UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 98-50164
Summary Calendar
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CECELIA AGUILAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
KENNETH S. APFEL,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. A-95-CV-842
September 30, 1998
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Cecelia Aguilar appeals from the district court’s decision
affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s determination
that Aguilar is not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act. She argues that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
improperly identified jobs that she could do that had “virtually
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
the same requirements as those jobs he found her unable to
perform.” This contention is belied by the record. The
vocational expert characterized her past work as medium level
work, whereas the jobs that he identified she could perform are
light level work. Aguilar also contends that the ALJ made a
“very significant error which is a basis for remand” when the ALJ
mistakenly found that Aguilar had a general equivalency diploma
(GED). Aguilar testified at her hearing that she had completed
the tenth grade and that she had not earned a GED. The ALJ’s
hypothetical to the vocational expert assumed that Aguilar had a
tenth grade education and made no mention of a GED. Although the
ALJ’s written decision does state that Aguilar “has a tenth grade
education and a high school GED equivalency diploma,” Aguilar
fails to show how this error affected the ALJ’s disability
finding, especially in light of the fact that there was no defect
in the ALJ’s hypothetical.
Aguilar also suggests that the ALJ erred in relying on a
consultative examination performed on March 8, 1994, because that
examination did not take all of her ailments into account.
However, the record reflects that the ALJ, in determining the
nature and extent of Aguilar’s ailments, also considered
Aguilar’s outpatient records and various other evaluations,
including her psychiatric consultative evaluation. No physician
who examined Aguilar pronounced her disabled. As to Aguilar’s
assertion that the ALJ failed to consider properly her chronic
pain, the record indicates that the ALJ specifically addressed
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this issue. The determination that the medical evidence is more
persuasive than Aguilar’s own testimony is precisely the kind of
determination that the ALJ is best suited to make. See Falco v.
Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1994).
AFFIRMED.
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