F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUL 2 2001
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 00-2300
RAYMOND TAN,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. NO. CR-00-13-LH)
James Miles Hanisee, Assistant United States Attorney (Norman C. Bay, United
States Attorney, with him on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Ray Twohig, Ray Twohig, P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-
Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR , ANDERSON , and KELLY , Circuit Judges.
ANDERSON , Circuit Judge.
The United States brings this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 challenging the district court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order (“Order”)
granting Defendant Raymond Tan’s Motion in Limine Regarding Other Cases and
Charges (“Motion in Limine”) which sought the exclusion of evidence of
Defendant’s prior drunk driving convictions. The government contends that the
district court erred as a matter of law in finding that Tan’s prior drunk driving
record was not offered for a proper purpose under F ED . R. E VID . 404(b) and
concluding, as a result, that it was more prejudicial than probative under F ED . R.
E VID . 403. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 29, 1999, at about 9:00 a.m., Defendant was driving his pickup
truck within the borders of the Navajo Indian Reservation when a collision
occurred between his truck and two motorcycles driven by William F. Sliney, Jr.,
and his son Sean F. Sliney. William was killed instantly and Sean was seriously
injured. The parties dispute the nature of the collision, but it appears that it
resulted either from Defendant driving his truck into the motorcycles or from
driving his truck directly into their path. An intoxilyzer test given to Defendant
several hours after the accident indicated that his blood alcohol level was .29.
-2-
Through investigation, the government discovered that Defendant had been
convicted of driving while intoxicated seven times since 1985. Four of the
convictions were in Navajo tribal court and three were in New Mexico state
court. 1 On January 4, 2000, a federal grand jury returned a two count Indictment
charging Defendant with second degree murder and assault resulting in serious
bodily injury in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(6), 1111 and 1153.
Before trial, Defendant filed his Motion in Limine seeking to exclude all
evidence relating to his prior drunk driving convictions. The district court held a
hearing on the matter on July 17, 2000 (the “Hearing”), at which the government
argued that the prior convictions were being offered to prove that Defendant acted
with malice. Defendant argued that the prior convictions were offered to show
criminal propensity and were more prejudicial than probative. In addition, he
stipulated at the Hearing that he knows that “it’s dangerous to other people to
drive while intoxicated” (the “Stipulation”). Tr. of Hr’g at 15. The district court,
without referring to the Stipulation, granted Defendant’s Motion in Limine after
finding that the prior drunk driving convictions were not offered for a proper
purpose under Rule 404(b) and were more prejudicial than probative under Rule
403.
We do not know the exact nature or circumstances of Defendant’s prior
1
convictions. However, defense counsel represents that none of them involved
vehicular homicide and that only one of them was a felony conviction.
-3-
II. DISCUSSION
In order to prove that Defendant acted with malice aforethought, a required
element of the crime of second degree murder, the government must show that he
engaged in “conduct which is reckless and wanton, and a gross deviation from a
reasonable standard of care, of such a nature that a jury is warranted in inferring
that defendant was aware of a serious risk of death or serious bodily harm.”
United States v. Wood , 207 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted).
Put another way, the government must show that Defendant knew that his conduct
posed a serious risk of death or harm to himself or others, but did not care. The
government claims that the prior drunk driving convictions were being offered to
make that showing.
Specifically, the government argues that, “the fact that there have been
long-standing, repeated warnings to Tan regarding alcohol impaired driving – that
he sadly and blatantly disregarded – demonstrates that when he chose to insert the
key in the ignition and press his foot to the gas pedal, he simply did not care
about the danger he well-knew he posed to other drivers.” Appellant’s Opening
Br. at 19. It argues further that the district court abused its discretion in
excluding Defendant’s prior drunk driving convictions because its determination
that they were not being offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) was
erroneous as a matter of law. That error, the government contends, was the basis
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of the court’s conclusion that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative
under Rule 403. Accordingly, it urges us to find that the district court abused its
discretion by excluding the prior convictions because that exclusion was based on
an error of law.
Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the district court properly
excluded the evidence because the prior drunk driving convictions were “offered
to show the Defendant’s propensity to violate the law rather than any element of
the government’s case.” Appellee’s Answer Br. at 3. Moreover, he argues, the
fact that the evidence was not offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b)
coupled with the Stipulation support the district court’s finding that it was
substantially more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403. We review the
district court’s decision to exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Becker , 230 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 2000). “A district court abuses
its discretion if its decision is based upon an error of law.” United States v.
Cherry , 217 F.3d 811, 814 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted).
Evidence of other bad acts is properly admitted if four requirements are
met: (1) the evidence is offered for a proper purpose under F ED . R. E VID . 404(b);
(2) the evidence is relevant under F ED . R. E VID . 401; (3) the probative value of
the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice
under F ED . R. E VID . 403; and (4) the district court, upon request, instructs the jury
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to consider the evidence only for the purpose for which it was admitted. Becker ,
230 F.3d at 1232 (citing Huddleston v. United States , 485 U.S. 681, 691-92
(1988)). This appeal focuses on the first and third requirements.
Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 each pose separate and distinct questions, and
admissibility under one rule does not govern admissibility under the other. Rule
404(b) presents a narrow threshold inquiry which must be answered before other
act evidence can be admitted, namely, whether the evidence is offered for a
purpose other than to prove criminal propensity. Questions of probative value
versus prejudicial impact are reserved for separate analysis under Rule 403. That
analysis is unnecessary if the evidence fails to satisfy the proper purpose
requirement of Rule 404(b). Accordingly, we begin with Rule 404(b).
A. Were Defendant’s Prior Drunk Driving Convictions Offered for a
Proper Purpose Under Rule 404(b)?
Rule 404(b) provides in pertinent part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . .
F ED . R. E VID . 404(b). The list of proper purposes is illustrative, not exhaustive,
and Rule 404(b) is considered to be “an inclusive rule, admitting all evidence of
other crimes or acts except that which tends to prove only criminal disposition.”
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United States v. Van Metre , 150 F.3d 339, 349 (4th Cir. 1998) (quotation
omitted). See also United States v. Segien , 114 F.3d 1014, 1022 (10th Cir. 1997).
Although the text of Rule 404(b) indicates that other act evidence “may” be
admissible for purposes other than to show criminal propensity, its legislative
history makes it clear that Congress did not intend that evidence offered for a
proper purpose under the rule be excluded thereunder:
[T]he use of the discretionary word “may” with respect to the
admissibility of evidence of crimes, wrongs, or acts is not intended to
confer any arbitrary discretion on the trial judge. Rather, it is
anticipated that with respect to permissible uses for such evidence,
the trial judge may exclude it only on the basis of those
considerations set forth in Rule 403, i.e. prejudice, confusion or
waste of time.
S. R EP . N O . 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7071. Of
course, the trial judge exercises discretion in determining whether the evidence is
offered for a proper purpose and whether it is relevant. 2
However, if the other act
evidence is relevant and tends to prove a material fact other than the defendant’s
criminal disposition, it is offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) and may
be excluded only under Rule 403.
In its Order, the district court stated, “[d]espite the fact that evidence of
other crimes may sometimes be admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove intent, as
“In the Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence is relevant only if the
2
jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the
actor.” Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689.
-7-
explained below, I conclude that this is not a proper purpose in this case. ”3
Order at 3 (emphasis added). The court’s conclusion was based, in large part, on
its reading of our pre- Huddleston decision in United States v. Soundingsides , 820
F.2d 1232 (10th Cir. 1987). In that case, the defendant was charged with second
degree murder for beating his girlfriend to death. The district court admitted
evidence under Rule 404(b) that the defendant had beaten a past girlfriend,
though not fatally. Soundingsides , 820 F.2d at 1236. The government stated that
the purpose of that other act evidence was to prove intent, namely, the malice
element of second degree murder. Id. We held that the admission of that
evidence was an abuse of discretion because intent was not a contested issue in
the case due to the fact that if the defendant was found to have administered the
violent beating which resulted in his girlfriend’s death, proof of intent/malice
would be shown by the act itself. Id. at 1237.
Soundingsides is distinguishable from this case. Most important, intent is
at issue here. In fact, it appears to be the issue. 4 In addition, there is no evidence
3
Proving intent is always a proper purpose under Rule 404(b). Other act
evidence is barred by Rule 404(b) only if it is offered to show criminal
disposition or is irrelevant under Huddleston. See note 2, supra. Considerations
of its probative value and potential for unfair prejudice are reserved for a separate
analysis under Rule 403.
We distinguished Soundingsides on the same basis in United States v.
4
Youts, 229 F.3d 1312, 1319 (10th Cir. 2000), where we held that other act
evidence offered to prove intent was offered for a proper purpose under Rule
(continued...)
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in this case from which Defendant’s malice can be readily inferred other than his
numerous prior drunk driving convictions. Finally, because malice was so plainly
shown by the charged conduct in Soundingsides , the probative value of the other
acts evidence of malice in that case was “inconsequential.” Id. Thus, its
potential prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value and it was
properly excluded, not because it was offered for an improper purpose under Rule
404(b), but because it failed the Rule 403 balancing test. Accordingly,
Soundingsides provides no support for the district court’s conclusion that the
evidence of Defendant’s past drunk driving convictions was not offered for a
proper purpose under Rule 404(b).
The district court also distinguished cases from the Fourth and Ninth
Circuits in which the admission of prior drunk driving convictions was upheld for
the purposes of proving malice in second degree murder prosecutions. In United
States v. Fleming , 739 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1984), the highly intoxicated defendant,
while fleeing from police in his vehicle, drove in an extremely reckless manner,
eventually striking a car in the oncoming lanes and killing its driver. Id. at 947.
The district court permitted the introduction of the defendant’s driving record
(...continued)
4
404(b) where the intent of a defendant charged with a general intent crime was
disputed.
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which showed several previous drunk driving convictions. The Fourth Circuit
upheld the admission of that evidence:
The driving record would not have been admissible to show that
defendant had a propensity to drive while drunk. F ED . R. E VID .
404(b). However, the driving record was relevant to establish that
defendant had grounds to be aware of the risk his drinking and
driving while intoxicated presented to others. It thus was properly
admitted.
Id. at 949.
In United States v. Loera , 923 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1991), the inebriated
defendant also drove in an extremely reckless manner prior to striking his victims.
He was charged, as is Defendant here, with one count of second degree murder
and one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury. Id. at 726. As in
Fleming , the district court in Loera admitted the defendant’s driving record which
revealed his past drunk driving convictions. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
summarily stated that “[t]he prior convictions were properly admitted to establish
the element of malice required for the proof of second-degree murder.” Id. at
729.
The district court in this case distinguished Fleming , and by implication,
Loera , on the ground that “in addition to being intoxicated, the defendant drove in
a manner indicating depraved disregard for human life.” Order at 5. In other
words, the jury could infer malice in those cases from the defendants’ actions
immediately prior to the fatal accidents. Distinguishing Fleming and Loera from
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the instant case on that basis, however, cuts against, rather than supports, the
district court’s exclusionary ruling. If malice could be inferred from evidence
other than prior drunk driving convictions, then the probative value of those prior
convictions was greatly reduced. The fact that the courts in Fleming and Loera
admitted the prior convictions to prove malice despite their reduced probative
value supports the admission of that kind of evidence in this case where its
probative value is high due to the lack of other evidence of malice. Most
significantly for Rule 404(b) purposes, neither the Fleming nor the Loera court
found the prior drunk driving convictions to be offered for the improper purpose
of proving character to show action in conformity therewith. 5
Because drunk driving offenses are rarely prosecuted in federal courts, the
only circuit court cases directly on point are Fleming and Loera . However, a
number of state courts have addressed this issue and have also held prior drunk
driving convictions to be properly offered under Rule 404(b) for the purpose of
proving malice in second degree murder prosecutions arising from drunk driving
accidents. See , e.g. , State v. McAllister , 530 S.E.2d 859, 863-64 (N.C. Ct. App.
2000) (demonstration of malice is a proper purpose for admission of evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts by the defendant); Moorhead v. State , 638 A.2d 52,
The defendant in Loera conceded that his prior drunk driving convictions
5
were offered to prove malice. Loera, 923 F.2d at 729. Accordingly, he
challenged their admission on the ground that they were unfairly prejudicial. Id.
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55-56 (Del. 1994) (prior drunk driving convictions admissible to prove malice in
second degree murder prosecution); State v. Woody , 845 P.2d 487, 489 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1992) (evidence of prior DUI relevant to issue of whether defendant’s
mental state reflected a reckless indifference to human life); People v. Brogna ,
248 Cal. Rptr. 761, 766-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (criminal act underlying
vehicular murder is driving under the influence with conscious disregard for life
and prior convictions are probative of that mental state since those who drink and
drive after being convicted of that offense know better than most of the illegality
and danger of their conduct); State v. Vowell , 634 S.W.2d 118, 119 (Ark. 1982)
(prior drunk driving convictions admissible “to prove the warning quality of the
other convictions and to infer that the respondent must have arrived at a mental
state inconsistent with mistake and consistent with the culpable mental state of
causing serious physical injury ‘under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life.’”).
A jury could infer from Defendant’s prior drunk driving convictions that he
is especially aware of the problems and risks associated with drunk driving. We
agree that “[o]ne who drives a vehicle while under the influence after having been
convicted of that offense knows better than most that his conduct is not only
illegal, but entails a substantial risk of harm to himself and others.” Brogna , 248
Cal. Rptr. at 766 (emphasis added). From the number of convictions, the jury
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could infer that Defendant does not care about the risk he poses to himself and
others since he continues to drink and drive. Such evidence is highly probative of
malice. In any event, Defendant’s prior convictions are not being offered solely
for the impermissible purpose of proving that he has a propensity to drive drunk.
After reviewing federal and state cases reaching similar conclusions and
based on our reading of Rule 404(b) and its legislative history, we conclude that
prior drunk driving convictions offered to prove the malice component of a
second degree murder charge resulting from an alcohol related vehicular homicide
are offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b). Accordingly, we hold that
the district court’s determination to the contrary was erroneous as a matter of law.
B. Was the Probative Value of Defendant’s Prior Drunk Driving
Convictions Substantially Outweighed by the Danger of Unfair
Prejudice?
As indicated above, other act evidence that is relevant and offered for a
proper purpose under Rule 404(b) must still survive the Rule 403 balancing test in
order to be admitted. Evidence is excluded under Rule 403 if the district court
determines that “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” F ED . R. E VID . 403. Unfair prejudice in the Rule 403
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context “means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” F ED . R. E VID . 403
advisory committee’s note. The district court has considerable discretion in
performing the Rule 403 balancing test. However, exclusion of evidence under
Rule 403 that is otherwise admissible under the other rules “is an extraordinary
remedy and should be used sparingly.” United States v. Rodriguez , 192 F.3d 946,
949 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted).
The district court’s Rule 403 conclusion reads as follows: “under the
immediate facts, it is more likely that the jury would choose to punish the
Defendant for the similar rather than, or in addition to, the charged act, which
means the evidence would be introduced for an improper purpose. In this sense
the evidence would be more prejudicial than probative and therefore will not be
permitted.” Order at 7 (citation omitted). It appears that the district court’s Rule
403 conclusion was based, in part, on its erroneous determination that
Defendant’s prior drunk driving convictions were not offered for a proper purpose
under Rule 404(b). However, the district court also discussed the probative value
of the evidence, though mostly in the context of its Rule 404(b) analysis. In
short, we are unable to discern the basis for the district court’s Rule 403
determination and, therefore, cannot review that determination on appeal.
Accordingly, on remand, the district court must conduct a new Rule 403 balancing
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test with the understanding that the evidence in question is offered for a proper
purpose under Rule 404(b) and cannot be excluded under that rule.
Of course, the district court will have discretion, as usual, in performing
the Rule 403 balancing test on remand. However, we feel it necessary to discuss
some of the factors that will likely be considered. First, we note that unfair
prejudice does more than damage the Defendant’s position at trial. Indeed,
relevant evidence of a crime which the government must introduce to prove its
case is by its nature detrimental to a defendant who asserts that he is not guilty of
the charged offense. In the Rule 403 context, however, “[e]vidence is unfairly
prejudicial if it makes a conviction more likely because it provokes an emotional
response in the jury or otherwise tends to affect adversely the jury’s attitude
toward the defendant wholly apart from its judgment as to his guilt or innocense
of the crime charged.” Rodriguez , 192 F.3d at 951 (quotation omitted) (emphasis
added). Even if this type of prejudice is found, it must substantially outweigh the
probative value of the evidence in order to be excluded under Rule 403. 6
F ED . R.
E VID . 403.
The Fourth Circuit has held that there is no unfair prejudice under Rule
6
403 when the extrinsic act is no more sensational or disturbing than the charged
crime(s). United States v. Boyd, 53 F.3d 631, 637 (4th Cir. 1995). We, however,
leave Rule 403 balancing more broadly to the discretion of the trial courts.
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We have held that Defendant’s prior convictions are offered for the proper
purpose of proving malice, an element of the crime. Accordingly, they have
significant probative value. Because Defendant did not commit conduct on the
day of the accident from which malice can be readily inferred, that probative
value is not diminished by the existence of alternative means of proving malice as
it was in Soundingsides , Fleming and Loera . 7 See also Huddleston , 485 U.S. at
685 (“Extrinsic acts evidence may be critical to the establishment of the truth as
to a disputed issue, especially when that issue involves the actor’s state of mind
and the only means of ascertaining that mental state is by drawing inferences from
conduct.”); Rodriguez , 192 F.3d at 950 (stating that where there is no direct
evidence of an element of the crime, the importance of any indirect evidence
thereof is magnified). Furthermore, in the circumstances of this case, the
probative value of Defendant’s prior convictions is not reduced simply because
Defendant is charged with a general intent crime. 8
7
As indicated above, the fact that the courts in Fleming and Loera admitted
the prior drunk driving convictions of the defendants in those cases despite the
fact that malice could have been inferred from the actions of those defendants
weighs in favor of admission here.
8
The district court made much of the distinction between specific and
general intent crimes. While we agree that, because specific intent cannot be
inferred from the charged conduct, other act evidence may be especially probative
in cases where the defendant is charged with a specific intent crime, we disagree
that other act evidence automatically loses much or most of its probative value if
the defendant is charged with a general intent crime. If, as in Soundingsides,
(continued...)
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Finally, we address the Stipulation. At the Hearing, Defendant attempted to
dilute the probative value of his prior drunk driving convictions by stipulating
that he knows that it is dangerous to drive while intoxicated. On appeal, defense
counsel argues that under Old Chief v. United States , 519 U.S. 172 (1997), the
Stipulation is “binding” on the trial court. In Old Chief , the Supreme Court held
that where a defendant stipulates to the status of being a convicted felon in an 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) prosecution, evidence of the crime giving rise to the status will
generally fail the Rule 403 balancing test. Old Chief , 519 U.S. at 191-92. The
first obvious difference between this case and Old Chief is that here the defendant
is not stipulating to an element of the charged crime. Rather, he stipulates that he
knows that driving drunk is dangerous. We think it self evident that nearly every
adult in this country knows that drunk driving is a dangerous activity. In order to
show malice, the government must show reckless and wanton disregard for human
life. In other words, it must show that Defendant is subjectively aware of the
(...continued)
8
Fleming and Loera, the requisite general intent is shown by proving that the
defendant did the charged conduct, the probative value of other act evidence of
malice is decreased. However, where, as here, the defendant is charged with a
general intent crime requiring the government to prove that the defendant acted
with a particular mental state, and the existence of that mental state cannot be
inferred from the charged conduct, then the probative value of other act evidence
tending to establish that mental state remains high.
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dangers of drunk driving, but that he does not care and continues to drive drunk
despite that awareness.
Even if Defendant stipulated that he knows of the danger and does not care,
or even that he acted with malice aforethought on the day of the accident, Old
Chief would not require the exclusion of his prior convictions. The Supreme
Court, while carving out a narrow exception for stipulations of felony-convict
status, reaffirmed the general rule that “a criminal defendant may not stipulate or
admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the Government
chooses to present it.” Id. at 186-87. Old Chief does not require the exclusion of
other crimes evidence where there is a stipulation to an element of the charged
crime where the evidence is offered to prove an element other than felony-convict
status. See United States v. Campos , 221 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 2000).
Other circuits have reached similar conclusions. See United States v. Hill , 2001
WL 436023, *4-5 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Williams , 238 F.3d 871, 876
(7th Cir. 2001) (“We believe that . . . Old Chief counsels that a defendant’s offer
to stipulate to an element of an offense does not render inadmissible the
prosecution’s evidence of prior crimes to prove elements such as knowledge and
intent.”); United States v. Bilderbeck , 163 F.3d 971, 977-78 (6th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Crowder , 141 F.3d 1202, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“we hold that a
defendant’s offer to stipulate to an element of an offense does not render the
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government’s other crimes evidence inadmissible under Rule 404(b) to prove that
element, even if the defendant’s proposed stipulation is unequivocal.”).
For the reasons discussed above, the Stipulation would be an improper
basis for excluding Defendant’s prior drunk driving convictions under Rule 403.
That is not to say that it may not be considered at all in the balancing test.
However, its value is slight. It merely proves that Defendant, like virtually all
other adults, understands drunk driving to be dangerous. While not worthless,
such an admission does little to further the prosecution’s efforts to prove malice.
Accordingly, its impact on the probative value of Defendant’s prior convictions is
negligible.
In short, the district court’s task on remand is to determine whether the
potential unfair prejudice of Defendant’s prior drunk driving convictions
substantially outweighs their probative value, and to explain its reasoning in
sufficient detail to permit informed appellate review if the issue is raised again.
As indicated above, the district court must assume at the threshold that those
convictions are offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) in this case and
should consider our discussion of their significant probative value and of the
negligible effect of the Stipulation.
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III. CONCLUSION
The district court’s conclusion that Defendant’s prior drunk driving
convictions were not offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) was
erroneous as a matter of law. It appears that the court’s determination that the
evidence was more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403 was based, in part,
on that conclusion. We conclude that the district court’s decision to exclude the
prior convictions rested on an error of law and hold that it was, therefore, an
abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we REVERSE the Order of the district court
and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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