F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 20 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a
corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-7115
(E.D. Okla.)
CITY OF ATOKA, STATE OF OKLAHOMA, a (D.Ct. No. 98-CV-606-S)
municipal corporation,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
JOHN J. CROWLEY and SUE A. CROWLEY,
husband and wife; JEFFREY W. GLASS and
WENDI C. GLASS, husband and wife; RANDY
M. COMBS and TERESA A. COMBS, husband
and wife; J.D. WILSON and SHANNON LEE
WILSON, husband and wife; DONNIE L.
ALLEN and MARY L. ALLEN, husband and
wife; CHARLES DALE, and DODD DUNCAN,
individually,
Defendants-Appellees.
----------------
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. Oklahoma
Department of Transportation,
Amicus Curiae.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, McKAY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
This suit was brought by Union Pacific Railroad Company (“Union
Pacific”) against the City of Atoka, Oklahoma (“Atoka”), to quiet title to land
located within the corporate limits of Atoka. Atoka cross-claimed, asserting
Union Pacific’s interest in its right-of-way is conditioned on its continued use of
the land for railroad purposes. The railroad used the land as a spur on its right-
of-way for nearly seventy years, 1
but subsequently sold it to private individuals.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific, holding
the railroad owned its right-of-way land in fee simple absolute not subject to
reversion on abandonment, and Atoka appeals. On appeal, we must determine, as
a matter of law, the nature of Union Pacific’s right-of-way grant made pursuant to
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1
“[T]he term ‘right of way’ has a two-fold signification. It sometimes is used to
describe a right belonging to a party, a right of passage over any tract; and it is also used
to describe that strip of land which railroad companies take upon which to construct their
road-bed.” Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U.S. 1, 44 (1891).
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the Act of July 25, 1866. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
In the Act of July 25, 1866, Congress made land and right-of-way grants
primarily to the Kansas and Neosho Valley Railroad Company. See Act of July
25, 1866, ch. 241 §§ 1-8, 14 Stat. 236-38. However, Congress also created in the
Act a railroad construction competition among three railroad companies,
including Union Pacific, Southern Branch. 2
See id. § 11, 14 Stat. at 238-39. Each
competitor sought to “construct and complete its road” and tie its railroad line to
the point near the southern boundary of Kansas, where the Kansas and Neosho
Valley Railroad was to cross the same point. Id. ; see also Missouri-Kansas-Texas
R.R. Co. v. Early , 641 F.2d 856, 857 (10th Cir. 1981). The competitor’s incentive
to win the construction race was the right to build a track, and acquire land
grants, from southern Kansas, through Indian Territory, to a point near Preston,
Texas. Early, 641 F.2d at 857-58. Union Pacific won the race. Id . at 858.
2
The Union Pacific, Southern Branch, later became known as the Missouri,
Kansas & Texas Railroad Company, which merged into the Missouri Pacific Railroad
Company. In 1997, the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company merged into the Union
Pacific Railroad Company, a party in this appeal. Because Union Pacific is a successor in
interest, we will refer to Union Pacific as if it were the original grantee.
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Union Pacific constructed its rail line, which passed through portions of Atoka,
Oklahoma, pursuant to the July 25 Act.
The Act makes two grants: (1) alternating sections of land on each side of
the road granted to the State of Kansas for the benefit of the railroad in financing
the construction of its line, and (2) right-of-way land granted directly to the
railroad company for construction of the rail line itself. Compare July 25 Act § 1,
with July 25 Act §§ 6, 8. See generally Railroad Co. v. Baldwin , 103 U.S. 426,
428 (1880) (examining St. Joseph and Denver City Railroad Company’s grants
authorized by the Act of July 23, 1866, 14 Stat. 210). In this case, the subject
land was granted pursuant to the right-of-way grant, not the alternating sections
grant. Under the right-of-way grant, Congress authorized Union Pacific to
construct its railroad through Indian Territory and public lands, granted one
hundred feet in width on each side of the railroad, and provided “all necessary
ground for station buildings ... switches, side-tracks, turn-tables, and water-
stations.” July 25 Act §§ 6, 8.
The subject property is located within the corporate limits of the City of
Atoka. For years, Union Pacific used the land as a part of its railroad, but the
company re-routed its mainline in 1906 and 1907. The company then used the
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subject property as a spur. Union Pacific held ownership in the property until
1995, at which time the railroad sold the parcel to private individuals.
Union Pacific filed an amended complaint adding private individuals, who
are the grantees and their successors claiming an interest in the abandoned spur
parcel, as defendants to the suit. 3
Atoka filed a counter-claim against the Union
Pacific and cross-claims against the individual defendants. The parties then filed
cross-motions for summary and partial summary judgment. The district court
granted Union Pacific’s motion for summary judgment and denied Atoka’s motion
for partial summary judgment, holding as a matter of law that Congress, in the
Act of July 25, 1866, granted the railroad a right-of-way in fee simple absolute
with no right of reversion. 4
The district court entered judgment for Union Pacific,
3
John and Sue Crowley, Jeffrey and Wendi Glass, Randy and Teresa Combs, J.D.
and Shannon Lee Wilson, Donnie and Mary Allen, Charles Dale, and Dodd Duncan are
the grantees and successors who claim an interest in the parcel. Union Pacific added
them as individuals defendants, and they filed cross-claims against Atoka claiming the
railroad owned the land in fee simple, and filed counter-claims against Union Pacific.
4
The district court also held it was not bound to give an unpublished Oklahoma
Court of Civil Appeals decision, involving private individuals who bought a small parcel
of land adjacent to the railroad’s right-of-way, collateral estoppel effect. On appeal,
Atoka briefly explains the nature of the case before that court, but fails to further raise or
even mention the issue of collateral estoppel. We deem the issue waived on appeal. See
Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555, 1558 n.1 (10th Cir. 1992), modified on
other grounds on reh’g, 995 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1993) (recognizing an issue mentioned in
the brief on appeal, but not addressed, is considered waived).
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and dismissed all cross claims and counterclaims as moot.
We review the district court's summary judgment ruling de novo . Pirkheim
v. First Unum Life Ins. , 229 F.3d 1008, 1010 (10th Cir. 2000). “Summary
judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “Cross-
motions for summary judgment are to be treated separately; the denial of one does
not require the grant of another.” Buell Cabinet Co. v. Sudduth , 608 F.2d 431,
433 (10th Cir.1979). The parties agree there are no genuine issues of material
fact in dispute.
DISCUSSION
We must determine as a matter of law whether Union Pacific acquired fee
simple absolute title in its right-of-way land granted by the Act of July 25, 1866.
Atoka argues we should construe the right-of-way land grant as a “limited fee”
which reverts to Atoka when the railroad fails to use the land for railroad
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purposes. 5
Atoka claims such a construction of the July 25 Act is appropriate for
alternative reasons: first, the Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit interpret all
railroad right-of-way land grants made in the 1860s as “limited fees,” and second,
Congress’ right-of-way grant in the July 25 Act is more limited than that provided
in the Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 270, 14 Stat. 289. 6
Union Pacific’s right-of-way title, granted by the July 25 Act, depends on
the construction given to the Act in light of Congress’ intent at the time the grant
was made. See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 682 (1979) (“To
ascertain [Congress’] intent we must look to the condition of the country when
the [railroad land grant] acts were passed, as well as to the purpose declared on
their face, and read all parts of them together.” (quotation marks and citation
omitted)). In 1850, “Congress embarked on a policy of subsidizing railroad
construction by lavish grants from the public domain.” Great Northern Ry. Co. v.
5
Atoka contends the property reverts to Atoka pursuant to § 14 of the Act of April
26, 1906, 34 Stat. 137. However, because we hold there is no reversion to Atoka, we do
not address the Act of April 26, 1906.
6
The Act of July 26, 1866 authorized Union Pacific’s railroad line from the
southern boundary of Kansas, through Indian Territory, and branching east to Fort Smith,
Arkansas. July 26 Act, § 8. The July 26 Act granted land to the state of Kansas in
alternating sections for the benefit of the railroad company, and granted right-of-way land
to Union Pacific directly. Id. at §§ 1, 8.
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United States , 315 U.S. 262, 273 (1942). In this case, Congress’ grant to Union
Pacific occurred in 1866. However, by 1871, Congress discontinued “outright
grants” of land to railroad companies because the public disfavored this practice.
Id. at 274.
Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit case law
Atoka first claims all railroad right-of-way land grants in the 1860s have
uniformly been interpreted as “limited fees,” and, thus, Union Pacific received a
limited fee grant in the July 25 Act. To support its contention, Atoka points to
various Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit cases that discuss grants made pursuant
to different acts and, in many instances, to different railroads. 7
We note the issue
7
Atoka cites the following cases as support for its claim all 1860s grants are
“limited fees”: United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 113, 118-19 (1957)
(discussing Union Pacific’s right-of-way granted by the Act of July 1, 1862); Great
Northern, 315 U.S. at 271, 273 n.6, 277-78 n.18 (discussing Great Northern’s right-of-
way granted by Act of March 3, 1875); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co.,
231 U.S. 190 (1913) (discussing Union Pacific’s right-of-way granted by the Act of July
1, 1862); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267, 267-68, 271 (1903)
(discussing Northern Pacific’s right-of-way granted by the Act of July 2, 1864); New
Mexico v. United States Trust Co., 172 U.S. 171 (1898) (discussing Atlantic & Pacific’s
right-of-way granted by the Act of July 27, 1866); Baldwin, 103 U.S. at 429-30
(discussing St. Joseph & Denver’s right-of-way granted by the Act of July 23, 1866);
Wyoming v. Andrus, 602 F.2d 1379, 1380 n.2 (10th Cir. 1979) (discussing Union
Pacific’s right-of-way granted by Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489, as amended
by Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 216, 13 Stat. 356); and Wyoming v. Udall, 379 F.2d 635, 637
(10th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 389 U.S. 985 (1967).
-8-
before us is not other railroads’ ownership interests granted pursuant to different
congressional acts. See Leo Sheep, 440 U.S. at 681 (recognizing the “pertinent
inquiry ... is the intent of Congress when it granted land to Union Pacific” at the
time of the grant).
Furthermore, we cannot accept Atoka’s sweeping characterization that all
1860s grants are limited fees. To the contrary, the Supreme Court and this court
recognized Union Pacific’s predecessor-in-interest received its right-of-way in
fee, and not limited fee, in the Act of July 26, 1866. See Missouri, K. & T. Ry.
Co. v. Roberts , 152 U.S. 114, 116-18 (1894); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v.
Oklahoma , 271 U.S. 303, 304, 308 (1926); Early , 641 F.2d at 860. We examine
the cases discussing Union Pacific’s right-of-way interest granted by the July 26
Act because they clearly refute Atoka’s blanket assertion all 1860s fees are
“limited” fees, and are instructive in our consideration of the railroad’s right-of-
way interest granted by the July 25 Act.
In Roberts , Mr. Roberts sought to recover possession of lands occupied by
the railroad as a right-of-way. 152 U.S. at 114. The Court examined Congress’
grant of right-of-way land to the railroad in the Act of July 26, 1866. Id. at 115-
16. The court concluded “[t]he United States had the right to authorize the
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construction of the road of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company
through the reservation of the Osage Indians, and to grant absolutely the fee of
the 200 feet as a right of way to the company.” Id. at 116 (emphasis added). The
Supreme Court attached no conditions to the July 26 right-of-way, and explicitly
made a “grant of both fee and possession” to the railroad. Id. at 118.
Over thirty years later, the Supreme Court again considered the same
railroad’s right-of-way interest granted by the same July 26 Act. 8
Oklahoma , 271
U.S. at 304. In Oklahoma , the Court held the Oklahoma Corporation Commission
could not lawfully order the railroad to construct and pay for an underpass
beneath the railroad’s right-of-way without paying the railroad just compensation.
Id. at 303-304, 308. The Court cited Roberts exclusively, and held “[t]he
company owned its right of way lands and station grounds in fee.” Id. at 308.
In Early , Union Pacific’s predecessor in interest brought action to quiet
title in lands along its right-of-way that were encroached by abutting landowners.
641 F.2d at 856. The landowners cross-claimed and alleged that the railroad had
8
The right-of-way land at issue was located in McAlester, Oklahoma, which
appears to be located further south than the southernmost reach of the July 26 Act, and is
more accurately within the geographic scope of the July 25 Act.
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“acquired, at best, an interest in the nature of an easement, subsequently
abandoned, thereby causing ownership to vest in the owners of the abutting
property.” Id. The right-of-way land was governed by both the July 25 and July
26 Acts. Id. at 857-58. This court held, “ Roberts..., [and] Oklahoma, ... control
our determination .... The Act of July 26, 1866, when viewed in the light of the
times, clearly expresses the intent of Congress to grant to the railway a fee
interest in the Indian lands.” Id. at 860. Although we acknowledged some
difficulty with the July 25 Act’s “cicuitous” language in §§ 6 and 8, we
recognized the July 26 Act cures any controversy surrounding the nature of Union
Pacific’s land grant. We unequivocally held the Acts provide the railroad with
fee title in its right-of-way lands. Id.
In this case, Atoka is essentially requesting this court to reconsider our
Early opinion, and re-characterize Union Pacific’s right-of-way interest granted
by the 1866 Acts as “a [limited] fee interest.” It suggests the Early case granted
only “a fee interest,” not a grant in fee absolute. However, Atoka’s emphasis on
this phrase from Early is factually disingenuous and legally insufficient. The
Early panel affirmed the trial court’s explicit holding the July Acts vested “fee
simple absolute title in the railroad.” Id. at 857, 860.
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“Under the doctrine of stare decisis , this panel cannot overturn the decision
of another panel of this court ... absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding
contrary decision by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Meyers , 200 F.3d 715,
719-20 (10th Cir. 2000) (recognizing stare decisis is a “decision on a legal point”
or “precedent in which a court has decided identical factual issues” (quotation
marks and citation omitted)). Prior precedent “includes not only the very narrow
holdings of those prior cases, but also the reasoning underlying those holdings,
particularly when such reasoning articulates a point of law.” Id. There has been
no en banc reconsideration of this issue and Atoka cites no superseding Supreme
Court ruling, instead relying on cases dating from 1881 to 1957. See, supra n.7.
Atoka next suggests this court, in United States v. Drumb , resolved that
Union Pacific acquired a right-of-way in limited fee pursuant to the July 25 Act.
152 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1946). Atoka claims this court’s disagreement with the
trial court’s conclusion in Drumb that the railroad received full fee title to the
right-of-way controls our decision in this case, even though we did not analyze or
decide Drumb based on that point. Id.
In Drumb , the United States brought suit, on its own behalf and for the
benefit of certain Indian tribes, to quiet title to lands that were set aside for
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railroad purposes but were later abandoned by the railroad having never been used
for railroad purposes. Id. at 822. We listed the trial court’s holdings as follows:
(1) That the grant vested the full fee title to the tract in the railroad
company, and that the abandonment did not effect a reverter; (2) that
the statute of limitations had run; (3) that the Act of April 26, 1906,
34 Stat. 137, Section 14, vested the title in the City of McAlester; (4)
that the railroad company did not abandon the tract because it
acquired land on the other side of the tracks for railroad purposes.
Id. This court then stated, “We cannot agree with the trial court’s conclusions
Numbers 1, 2, and 4, but since we agree with the trial Court’s conclusion Number
3, it would serve no useful purpose to recite in detail the reasons why we do not
agree with the other conclusions of the court.” Id. Thus, we did not discuss,
analyze or issue a holding on whether the railroad acquired a limited fee in the
Act of July 25, 1866. Id. at 821-24.
We are not bound by the Drumb comment because the statement is dicta.
“Dicta are ‘statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law
or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the
case in hand.’” Rohrbaugh v. Celotex Corp. , 53 F.3d 1181, 1184 (10th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 454 (6th ed. 1990)); cf. Wilder v. Apfel , 153
F.3d 799, 804 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[W]hat the [agency] describes as ‘dicta’ are the
essentials of our first decision, the grounds on which we reversed .... Take [the
essentials] away and there wouldn’t be an opinion, just a conclusion.”). In
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Drumb , we limited our examination and resolution to the “trial court’s conclusion
Number 3 [that the Act of April 26, 1906, 34 Stat. 137, Section 14, vested the
title in the City of McAlester].” 152 F.2d at 822. In fact, we explicitly stated any
further discussion of the trial court’s alternative conclusions “would serve no
useful purpose.” Id. The statement at issue is unessential to the determination of
the opinion, lacks analysis, and is “unsupported by citation to relevant authority”;
we are not bound by a prior panel’s dicta. UMLIC-Nine Corp. v. Lipan Springs
Dev. Corp. , 168 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 528 U.S. 1005 (1999);
see also Bates v. Department of Corrections , 81 F.3d 1008, 1011 (10th Cir. 1996).
In summary, we reject Atoka’s argument that all 1860s right-of-way grants
are limited fees because, absent a supervening Supreme Court case or en banc
reconsideration, we are bound by a prior panel’s holding, but not its dicta.
Union Pacific’s right-of-way granted by the Act of July 25, 1866 compared with
that granted by the Act of July 26, 1866
As we do not accept Atoka’s first argument, we turn our attention to its
alternative contention that the July 25 Act authorizes a more limited right-of-way
grant than the July 26 Act. This argument followed to its logical conclusion
suggests the July 26 Act contemplates a fee absolute grant, while the July 25 Act
merely provides a limited grant conditioned on the railroad’s continued use of its
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right-of-way for railroad purposes. According to Atoka, the fact that the two acts
have “technical differences in the granting language” intimates the acts convey
different ownership interests to the railroad. Specifically, Atoka suggests: (1)
Section 6 of the July 25 Act contains limitations, unlike Section 8 of the July 26
Act, that the right-of-way is granted “for the construction of the railroad as
proposed,” and (2) Section 6 of the July 25 Act implicitly incorporates limiting
language from Sections 1 and 3 of the same Act, which states the purpose of the
grant is to construct and operate a railroad. We disagree with Atoka’s reading of
the acts, and ultimately its contention the July 25 Act provides a more limited
right-of-way grant.
While mindful of the historical conditions existing at the time of the grant,
“[w]e begin with the plain language of the law.” St. Charles Inv. Co. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 232 F.3d 773, 776 (10th Cir. 2000); see also
Leo Sheep , 440 U.S. at 682. Section 11 of the July 25 Act provided the winner of
the railroad construction race, in this case Union Pacific, with grants “according
to the provisions of this act.” The right-of-way grants inuring to Union Pacific
were governed by § 8 of the Act:
That said [Union Pacific] . . . is hereby authorized and empowered to
extend and construct its railroad . . . and the right of way through
the Indian Territory, wherever such right is now reserved or may
hereafter be reserved to the United States by treaty with the Indian
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tribes, is hereby granted to said company, to the same extent as
granted by the sixth section of this act through the public lands[.]
July 25 Act § 8 (emphasis added). Section 6 of the July 25 Act, in relevant part,
provides:
[T]he right of way through the public lands be, and the same is
hereby, granted to said [Union Pacific], its successors and assigns,
for the construction of a railroad as proposed .... Said way is
granted to said railway to the extent of one hundred feet in width on
each side of said road where it may pass through the public domain;
also all necessary ground for station buildings, workshops, depots,
machine-shops, switches, side-tracks, turn-tables, and water-stations.
(Emphasis added.)
On the following day, Congress enacted legislation that pertained
exclusively to Union Pacific, but contained “[a] similar land grant procedure.”
Early , 641 F.2d at 858. Congress granted Union Pacific right-of-way land through
Indian Territory in Section 8 of the July 26 Act as follows:
That said Pacific Railroad Company, southern branch [Union
Pacific], its successors and assigns, is hereby authorized and
empowered to extend and construct its railroad .... [T]he right of
way through said Indian Territory is hereby granted to said company
[Union Pacific], its successors and assigns, to the extent of one
hundred feet on each side of said road or roads, and all necessary
grounds for stations, buildings, work-shops, machine-shops,
switches, side-tracks, turn-tables, and water-stations.
(Emphasis added.)
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We disagree with Atoka’s argument that Section 6 of the July 25 Act
provides a more limited right-of-way grant than Section 8 of the July 26 Act.
Both acts contain identical language stating the railroad “is authorized and
empowered to extend and construct its railroad.” See Act of July 25 § 8; Act of
July 26 § 8. Section 6 of the July 25 Act, which is incorporated into Section 8 of
the same Act, establishes the right-of-way through public lands “for the
construction of a railroad as proposed.” July 25 Act at §§ 6, 8. When we
construe these substantially similar phrases similarly, it is evident Congress
granted right-of-way lands in both acts in order for Union Pacific to “construct”
its railroad. See Kansas v. United States , 204 U.S. 331, 338 (1907) (recognizing
the similarity between the July 25 and July 26 Acts, and stating the acts “us[e] the
same language, except as to the routes”); see also White v. Mercury Marine, Div.
of Brunswick, Inc. , 129 F.3d 1428, 1434 (11th Cir. 1997) (“It is a familiar canon
of statutory construction that courts should generally construe similar statutory
language similarly.”). Congress made no mention that the railroad was obligated
to “operate” a railroad ad infinitum on that land. Because it is “our judicial
function to apply statutes on the basis of what Congress has written, not what
Congress might have written,” we cannot accept Atoka’s argument that Sections 6
and 8 of the July 25 Act provide a more limited right-of-way grant than that
offered in Section 8 of the July 26 Act. United States v. Great Northern Ry. Co. ,
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343 U.S. 562, 575 (1952).
We also reject Atoka’s artful, albeit flawed, reading of the July 25 Act
which lassos language from Sections 1 and 3 and incorporates it into the right-of-
way sections. Atoka suggests the Section 6 language “[t]hat the right of way
through the public lands be ... granted ... for the construction of a railroad as
proposed ” opens the door for sections 1 and 3 to be read into the right-of-way
provisions. July 25 Act, § 6 (emphasis added). Section 1 states, among other
things, that land is granted to the State for the purpose of aiding the railroad “to
construct and operate a railroad”; and Section 3 states “[t]hat the grant of lands
hereby made [to the State] is upon condition that said company, after the
construction of its road, shall keep it in repair and use.” July 25 Act §§ 1, 3.
Atoka cites no case or authoritative rationale to support its reading of this Act.
We can think of no reason why we should import the language from
Sections 1 and 3 into Sections 6 and 8, and one critical reason why we should not.
If we accepted such a reading we would obviate the structure and purpose of the
July 25 Act. See United States v. Lewis , 67 F.3d 225, 228-29 (9th Cir. 1995)
(requiring particular phrases be construed in light of the overall purpose and
structure of the act). As we previously mentioned, the Act is structured to make
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two grants: one, alternate sections of lands on each side of the proposed railroad
granted to the state to benefit the railroad in constructing its line; and two, the
right-of-way granted directly to the railroad company. Compare July 25 Act § 1,
3 with July 25 Act §§ 6, 8. Sections 1 and 3 9
refer to the alternate sections of
land granted to the State for the benefit of the railroad; Sections 6 and 8 address
the right-of-way grant made directly to the railroad. Id. Section 6 provides no
directive to refer to, much less import language from Sections 1 and 3 when
determining the extent of the railroad’s right-of-way grant. See July 25 Act, § 6.
Additionally, if we were to accept Atoka’s reading of the July 25 Act, we
would be thwarting, if not nullifying Congress’ intent; we must presume Congress
acted intentionally when it included language in Sections 1 and 3, conditioning
the State’s grant of alternating lands on the “construct[ion] and operat[ion of] a
railroad,” or the railroad’s “repair and use” of its road, but did not include the
same language in the same Act’s right-of-way sections. Compare July 25 Act § 1,
3 with July 25 Act §§ 6, 8. “Where language appears in one section of a statute
but not in another section, we assume the omission was intentional.” Universal
9
Read in its entirety, Section 3 refers to the alternating land grants made to the
state in Section 1. See July 25 Act § 3. Section 3 refers to Section 1 as those grants
“hereby made” and the land that is “reserved as aforesaid shall inure to the benefit of said
company.” Id. The section does not address the right-of-way grants made in Sections 6
and 8. Id.
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Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n , 182 F.3d 726, 729
(10th Cir. 1999). This court’s obligation is to “give effect to the intent of the
legislature as expressed rather than determine what the law should or should not
be.” Beck v. Northern Natural Gas Co. , 170 F.3d 1018, 1024 (10th Cir. 1999)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the July 25 Act establishes two
land grants and the land at issue is governed exclusively by the right-of-way
grants in Sections 6 and 8, the conditional language of Sections 1 and 3 setting
forth the alternating section grants lies outside our inquiry. 10
In other words, we
will not inject language from the alternating land grants sections into the right-of-
way provisions.
For all of the following reasons, we hold the July 25 Act conveyed to
Union Pacific a fee absolute title in its right-of-way with no right of reversion:
(1) not all 1860s right-of-way land grants are automatically construed as limited
fees; (2) our comment in Drumb is dicta; and (3) Union Pacific’s right-of-way
granted by the July 25 Act is not more limited than that authorized in the July 26
Act.
10
Atoka candidly concedes the only issue in this case is the right-of-way grant.
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AFFIRMED .
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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