F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 26 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 00-2134
(D.C. No. CIV-97-587-JC)
GARY RAY CROWELL, (D. N.M.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY, BRISCOE, and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Defendant Gary Ray Crowell seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) in
order to appeal from the district court’s order denying relief in his motion filed
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We deny Crowell’s application and dismiss the appeal.
I.
The facts and procedural background of this case are set forth in the
magistrate judge’s detailed and thorough thirty-four-page report and
recommendation. Thus, we only briefly repeat those facts necessary to resolve
this appeal. Crowell pled guilty in April 1987 to an indictment charging him with
one count of kidnaping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) based upon his
abduction and sexual abuse of a fourteen-year-old victim in Arizona. Crowell
was represented by appointed counsel, Mr. Phillip Gaddy. His guilty plea, made
at the start of his trial, was not based on any plea negotiations with the
government, but rather on his belief that he would not be prosecuted in Arizona if
he received a substantial sentence in federal court. However, the day before
sentencing, Crowell sought to withdraw his plea. He alleged he had recently
received copies of certain discovery documents which he believed bolstered his
chances of an acquittal. These discovery documents had been timely provided by
the government to Gaddy, but Crowell claimed to be unaware of them. Gaddy
sought to have new counsel appointed in case Crowell wished to pursue a claim
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that Gaddy had been ineffective in not providing him copies of these discovery
materials.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on these motions at which
Crowell and others testified. The district court denied the motion to appoint new
counsel and the motion to withdraw the plea and sentenced Crowell to life
imprisonment. Gaddy immediately wrote a letter to Crowell recommending that
he file an appeal, and informing him of the appeal deadline and how to have the
court clerk enter a notice of appeal on his behalf. Gaddy told Crowell to contact
him if he wanted any further assistance from Gaddy, though he did not expressly
offer to file an appeal for Crowell. Crowell was in transit to a new prison at the
time, and did not receive Gaddy’s letter until after the appeal deadline had
passed. 1 Crowell did not attempt to contact Gaddy.
Crowell did not file his § 2255 motion until ten years later, in 1997. He
raised numerous arguments, including a claim that his guilty plea was not
knowing and voluntary and claims that he was denied due process and ineffective
assistance of counsel because he was not informed of his right to appeal and
because Gaddy failed to perfect a direct appeal. After Crowell filed his § 2255
1
There is some conflict in the record as to when Crowell received the letter,
which was dated June 1, 1987. In his § 2255 motion, Crowell stated that he
arrived at the federal prison on June 10, 1987, and received his mail some days
later. At his § 2255 evidentiary hearing, however, Crowell testified that he did
not receive the letter until the end of July, 1987.
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motion, it was determined that transcripts of Crowell’s 1987 change of plea
hearing and sentencing hearing no longer existed. The district court sua sponte
determined that Crowell’s § 2255 motion was barred by Rule 9(a) of the Rules
Governing § 2255 Proceedings and denied the motion. Rule 9(a) “provides the
state with an equitable defense to unjustifiably delayed petitions.” Hannon v.
Maschner , 845 F.2d 1553, 1555 (10th Cir. 1988).
On appeal, we reversed the ruling that Crowell’s motion was barred by
Rule 9(a), holding that it is an affirmative defense that the government waived by
failing to raise it. United States v. Crowell , No. 98-2064, 1999 WL 285855, **3
(10th Cir. Apr. 21, 1999). We affirmed the dismissal of some of Crowell’s claims
as without merit. Id. at **4. We concluded, however, that Crowell’s claims
relating to the voluntariness of his guilty plea and his ineffective assistance of
counsel claims could only be resolved by an evidentiary hearing and remanded the
case to the district court for further proceedings. Id. at **3.
The magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing on remand at which
Crowell, Gaddy, and the prosecutor testified. For the first time, the government
asserted a Rule 9(a) defense. The magistrate judge again concluded Crowell’s
motion was barred by Rule 9(a), but also rejected Crowell’s claims on the merits.
The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and
dismissed the § 2255 motion.
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II.
To be entitled to a COA, Crowell must make a “substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). He may make this
showing by demonstrating that the issues he raises are debatable among jurists,
that a court could resolve the issues differently, or that the questions presented
deserve further proceedings. See Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 483-84
(2000). We have reviewed Crowell’s request for a COA, his appellate briefs, the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, adopted by the district court, the
transcript of the evidentiary hearing held in the district court, and the entire
appellate record and conclude that Crowell has failed to make the required
showing for a COA. 2
2
While we conclude that the district court’s disposition of the merits of
Crowell’s § 2255 petition is not deserving of further proceedings, we disagree
with its conclusion that the government could raise a Rule 9(a) defense for the
first time on remand. In Crowell’s first appeal, we held that the government
waived that defense by failing to assert it in its response to the § 2255 motion.
Crowell , 1999 WL 285855, at **3. Our ruling that Rule 9(a) had been waived
became the law of the case and was required to be followed by the district court
on remand. See Phelps v. Hamilton , 122 F.3d 1309, 1322 (10th Cir. 1997) (“The
law of the case doctrine provides that when a court decides upon a rule of law,
that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages of
the same case.”) (internal quotation omitted); Rohrbaugh v. Celotex Corp. , 53
F.3d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[W]hen a case is appealed and remanded, the
decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the case and ordinarily will
be followed by both the trial court on remand and the appellate court in any
subsequent appeal.”).
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A.
Crowell claims he was denied due process and effective assistance of
counsel because he was never informed of his right to appeal. The magistrate
judge found, with record support, that Crowell was aware of his right to appeal
based on (1) evidence that the sentencing judge uniformly advised defendants of
their right to appeal using a standardized sentencing memorandum, consistent
with the court’s obligation under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(2) (1987) to inform a
defendant of his right to appeal; 3
(2) the fact that Crowell had two prior criminal
convictions from which he would have had independent knowledge of a
defendant’s right to appeal, and (3) his determination that Crowell was not
credible when he testified he was unaware he had any right to appeal. Based on
these findings, we agree with the magistrate judge that Crowell was not denied
due process and effective assistance of counsel due to any failure of the court or
his counsel to inform him of his right to appeal.
B.
We also agree with the magistrate judge that Gaddy did not provide
ineffective assistance by failing to perfect an appeal on Crowell’s behalf. An
ineffective assistance claim based upon counsel’s failure to file a notice of
appeal, like any other ineffective assistance claim, must be judged in accordance
3
Now set forth at Fed. Crim. R. P. 32(c)(5).
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with the two-pronged test described in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668,
687-88, 694 (1984), which requires the petitioner to show that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the
petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. Roe v.
Flores-Ortega , 528 U.S. 470, 476-77 (2000). In cases such as this one where the
defendant has not clearly conveyed to counsel whether or not he wishes to pursue
an appeal, the court must first ascertain whether counsel “consulted” with the
defendant regarding a possible appeal by “advising the defendant about the
advantages and disadvantages of taking an appeal, and making a reasonable effort
to discover the defendant’s wishes.” Id. at 478. If deficient performance is
established, the defendant is then required to establish that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s deficient failure to consult with him about an
appeal, he would have timely appealed. Id. at 484.
Here, Gaddy informed Crowell by letter of his right to appeal immediately
after Crowell’s sentencing hearing. He recommended that Crowell file an appeal,
informed him of the appeal deadline, and instructed him how to have the court
clerk file a notice of appeal on his behalf. However, he did not consult with
Crowell in person, nor did he make a further attempt to contact Crowell to
ascertain his wishes. Even if we assume for the sake of argument, however, that
Gaddy was deficient in failing to make a reasonable effort to discover Crowell’s
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wishes, we nevertheless agree with the magistrate judge that Crowell failed to
show that this deficiency prejudiced him because he failed to establish that, but
for Gaddy’s performance, he would have timely appealed.
When Crowell received Gaddy’s letter in June or July 1987, he did nothing
for weeks, even months. He made no attempt to contact Gaddy, nor did he make
any immediate attempt to file a late appeal. Had he taken any action upon receipt
of Gaddy’s letter, he or Gaddy might have been able to file a request to file a late
appeal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(b) (1987), which, as then in effect,
authorized the district court to extend the time to file a notice of appeal based on
a finding of excusable neglect. Crowell’s first attempt to contact the district court
was not until September 1987, when he requested the appointment of counsel. He
again sought the appointment of counsel in October 1987 and, in November 1987,
wrote a letter to the court seeking copies of documents and transcripts. In both
October and November, the district court wrote to Crowell explaining that he
could raise his claims in a § 2255 motion and the court provided him with the
necessary forms and instructions to file such a motion. Yet, Crowell waited ten
years before filing his § 2255 motion. Thus, the magistrate judge correctly
concluded that Crowell failed to demonstrate that, but for Gaddy’s failure to
consult adequately with him, he would have timely appealed.
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C.
Finally, Crowell contends his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary
because Gaddy withheld three exculpatory documents, failed to inform him that
Arizona might still pursue charges against him, and incorrectly told him that any
sentence he received in Arizona would run concurrent with his federal sentence.
At the time Crowell pled guilty, he signed an affidavit acknowledging that his
plea was knowing and voluntary. The affidavit clearly indicates Crowell was
aware of the possibility that Arizona would still prosecute him. The magistrate
judge found no evidence to support Crowell’s claim that Gaddy advised him any
Arizona sentence would be concurrent and found, for numerous reasons, that
Crowell’s testimony on this point was not credible. As to the three allegedly
undisclosed documents, we have already determined that discovery material
similar to one document, an interview with the victim’s aunt and uncle, was not
exculpatory or material. Crowell , 1999 WL 285855 at **4 (ruling on the aunt and
uncle’s statement under Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). Crowell never
introduced into the record copies of the remaining two allegedly undisclosed
documents, though it is his burden to establish what the allegedly exculpatory
evidence is. He claims there was a laboratory result allegedly finding no blood,
skin or hair on a piece of rope. We agree with the magistrate judge that such a
report would not be exculpatory because there is no evidence it was the rope used
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to tie the victim. Crowell also claims there was a medical report of the victim
showing that she had no cuts or bruises. We agree with the magistrate judge that
such a report, while somewhat exculpatory, would not necessarily impeach the
victim’s statement that Crowell tied her up and raped her. Considering all the
circumstances, we agree with the magistrate judge that the allegedly withheld
material did not compromise the voluntary and knowing nature of Crowell’s plea.
In summary, Crowell failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right” and, accordingly, he is not entitled to a COA. See
§ 2253(c)(1)(B). The magistrate judge wrote a lengthy, thorough, and well-
reasoned report and recommendation that was adopted by the district court. We
agree with its analysis and ultimate decision to deny habeas relief.
We DENY Crowell’s application for a COA and DISMISS this appeal.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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