F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 27 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
REGINA TAMOSHAITYTE,
Petitioner,
v. No. 00-9533
(No. A72-453-376)
IMMIGRATION & (Petition for Review)
NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Respondent.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY , BRISCOE , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this petition for review. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The
case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner Regina Tamoshaityte filed this petition for review of the decision
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that she is not eligible for
political asylum. Following review of the administrative record and consideration
of the parties’ arguments, we conclude that the INS was correct to deny the
petition. 1
Petitioner, a citizen of Lithuania, arrived in the United States in 1991.
She applied to the INS for political asylum in November 1992, claiming fear of
persecution because of her involvement with the Communist Party. The agency
denied her asylum request in July 1993. The INS then served petitioner with an
order to show cause as to why she should not be deported for overstaying her
visa. She conceded deportability, but again sought asylum.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the immigration judge (IJ) denied
petitioner’s application for asylum in 1994. Petitioner appealed to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA issued a per curiam decision in August
2000, dismissing her appeal of the IJ’s decision. The BIA stated it had reviewed
1
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) alters the availability, scope, and nature of judicial review in INS cases.
Because petitioner’s deportation proceedings commenced before April 1, 1997,
and the agency’s final order was filed more than thirty days after IIRIRA’s date of
enactment, transitional IIRIRA rules apply in this case. Rivera-Jimenez v. INS ,
214 F.3d 1213, 1215 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). The transitional rules do
not bar petitioner from seeking judicial review of the INS’s final order in this
case. Id.
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the record, concluded that the IJ correctly analyzed the case, and adopted the IJ’s
decision as its own.
To qualify for a grant of asylum, petitioner “must establish that [she] is
a refugee by proving either past persecution or a ‘well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.’” Rezai v. INS , 62 F.3d 1286, 1289 (10th Cir.
1995) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). Where, as here, the BIA adopts the
decision of the IJ, we review the IJ’s decision. See Panrit v. INS , 19 F.3d 544,
546 (10th Cir. 1994). We review the IJ’s factual finding that an alien is not a
refugee for substantial evidence. Rezai v. INS , 62 F.3d 1286, 1289 (10th Cir.
1995). We will uphold the IJ’s conclusion if it is supported by “reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole” and will
not reverse unless the asylum applicant presents evidence “so compelling that no
reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite [persecution or] fear of
persecution.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias , 502 U.S. 478, 481, 484 (1992). We review
the IJ’s legal determinations de novo, but will accord deference to its legal
determinations unless they are clearly contrary to the statute’s language or to
congressional intent. Rivera-Jimenez , 214 F.3d at 1216.
In her second asylum application, petitioner claimed that after Lithuania
regained its independence from the Soviet Union, she turned over files to the
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press exposing certain Lithuanian political leaders as former members of the
KGB. She claimed that bodyguards and an aide of one such politician went to her
home and demanded the files at gunpoint. She claimed that she was summoned to
the aide’s office two weeks later and detained without food or sleep for two days
and threatened with imprisonment in a mental hospital. She contends this
politician might assassinate her in revenge if she returned to Lithuania.
The IJ determined that petitioner’s claims of past persecution were not
credible because she never mentioned any allegations concerning the KGB files,
the detention or the alleged threats in her first asylum application, prepared with
the assistance of counsel, or in her affidavit accompanying her application or in
her interview with the INS asylum officer. The IJ also did not believe her
testimony that she was afraid to tell the asylum officer about these allegations of
persecution in light of her current assertion that these events caused her to leave
Lithuania. The IJ also concluded that petitioner had failed to establish a
well-founded fear of future persecution because the claimed accusations no longer
had any impact on any politician’s reputation and petitioner’s claimed role in any
accusations was insufficient to cause anyone to seek revenge against her.
Petitioner claims the IJ improperly based his credibility determination on
what amounts to an “irrebuttable presumption” that her original counsel provided
effective assistance in prosecuting her initial asylum application. Appellant’s Br.
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at 15. Petitioner misconstrues the basis of the IJ’s determination. The IJ’s
credibility determination was based not just on petitioner’s failure to make known
these claims of persecution in the initial asylum application prepared with
counsel, but also her own failure to mention these claims in her affidavit and
during her asylum interview, coupled with the inherent unbelievability of aspects
of her testimony. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the IJ did make a de novo
determination of petitioner’s credibility and eligibility for asylum and did not
inappropriately base his determination on the denial of her initial application. See
8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (1991) (immigration judge to review asylum claims de novo).
Petitioner contends that the IJ inappropriately denied her application based
on his determination that she was not the prime mover in the exposure of former
KGB agents. Regulations provide that the IJ “shall not require the applicant to
provide evidence that [s]he would be singled out individually for persecution” if
[s]he establishes [her] inclusion in and identification with “similarly situated”
groups of persons against which there is a “pattern or practice” of persecution.
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i). The evidence before the IJ showed that accusations of
KGB involvement by Lithuanian officials had been widespread in the years
following Lithuania’s independence. The IJ found no evidence of harm or
persecution against anyone else who had made similar accusations of KGB
involvement, and determined that petitioner was unlikely to be singled out as
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a target of persecution in the future because of her claimed role in accusing
a handful of officials. The IJ correctly identified and applied the standards for
determining whether a well-founded fear of future persecution has been shown.
Hadjimehdigholi v. INS , 49 F.3d 642, 649 (10th Cir. 1995).
In making its determination that there was no evidence of repression in the
then-current government of Lithuania, the IJ relied in part on the State
Department’s assessment of conditions in Lithuania in its Country Report on
Human Rights Practices for 1993 . The IJ is free to treat the information in
Country Reports as evidence, 8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a), and petitioner was given
notice and an opportunity to respond to the Country Report , see Kowalczyk v. INS ,
245 F.3d 1143, 1147-48 (10th Cir. 2001) (requiring INS to provide notice and
opportunity to respond before taking administrative notice of facts during
immigration proceedings). Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the IJ did not rely
exclusively on this evidence. The IJ also considered the testimony of an expert
witness, the testimony of each witness and all of the documentary evidence.
We find nothing improper in the IJ’s use of the Country Report . Petitioner’s
remaining arguments essentially contend the IJ gave too much weight to her
inability to provide documentary support for her allegations and insufficient
weight to the testimony of herself and her husband. We may not reweigh
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the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. Refahiyat v. INS , 29 F.3d
553, 556 (10th Cir. 1994).
The evidence does not compel a conclusion that petitioner suffered past
persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution if she is deported.
Elias-Zacarias , 502 U.S. at 483-84. Therefore, we AFFIRM the IJ’s decision
denying petitioner’s request for asylum.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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