F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 2 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ANTHONY RYLEE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-2030
(D.C. No. CIV-98-1314-JC/DJS)
LARRY G. MASSANARI, * Acting (D. N.M.)
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration ,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before BRISCOE , ANDERSON , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
*
On March 29, 2001, Larry G. Massanari became the Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. In accordance with Rule 43(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Mr. Massanari is substituted for Kenneth S. Apfel as the
appellee in this action.
**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff appeals the district court’s dismissal of his action seeking review
of the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) denial of plaintiff’s application for social
security disability benefits or, in the alternative, mandamus relief. We dismiss the
appeal as moot.
Plaintiff applied for disability benefits in 1991, and the ALJ issued his
decision denying benefits on April 12, 1993. Two days later, plaintiff requested
review of that decision by the Appeals Council. Sometime thereafter, the agency
lost plaintiff’s file. Despite ongoing inquiries to the agency, plaintiff was not
informed of the loss until September 1998. When, on October 20, 1998, the
agency had yet to reconstruct plaintiff’s file and the Appeals Council had yet to
rule on plaintiff’s request for review, plaintiff filed the present action in district
court. Plaintiff asserted two claims for relief, one for review of the ALJ’s
decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and one for mandamus relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361.
The Commissioner initially moved the district court to remand the action to
the agency so that it could reconstruct plaintiff’s file and the Commissioner could
then issue a final decision. Later, the Commissioner withdrew this motion and
moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction. The Commissioner argued
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that because plaintiff had not yet exhausted his administrative remedies he could
not obtain judicial review under § 405(g). Plaintiff responded by arguing that the
Commissioner had waived the exhaustion requirement by his earlier conduct in
the judicial proceedings or, in the alternative, that the court should waive the
exhaustion requirement. Plaintiff also argued that, even if the court had no
jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C.§ 405(g) to review the ALJ’s decision, it still had
jurisdiction to grant mandamus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
The district court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the Commissioner had
waived the exhaustion requirement. The court also concluded that judicial waiver
of the requirement was not appropriate either. Finally, the court determined that
mandamus relief was not appropriate because plaintiff had an adequate remedy in
§ 405(g). Accordingly, the court granted the Commissioner’s motion and
dismissed plaintiff’s case without prejudice. This appeal followed.
By order of this court entered February 26, 2001, we directed the parties to
file a joint status report detailing the progress of plaintiff’s case in the Social
Security Administration since August 2000. The Commissioner filed a status
report 1 in which he stated that plaintiff’s file was fully reconstructed and a
1
The Commissioner stated in his report that he attempted several times to
discuss the contents of the status report with plaintiff’s counsel so they could file
a joint report, as ordered, but he was unable to do so. Plaintiff’s counsel neither
filed a separate status report nor objected to the report filed by the Commissioner.
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hearing scheduled before a new ALJ. When the case came on for hearing, the
ALJ determined that he could not proceed without further evidence, so he vacated
the hearing and ordered two consultative examinations. The exams were
scheduled for January 29, 2001 and February 13, 2001, respectively. As of March
1, the Albuquerque Office of Hearing and Appeals had not yet received either
consultative report, and the Commissioner did not know whether plaintiff had
actually attended either of the examinations.
Based on the Commissioner’s status report, we ordered the parties to
submit supplemental briefs addressing whether this appeal is moot, either in
whole or in part. “Because the existence of a live case or controversy is a
constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction, the court must determine
whether a case is moot before proceeding to the merits.” Citizens for Responsible
Gov’t State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson , 236 F.3d 1174, 1181-82 (10th
Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted).
In his supplemental brief, the Commissioner states that, since the filing of
the status report, the agency has received both consultative examination reports,
and the ALJ has scheduled a hearing for April 11, 2001. The Commissioner
argues that the appeal is now moot because the original file has been
reconstructed, it has been supplemented with new evidence, and a new hearing
has been set before an ALJ, who will vacate the previous ALJ’s 1993 decision.
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Plaintiff does not contest the Commissioner’s recitation of events, but
argues that the case is not moot because he is back in the position he found
himself in October 1992. He is once again awaiting a decision by the ALJ that, if
unfavorable, will have to go through further administrative procedures before
becoming final. Plaintiff contends there is no guarantee that he will not face the
same sorts of delay he did before, and he contends that given the extreme delay he
has suffered to date, further administrative process should occur only on an
expedited, court-scheduled basis. 2
“Generally an appeal should be dismissed as moot when events occur that
prevent the appellate court from granting any effective relief.” Phelps v.
Hamilton , 122 F.3d 885, 891 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). “The crucial
question is whether granting a present determination of the issues offered . . . will
have some effect in the real world.” Citizens for Responsible Gov’t , 236 F.3d at
1182 (quotation omitted; alteration in original).
Based upon our review, we conclude the matters before us are now moot.
Plaintiff originally sought judicial review under § 405(g) of an unfavorable ALJ
decision issued in April 1993. That decision has been, or shortly will be, vacated
2
Plaintiff asks that we set the following deadlines: thirty days for the ALJ
to issue a new decision; sixty days for the Appeals Council to perform its review,
if necessary; and sixty days for the agency to commence payment of benefits, if
applicable.
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and replaced by a new decision to be issued following the hearing that was held
April 11, 2001. 3
Thus, even if we were to waive plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies with respect to the 1993 ALJ decision, our review of that
decision would be for nought.
Plaintiff’s request for mandamus relief also is moot. That claim focused
primarily on reconstruction of the record. The record has now been reconstructed
and supplemented with more recent evidence. Plaintiff has not suggested that the
record as currently constituted is inadequate for decision on his application for
benefits. In any event, if plaintiff has a complaint with the record as it is
currently constituted, he can pursue that complaint in a future proceeding under
§ 405(g) once he obtains a final agency decision based on the current record.
Likewise, to the extent that plaintiff’s mandamus claim sought other relief related
to the 1993 ALJ decision, that claim is now moot. There is no point in ordering
the Appeals Council to review the ALJ’s 1993 decision because it is soon to be
replaced by a new decision. If the new decision also is unfavorable, plaintiff can
seek Appeals Council review of that decision and, if necessary, judicial review
under § 405(g).
3
As the parties have not informed us otherwise, we assume the hearing went
forward on April 11 as scheduled.
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If plaintiff encounters unreasonable delay in obtaining a new, final
judgment from the agency, he can apply to the district court for mandamus relief.
The matters before us concern only the unfavorable 1993 decision, however, and
we cannot grant plaintiff any of the relief he seeks with respect to that decision.
Plaintiff’s motion to expedite the appeal is DENIED, and this appeal is
DISMISSED as moot.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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