F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 13 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
GREGORY D. WILLIAMS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
vs. No. 00-6184
(D.C. No. 98-CV-154-M)
KEN KLINGER, (W.D. Okla.)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , KELLY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges. **
Petitioner-Appellant Gregory D. Williams, an inmate appearing pro se,
seeks to appeal the district court’s denial of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §
2254. Because the petitioner has failed to make “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right,” we deny his application for a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) and dismiss the appeal. Slack v. McDaniel , 120 S. Ct.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1 (G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
1595, 1603 (2000) (citation omitted).
On December 3, 1996, Mr. Williams pled guilty to obtaining property under
false pretenses, specifically, “purchasing” a set of tires with a $527.28 check,
drawn on an account that contained insufficient funds. Based on his prior
convictions of two or more felonies, he received an enhanced sentence of twenty-
five years imprisonment. See Doc. 22, Ex. B. His application for post-conviction
relief, challenging the validity of his sentence on various grounds, was denied as
procedurally barred. Id. That denial was eventually affirmed by the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”), which also concluded that Mr. Williams’
claims were unavailing on the merits. Doc. 43, Ex. C. The magistrate judge
found that although Mr. Williams’ jurisdictional claims had not been procedurally
defaulted, his federal petition should be denied on the merits. Doc. 48. The
district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and denied both the
petition and a COA. Docs. 53, 57.
In light of Mr. Williams’ plea of guilty, we may only consider those claims
that are jurisdictional in nature. United States v. Davis , 900 F.2d 1524, 1525-26
(10th Cir. 1990). Thus, our analysis is limited to the petitioner’s claim that the
sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to enhance his sentence based on his prior
felony convictions. See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 51 (1983 & Supp. 1996). He
advances three alternative arguments in support of this claim. First, Mr. Williams
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contends that he only pled to a violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1541.1 (1983), a
misdemeanor offense, and that misdemeanors are not subject to enhancement
under § 51. Aplt. Br. at 11-12. He also claims that even if he pled to a violation
of § 1541.2, a felony offense, his crime was still not subject to enhancement
because the value of the property involved was less than $500. Aplt. Br. at 3-11.
Specifically, he claims that the sentencing court misapplied Oklahoma law by
relying on the amount of the check rather than the (pre-tax) value of the property,
and that the district court’s denial of his motion under Rule 201(d) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence was erroneous. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(d), (f); Doc. 53, Doc.
51. Finally, he argues that enhancement was improper in any event because he
did not plead to any of the prior convictions. Aplt. Br. at 2, 12-14. Each
argument fails.
Under Oklahoma law, a sentence may be enhanced when three conditions
are present. Walker v. State , 953 P.2d 354, 356 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998)
(construing Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 51); see also Fiore v. White , 121 S. Ct. 712, 714
(2001) (holding that where a state court decision does not create a new rule, but
merely interprets a state criminal statute, that decision applies to any § 2254
petitioner whose conviction under that statute was final at the time of the state
court’s decision). The conditions vary slightly, depending on whether the
enhancement is premised on one or more than one prior conviction. Walker , 953
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P.2d at 356. In this case, the Oklahoma District Court found that Mr. Williams
“acknowledged and initialled [sic] that he was entering the plea after two or more
prior felony convictions.” Doc. 22, Ex. B at 2; see also Aplt. Br., Att. G at 3-4,
Att. N at 3. As with any “determination of a factual issue made by a State court,”
this finding is “presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Because Mr.
Williams has not produced “clear and convincing evidence” to the contrary, the
finding stands. Id.
An enhancement premised on two or more prior convictions is authorized
when: (1) the defendant has “a prior conviction for ‘any offense punishable by
imprisonment in the State Penitentiary,’” Walker , 953 P.2d at 356 (quoting Okla.
Stat. tit. 21, § 51(A)); (2) the prior convictions upon which the enhancement is
based are “‘felony offenses’ for which the sentence has been discharged within
ten years of the commission of the current crime,” id. (quoting § 51(B)), and
which did not arise out of the same incident, § 51(B); and (3) where the current
crime is a felony, regardless of whether it is punishable by imprisonment in the
penitentiary. Walker , 953 P.2d at 356. All three conditions are present here.
First, among Mr. Williams’ prior convictions is one for second-degree
forgery, Aplt. Br., Att. G at 3, an offense punishable by imprisonment in the state
penitentiary . Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1621(2) (1983). The second factor involves a
three-part inquiry: (a) has Mr. Williams been convicted of two prior felonies, (b)
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arising out of separate incidents, (c) for which the sentences have been discharged
within the ten years preceding the commission of the current crime on September
11, 1996? See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 51(B). The record does not reflect the length
of Mr. Williams’ prior sentences, rendering it impossible to determine which -- if
any -- of the sentences imposed in connection with the pre-1986 convictions were
completed within the relevant ten-year period. We therefore confine our analysis
of the second Walker condition to the post-1986 convictions.
The information to which Mr. Williams pled shows that he was convicted
of two counts of theft and one count of second-degree forgery on November 13,
1990; escape from custody on August 18, 1994; and two counts of obtaining
merchandise and/or money by a false and bogus check on October 8, 1996. Aplt.
Br., Att. G at 3-4. Of those six convictions, only the first four were entered prior
to September 11, 1996, and of those four, three appear to have arisen from the
same incident. Thus, in order to satisfy the second Walker condition, Mr.
Williams need only have completed his sentence for the 1994 escape conviction,
as well as his sentence for at least one of the three 1990 convictions, by
September 11, 1996. We know that Mr. Williams had been released from prison
by September 11, 1996, and nothing in the record suggests that the sentences had
not been completely discharged by that date. Cf. Harmon v. State , 748 P.2d 992,
995 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
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As to the third and final condition, it suffices to note that Mr. Williams
pled to an information charging him with “feloniously” committing the crime of
obtaining property under false pretenses, in violation of §§ 1541.1 and 1541.2.
Aplt. Br., Att. G; see also Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1541.2 (defining a violation as a
felony). Under Oklahoma law, a guilty plea “admits the facts pleaded in the
information.” Lozoya v. State , 932 P.2d 22, 30 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996). Mr.
Williams cites Bumpus v. State , 925 P.2d 1208 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996), for the
contrary proposition, but that case is easily distinguishable. In Bumpus , the
portion of the information that “alleged three separate prior felony convictions . .
. was dismissed as part of Appellant's plea agreement.” Id. at 1210.
Given that Mr. Williams’ plea admitted the facts charged in the
information, Lozoya , 932 P.2d at 30, we must reject his argument that he did not
plead to the prior felonies, see Aplt. Br., Att. G at 1; see also id. , Att. N at 3, as
well as his argument that he only pled to a misdemeanor. See Aplt. Br., Att. G at
1 (charging Mr. Williams with “feloniously” obtaining property under false
pretenses in violation of § 1541.2). As to the proper method of valuation under
§§ 1541.1 and 1541.2, we need not decide whether the district court’s denial of
Mr. Williams’ motion under Rule 201(d) was error. When, as in this case, a
sentence enhancement is based on two or more prior felony convictions, any
felony crime is subject to enhancement, regardless of whether the crime is
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punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary. Walker , 953 P.2d at 356. Under
§ 1541.2, any violation involving property worth $50 or more is a felony. There
is no evidence in the record to suggest that the tires, which Mr. Williams
purported to purchase for $527.28, were in fact worth less than $50. His
argument that the pre-tax value of the tires was less than $500 is unavailing.
Accordingly, we DENY Mr. Williams’ application for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis and for a COA, and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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