. Gay was armed at all
times. In addition, Deputy McNeil learned from another agent, and the Tulsa
police department confirmed, Mr. Gay participated in a police shoot-out two years
prior to his 1999 arrest. In discussing the events of the shoot-out, Tulsa police
told Deputy McNeil that Mr. Gay admitted he would involve himself in another
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shoot-out with police to avoid jail. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the
forcible entry into the Pottinger Street residence are less extreme than those in
Stewart . In this case, the arresting officers knocked, announced “police,” waited
two or three seconds, heard a thud, and twice kicked, rather than rammed, the
door before entering. After carefully reviewing the transcript of the suppression
hearing, we conclude the district court’s factual findings are not clearly
erroneous, are fully supported by the evidence, and this court is not left with a
“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Patron-Montano ,
223 F.3d at 1188 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Based on these facts,
we hold exigent circumstances justified the officers’ forcible entry into Mr. Gay’s
Pottinger Street residence.
II. CAREER OFFENDER SENTENCING
On appeal, Mr. Gay does not dispute the district court’s finding he is a
career offender within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, but instead challenges
the court’s sentencing calculation under the career offender provision. In order to
understand the basis of Mr. Gay’s appeal, a brief recitation of the probation
officer’s sentencing computation, which the district court adopted, is necessary.
The probation officer found Mr. Gay accountable for a total 257.64 grams
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of cocaine base, based on the 255.15 grams, or nine ounces, he was “fronted” in
1997, 6 and the 2.49 grams he possessed when arrested in 1999. Under the
Sentencing Guidelines, Mr. Gay’s base offense level for 257.64 grams of cocaine
base is 34. 7
The probation officer added two levels, pursuant to Sentencing
Guideline § 2D1.1(B)(1), because Mr. Gay possessed a firearm during the
offense, resulting in a base offense level of 36. The probation officer then
reduced by three levels, pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines § 3E1.1(a)-(b),
because Mr. Gay accepted responsibility and assisted authorities, resulting in a
total offense level of 33.
Mr. Gay’s initial criminal history category was IV. However, Mr. Gay
satisfies the § 4B1.1. career offender guideline requirements because he was at
least eighteen years old at the time he committed the instant offense, which
6
Although the government dismissed Mr. Gay’s 1997 drug possession and
distribution count, pursuant to a plea agreement, the probation officer used the
nine ounces of cocaine base to calculate his offense level. We recognize a
sentencing court may consider drug quantities from dismissed counts as relevant
conduct, under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). See United States v. McGee, 7 F.3d 1496, 1499
(10th Cir. 1993). On appeal, Mr. Gay does not contest the probation officer’s
calculation of his total amount of cocaine base.
7
The Drug Quantity Table in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3) provides a base
offense level of 34 for “[a]t least 150 [grams] but less than 500 [grams] of
Cocaine Base.”
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involved a controlled substance, and had been convicted of at least two prior
crimes of violence. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Thus, the probation officer assigned
Mr. Gay a criminal history category VI, pursuant to § 4B1.1 which requires
category VI in “every case.” 8
Id.
The probation officer also explained § 4B1.1 provides an alternative
method for calculating a career offender’s base offense level. The § 4B1.1 base
offense level must be applied if it is greater than the offense level calculated
under § 2D1.1. Id. Mr. Gay’s § 4B1.1 base offense level is 34 because the
maximum statutory penalty for his violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) is
forty years. 9
Because Mr. Gay’s base offense level of 36 under § 2D1.1 is greater
than his offense level of 34 under § 4B1.1, 10
the probation office calculated Mr.
Gay’s sentence applying the § 2D1.1 base offense level. Id.
8
Before application of the career offender guideline, Mr. Gay’s criminal
history category was IV.
Section 4B1.1 provides an offense level of 34 if the offense statutory
9
maximum is twenty-five years or more, but less than life imprisonment. Id.
10
The career offender guideline permits a decrease under § 3E1.1.
Because Mr. Gay accepted responsibility and assisted authorities, the probation
officer deducted three levels from Mr. Gay’s career offender base offense level of
34. Thus, his total offense level under § 4B1.1 is 31.
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The district court adopted the probation officer’s sentencing calculation,
which combined the adjusted § 2D1.1 offense level (33) to the criminal history
category VI specified in § 4B1.1 and resulted in a sentencing range of 235 to 293
months imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. Chapter 5 (Sentencing Table). The district
court sentenced Mr. Gay to 235 months in prison.
On appeal, Mr. Gay argues the district court applied a piecemeal, and
ultimately higher, sentence by using the greater § 2D1.1 offense level with the
§ 4B1.1 criminal history category. Mr. Gay contends that because the district
court did not apply the offense level listed in the career offender guideline, the
higher criminal history category VI also may not be applied. Stated differently,
Mr. Gay asserts the district court erred because the “career offender provision
must be applied in toto , or not at all.”
We review the district court’s factual findings regarding sentencing for clear
error and review its legal interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo .
United States v. Maldonado-Acosta , 210 F.3d 1182, 1183 (10th Cir. 2000). The
§ 4B1.1 career offender provision states, in relevant part: “If the offense level for
a career criminal from the table below is greater than the offense level otherwise
applicable, the offense level from the table below shall apply. A career offender’s
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criminal history category in every case shall be Category VI.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1
(2000). The table specified in the provision contains offense levels geared to the
maximum sentence under the statute of conviction. 11
In enacting § 4B1.1,
Congress intended career offenders to “receive a sentence of imprisonment at or
near the maximum term authorized.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 comment. (backg’d)
(quotation marks omitted).
This court has stated the guidelines must be interpreted as if they were a
statute or court rule. United States v. Checora , 175 F.3d 782, 790 (10th Cir.
1999). As with general statutory interpretation, “our analysis must begin with the
language of the guidelines in question.” United States v. Smith , 900 F.2d 1442,
1446 (10th Cir. 1990). “The guidelines, as criminal statutes, are ‘given their fair
meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers.’” United States v.
Mojica , 214 F.3d 1169, 1171 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Moore ,
423 U.S. 122, 145 (1975)).
It is evident § 4B1.1, adopted for the purpose of enhancing the sentences for
career offenders, articulates two opposed offense levels. The first offense level is
In this case, the statute of conviction, § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), sets the
11
maximum sentence at forty years.
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that listed in the career offender table; the second is the “otherwise applicable”
Chapter Two offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. The career offender guideline
plainly directs the sentencing court to apply the listed career offender offense level
if it is greater than the offense level otherwise applicable. Based on the “fair
meaning” of § 4B1.1, it logically follows that if the “otherwise applicable” ( ie.,
Chapter Two) offense level is greater, then the sentencing court must apply that
offense level. See Mojica , 214 F.3d at 1171. Our reading of § 4B1.1 and its
explanatory background notes is consistent with the legislatures’ manifest intent
for offenders with a career criminal background to receive at or near the maximum
sentence authorized, and the fact § 4B1.1 is intended as a sentence enhancement.
United States v. Robinson , 935 F.2d 201, 206 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied , 502
U.S. 1037 (1992); see also U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 comment. (backg’d).
Additionally, our holding is in accord other circuits’ case law. The Eleventh
Circuit, when confronted with a similar question, stated, “[i]t would appear the
negative corollary of [§ 4B1.1] must also apply; i.e. , if the offense level from the
career offender table is less than the otherwise applicable offense level, the greater
of the offense levels shall apply.” Robinson , 935 F.2d at 205-06. See United
States v. Marrone , 48 F.3d 735, 740 n.9 (3d Cir.) (“A career offender’s offense
level is the greater of the offense level applicable to the underlying conduct or the
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appropriate offense level specified in section 4B1.1. A career offender
automatically receives a criminal history category of VI.”), cert. denied , 516 U.S.
836 (1995). For the reasons stated, we hold Mr. Gay’s “otherwise applicable”
offense level, under § 2D1.1, applies because it is greater than his career criminal
offense level.
However, our resolution of the applicable offense level does not end our
inquiry. We now must resolve Mr. Gay’s appropriate criminal history category.
Mr. Gay contends his criminal history category is inextricably intertwined with his
applicable offense level. Thus, he suggests the sentencing court may only apply
the specified § 4B1.1 criminal history category VI if that court also uses the listed
career offender offense level. We reject such a constrained reading of § 4B1.1.
This court has previously noted the structure of the Sentencing Guidelines
suggests that the criminal history category is to be determined independently of the
offense level and “without regard to the nature of the crime for which the
defendant is currently being sentenced.” United States v. Goldbaum, 879 F.2d
811, 813 (10th Cir. 1989). Therefore, Mr. Gay’s contention the automatic criminal
history category is dependent on the offense level listed in the career offender
table is erroneous. The plain language of § 4B1.1 requires criminal history
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category VI in “every case.” We read this to mean the sentencing court must
employ Category VI regardless of which offense level is applied. Congress
provided no exceptions to the mandatory criminal history category, and we find it
difficult to believe Congress intended an alternative criminal history to apply to a
career offender. This court recognizes “[t]he automatic placement of a career
offender in criminal history category VI under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 reflects the
Commission’s assessment that the offender possess the most serious criminal
history and the highest possible likelihood of recidivism.” United States v.
Collins , 122 F.3d 1297, 1304 (10th Cir. 1997). For the reasons stated, we hold the
district court did not err in applying the “otherwise applicable” § 2D1.1 offense
level with the career offender criminal history category VI.
Although Mr. Gay cites no case law to support his argument, he suggests
§ 1B1.5 requires the sentencing court to apply the career offender guideline in its
entirety. Section 1B1.5 generally provides guidance on how to apply a guideline
referenced in another guideline. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.5. Mr. Gay asserts § 1B1.5
requires “that if a cross-reference to another [offense] guideline is used, then the
entire [offense] guideline shall be used.” However, Mr. Gay’s argument excludes
relevant commentary, and ultimately attempts to inject a cross-reference term into
the plain language of the guideline.
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“The intent of the Sentencing Commission is demonstrated in part through
its commentary. District courts are obliged to follow the explanatory application
notes unless they are plainly erroneous, inconsistent with the guidelines, or
violative of the Constitution or a federal statute.” Mojica , 214 F.3d at 1171. The
“commentary explains the guidelines and provides concrete guidance as to how
even unambiguous guidelines are to be applied in practice.” United States v.
Pedragh , 225 F.3d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Mr. Gay disregards the commentary to § 1B1.5 which acknowledges a
“cross-reference,” or instruction to apply another offense guideline, is typically
labeled as such. The commentary states “[r]eferences to other offense guidelines
are most frequently designated ‘Cross References,’ but may also appear in the
portion of the guideline entitled ‘Base Offense Level’ ..., or ‘Specific Offense
Characteristics.’” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.5. It is clear the career offender provision
contains no “cross reference” designation, and does not appear in the portion of
the guideline entitled “Base Offense Level” or “Specific Offense Characteristic.”
Thus, § 4B1.1 does not “cross reference,” as defined by § 1B1.5, another guideline
provision by merely stating an “otherwise applicable” offense level may apply.
Compare U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 with §§ 2D1.1(d), 2D2.1(b), 2A4.1(c).
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As an alternative argument, Mr. Gay asserts we should invoke the rule of
lenity because the district court suggested his sentence under the career offender
guideline is a “close question.” The rule of lenity requires courts to interpret
ambiguous statutes, including the Sentencing Guidelines, in favor of criminal
defendants. Ladner v. United States , 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958); United States v.
Blake , 59 F.3d 138, 140 (10th Cir.) (applying the rule of lenity to the Sentencing
Guidelines), cert. denied , 516 U.S. 1016 (1995). “The rule of lenity, however,
applies only in cases where there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the
language and structure of a provision.” United States v. Onheiber , 173 F.3d 1254,
1256 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The rule of lenity
“is a rule of last resort [and] the mere assertion of an alternative interpretation is
not sufficient to bring the rule into play.” Blake , 59 F.3d at 140.
After a thorough review of the text and structure of the career offender
guideline, and mindful of the lawmaker’s manifest intent, we do not believe the
§ 4B1.1 offense level and criminal history category language is grievously
ambiguous or uncertain. See United States v. Schneider , 14 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir.
1994). For the reasons stated, the provision unequivocally addresses the
applicable offense level and the automatic criminal history category that shall
apply in “every case.” See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Moreover, Congress intended the
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career offender provision to impose substantial imprisonment at or near the
statutory maximum for repeat drug traffickers and repeat violent offenders. See
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 comment. (backg’d) . In order to accept Mr. Gay’s argument, we
would ignore the plain language requiring a criminal history category VI in “every
case” and nullify Congress’ evident intent. We refuse to do so. Accordingly, we
conclude no grievous ambiguity exists and Mr. Gay’s assertion of an alternative
interpretation is simply insufficient to invoke this rule. See Blake , 59 F.3d at 140.
Finally, Mr. Gay argues the district court erred in computing his criminal
history category by improperly including deferred sentences in computing his
criminal history. We need not pause long to consider Mr. Gay’s contention
because we concluded a criminal history category VI applies in his case pursuant
to § 4B1.1. Thus, our holding renders Mr. Gay’s argument moot. We AFFIRM
the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma.
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