F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 1 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 00-4154
(D.C. No. 00-CR-001-C)
HECTOR CAMACHO-JIMINEZ, also (D. Utah)
known as Hector J. Camacho, also
known as Ignacio Camacho, also
known as Frederico Camacho,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, PORFILIO, and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of illegal entry following deportation
in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). The district court sentenced defendant to
forty-six months of incarceration, followed by thirty-six months of supervised
release. The sentence calculation included a sixteen-level enhancement for
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
defendant’s prior conviction of an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2);
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual , § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). Defendant
now appeals, arguing that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence based
on a factor that was not charged in the indictment and to which he did not plead
guilty. 1
Defendant bases his argument on Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466
(2000), in which the Supreme Court held that facts used to enhance the penalty
for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant argues that because the indictment did not
charge him with the prior conviction of an aggravated felony, and because he did
not plead guilty to that fact, the sentencing court could not rely on the prior
conviction to enhance his sentence in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2).
In Apprendi , however, the Court explicitly excepted from its rule cases in
which the enhancement factor is a prior conviction. 530 U.S. at 487-90. The
Court did so based on its previous decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United
States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), in which it held that the existence of a prior
conviction is merely a sentencing factor, not a separate element of the offense to
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
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which the full panoply of due process protections attach. Accordingly, the
increased prison term set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) may apply even when an
indictment does not allege the prior conviction of an aggravated felony.
Almendarez-Torres , 523 U.S. at 226-27, 235.
Although the Court expressed misgivings in Apprendi about whether it
correctly decided Almendarez-Torres , the Court nonetheless refused to overrule
its earlier decision. 530 U.S. at 489-90. This court, therefore, is “bound by
[Almendarez-Torres ] to hold that the fact of defendant’s prior felony conviction is
not an element of the offense with which he was charged by indictment, but is,
instead, a sentencing factor.” United States v. Martinez-Villalva , 232 F.3d 1329,
1332 (10th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Dorris , 236 F.3d 582, 587 (10th
Cir. 2000) (rejecting defendant’s efforts to challenge the continuing validity of
Almendarez-Torres ), cert. denied , 121 S. Ct. 1635 (2001).
Defendant concedes that our decision in Martinez-Villalva requires us to
reject his claim, but states that he is bringing this appeal to preserve the issue for
Supreme Court review. He has done so. It remains our duty to decide his case
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under the rule announced in Almendarez-Torres . Accordingly, the judgment of
the United States District Court for the District of Utah is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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