F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 15 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RICHARD D. BLACKBURN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-5173
(D.C. No. 98-CV-776-K)
UNITED STATES POSTAL (N.D. Okla.)
SERVICE, Postmaster General of the
United States, John Henderson,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , BRORBY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Richard Blackburn appeals the district court’s rulings regarding
his proposed jury instructions and the admission of evidence. Because plaintiff
has not shown that the district court abused its discretion, we affirm.
Plaintiff initially injured his back during military service in 1974. In 1988,
he began working for defendant United States Postal Service (USPS), and in
1990, he reinjured his back by lifting a box of encyclopedias. Plaintiff filed
a claim for federal workers’ compensation benefits, which was accepted as an
on-the-job temporary aggravation of a preexisting condition. Pursuant to federal
law, the USPS created a limited duty position for plaintiff to accommodate his
medical restrictions.
In 1995 and 1996, while still medically restricted, plaintiff applied for
a position in a supervisor training program. Plaintiff was not offered a position
because the USPS determined that, given his medical restrictions, he would not be
able to perform the essential functions of the job. In 1997, after plaintiff
presented a new set of medical restrictions, the USPS offered him a limited duty
position which he refused.
In May 1998, the Office of Workers Compensation Programs determined
that plaintiff was no longer entitled to benefits because the temporary on-the-job
aggravation of his condition had ceased. Because plaintiff was still medically
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restricted and the USPS alleged there were no “light duty” jobs available, he was
placed in a leave without pay status in July 1998.
Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
alleging the USPS discriminated against him based on his disability and subjected
him to retaliation for his various administrative and court proceedings. Before
trial, plaintiff drafted and submitted his pretrial order, which alleged that he was
disabled because (1) he had a physical impairment which substantially limited one
or more of his major life activities; and (2) he was regarded by others as having
such an impairment. The pretrial order did not allege that plaintiff was disabled
because he had a “record” of having a substantially limiting impairment. For this
reason, the district court denied plaintiff’s request to instruct the jury that
disability could be proved by showing that plaintiff had a record of a substantially
limiting impairment.
Plaintiff also asked for instructions regarding the USPS’s burden of proving
it would have made the same decision absent consideration of plaintiff’s
disability, and the federal government’s enhanced duty to accommodate and to
keep records. These instructions were refused, as was plaintiff’s request to admit
a medical report prepared in March 2000. After a multi-day trial, the jury
returned a verdict that, at the time of the alleged wrongful acts, plaintiff was not
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disabled or perceived to be disabled, and that the USPS did not retaliate against
plaintiff for his discrimination complaint.
We note initially that plaintiff’s briefs fail to provide us with any
meaningful record citations to support his contentions. Although we could deny
his appeal for this reason alone, see SEC v. Thomas, 965 F.2d 825, 826-27
(10th Cir. 1992), we will address plaintiff’s arguments on their merits.
“[W]e review the district court’s decision to refuse to instruct the jury on
an issue it concludes is not raised in the pretrial order for an abuse of discretion.”
Rios v. Bigler, 67 F.3d 1543, 1549 (10th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff argues that the
district court abused its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury that he could
prove disability by showing that he had a “record” of a substantially limiting
impairment because (1) the complaint identified this theory, and (2) the jury could
have been confused after hearing evidence that would support the theory. It is the
pretrial order, however, and not the complaint, that defines the scope of litigation.
See Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 118 F.3d 1400, 1403 (10th Cir. 1997). Further,
plaintiff has not demonstrated how the jury was confused by the evidence
presented, and has not cited any authority for the proposition that the evidence
mandated such an instruction despite his failure to identify the claim in the
pretrial order. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by
restricting the jury’s consideration to the issues identified in the pretrial order.
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Plaintiff argues next that the district court erred in refusing his instructions
regarding (1) the USPS’s burden after direct evidence of discrimination is
presented; (2) the government’s heightened duty of accommodation; and (3) the
USPS’s duty to keep records of prior discrimination complaints. In determining
whether the district court erred in refusing plaintiff’s instructions, we review for
an abuse of discretion, considering de novo whether the instructions, as a whole,
accurately informed the jury of issues and governing law. FDIC v. Schuchmann,
235 F.3d 1217, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2000). “[I]t is not error to refuse to give
a requested instruction if the same subject matter is adequately covered in the
general instructions.” Id. at 1222 (quotations omitted).
Applying these standards, we conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing plaintiff’s instructions. The substance of plaintiff’s “direct
evidence” instruction, taken from the Supreme Court’s mixed motives holding in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989), was fully explained
in the district court’s instruction regarding the USPS’s burden to prove its
affirmative defense. As for plaintiff’s instructions regarding the government’s
heightened duty of accommodation, we need not consider whether the district
court erred in failing to so instruct because once the jury decided that plaintiff
was not disabled, accommodation was no longer an issue. Finally, the district
court did not err in refusing plaintiff’s instructions based on Faragher v. City of
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Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), as that case dealt specifically with the concept
of vicarious liability and did not state a general rule applying to all discrimination
cases. See id. at 807-08.
Plaintiff’s last argument centers on the district court’s refusal to admit
a report by Dr. Marilyn Lins regarding plaintiff’s medical condition. It appears
that at the beginning of the trial the district court ruled without objection that
both the testimony of Dr. Lins and her report would be excluded because
plaintiff’s physical condition in March of 2000 was irrelevant to his condition
when the disputed actions took place in 1995 and 1996. See Appellant’s App.
Vol. II at 443-44. Sometime later in the proceedings, plaintiff’s attorney moved
“for the record” to admit the doctor’s report, which was exhibit 63. Id. at 643.
No objection or offer of proof was made when the district court ruled that the
exhibit would not be admitted. See id.
When a party seeking to admit evidence fails to make a contemporaneous
offer of proof regarding what he expects to show and the purpose for which the
evidence is offered, we review the district court’s exclusion of the evidence for
plain error. Polys v. Trans-Colorado Airlines, Inc., 941 F.2d 1404, 1406-08 (10th
Cir. 1991); Fed. R. Evid. 103(a) & (d). In a civil case, the court will reverse only
if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings. Polys, 941 F.2d at 1408. We conclude that plaintiff has not
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shown that the exclusion of Dr. Lins’ report was erroneous, and he certainly has
not shown that this evidentiary ruling fundamentally affected the fairness of the
trial.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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