F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 10 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LEO SIMMONS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-1249
(D.C. No. 99-M-1228)
JOHN SUTHERS; DONICE NEAL; (D. Colo.)
BOBBY LYNN; JOHN DOE
LIEUTENANT OF MAINTENANCE;
JOHN DOE TRANSPORTATION
OFFICERS FROM HOSPITAL;
OFFICER RAMOS; ST. THOMAS
MORE HOSPITAL MEDICAL
STAFF; JOHN DOE NON STAFF
PHYSICIAN TOLLETT, MICHAEL
TOLLETT, D.O., NON STAFF
PHYSICIAN
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, BALDOCK, and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Leo Simmons, a state prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his amended complaint alleging that Colorado
Department of Corrections (DOC) defendants violated his civil rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Invoking supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
Mr. Simmons also alleged that the medical defendants denied him proper medical
care, committed malpractice, and violated other Colorado state laws.
At the time of the events in question, Mr. Simmons was incarcerated at the
Four Mile Correctional Facility (FMCF) in Cañon City, Colorado. He filed his
initial civil rights complaint in the District of Colorado on June 30, 1999.
Because his allegations were vague and conclusory and failed to link any of the
named defendants to any of the alleged civil rights violations, the district court
ordered him to file an amended complaint within thirty days. The district court
warned Mr. Simmons that he was obligated to clearly identify the personal
participation of each named defendant with respect to any allegations and to
clearly assert the acts each defendant allegedly committed.
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In his amended complaint, Mr. Simmons alleged very generally that
defendants John Suthers, the Executive Director of the DOC, and Donice Neal,
the administrative head of the DOC, allowed DOC officers to break the law, and
that DOC Officer Bobby Lynn, failed to “stop the abuse.” R. Doc. 21, at 1a.
More specifically, he alleged that on May 13, 1999, DOC Officer Lisa Ramos
ordered him to report to work at the FMCF maintenance department even though
he was sick and that unnamed DOC maintenance officers forced him to work,
even though he was under medical restrictions. He claimed he was injured while
working in the maintenance department, and had to be taken to the defendant
St. Thomas More Hospital. He claimed that at the hospital, defendant
Dr. Michael Tollett assaulted him with an ink pen and denied him professional
medical care by giving him fake medicine. Mr. Simmons then alleged that upon
discharge from the hospital that day, unnamed DOC transportation officers threw
him into a van, causing him to jam his neck, and threw him from the van to the
ground upon his return to prison.
The district court dismissed Mr. Simmons’ amended complaint against
defendants Suthers, Neal, and Lynn because he failed to allege any personal
participation or conduct by these individuals that allegedly deprived him of a
federal right. R. Doc. 23, at 3-4, see Mitchell v. Maynard , 80 F.3d 1433, 1441
(10th Cir. 1996) (holding that personal participation is an essential element of a
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civil rights claim; mere allegation of supervisory status insufficient). The district
court also dismissed the complaint against St. Thomas More Hospital because
Mr. Simmons failed to assert any factual allegations of wrongdoing by the
defendant hospital. R. Doc. 33.
The district court subsequently granted defendant Ramos’ motion for
summary judgment because she presented evidence, uncontroverted by
Mr. Simmons, that Mr. Simmons was not under any medical restrictions on
May 13, 1999, and therefore was under no restrictions preventing him from
working in the maintenance department that day. Thus, the district court ruled
that Mr. Simmons failed to provide any evidentiary support for his allegations
against Ms. Ramos. R. Doc. 55, at 1.
Because Mr. Simmons’ allegations against Dr. Tollett were based on claims
of professional negligence against a licensed professional, the district court
directed him to file a certificate of review, as required by Colorado law, or his
complaint would be dismissed. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-602 (requiring
written statement that plaintiff consulted with expert who agreed action did not
lack substantial justification); Baumgarten v. Coppage , 15 P.3d 304, 306
(Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that Colorado’s certificate of review requirements
apply to any claim “based upon” allegations of professional negligence by
licensed professional). Mr. Simmons failed to file a certificate of review within
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the deadline, and the court dismissed his complaint against Dr. Tollett.
R. Doc. 63. The John Doe defendants were never properly identified or served.
As all claims against all served defendants had been dismissed, the district court
entered a final judgment dismissing the amended complaint in its entirety.
This appeal followed. Simmons sought leave from the district court to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, but the district court denied his request.
Simmons has renewed his motion with this court. In order to succeed on his
motion, Simmons must show both an inability to pay the filing fee and the
existence of a nonfrivolous issue on appeal that states a claim on which relief can
be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Coppedge v. United States , 369 U.S. 438,
445 (1962); Ragan v. Cox , 305 F.2d 58, 60 (10th Cir. 1962). We have carefully
reviewed Mr. Simmons arguments on appeal, the district court’s orders of
dismissal, and the entire record on appeal. Mr. Simmons has failed to offer on
appeal any legally justified basis for reversing the district court’s judgment of
dismissal, and it is clear the district court did not err in its disposition. We
conclude Mr. Simmons’ appeal has no arguable basis for relief in either law or
fact. Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss this
appeal on the ground that it is frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)
and (ii). This dismissal counts as a “prior occasion” or “strike” for the purposes
of the “three strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, as set forth in
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28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 1
We note that Mr. Simmons has at least one other “prior
occasion” or “strike” under § 1915(g). See Simmons v. [No Appellee Named on
Appeal] , No. 99-1395, 1999 WL 1243082 (10th Cir. Dec. 21, 1999) (dismissing
appeal, finding it frivolous and counting dismissal as a “strike”).
The motion to proceed in forma pauperis is denied and the appeal is
DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
1
Section 1915(g) provides:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment
in a civil action [in forma pauperis ] if the prisoner has, on 3 or more
prior occasions, while incarcerated . . . brought an action or appeal in
a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it
was frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of
serious physical injury.
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