F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 31 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 00-6331
v. (Western District of Oklahoma)
(D.C. No. CR-99-206-L)
MICHAEL ALBERT CERVINI,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, ANDERSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Michael Cervini entered a conditional guilty plea to one count
of possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) .
Cervini appeals from the district court’s final judgment, asserting the district
court erred in denying his motion to suppress and his request for an evidentiary
hearing. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) (providing that a defendant, with approval
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
of the court and consent of the government, may enter conditional guilty plea and
reserve right to appeal an adverse determination of pretrial motion). This court
exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirms the district court.
II. BACKGROUND
In April 1999, two images of child pornography were posted to an Internet
newsgroup. Accompanying the postings were message headers that included an
Internet protocol address linked to the Internet service provider account of
Michael Cervini. After an investigation, a search warrant for Cervini’s residence
was issued and executed.
In December 1999, Cervini was indicted for knowingly transporting and
shipping child pornography in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2252A(a)(1) and knowingly possessing an image of child pornography that was
produced using materials shipped and transported in interstate commerce in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Cervini filed a motion to suppress the
evidence obtained during the search of his residence, arguing the affidavit in
support of the warrant provided insufficient probable cause that evidence of
criminal activity would be found at his residence. The district court denied
Cervini’s motion and ruled that he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Cervini entered a conditional guilty plea to possessing child pornography,
and the government dismissed the other charge. Cervini comes before this court
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on appeal from the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and its denial
of his request for an evidentiary hearing on his motion.
III. DISCUSSION
Cervini challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress,
arguing the affidavit supporting the search warrant provided insufficient probable
cause to establish a nexus between the criminal activity and Cervini’s residence.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this court reviews the district
court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions regarding the
sufficiency of the search warrant de novo. See United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d
1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th
Cir. 1998). This court reviews the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing
on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Chavez-
Marquez, 66 F.3d 259, 261 (10th Cir. 1995).
“In determining whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant, the
issuing judge must decide whether . . . there is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Simpson, 152 F.3d at
1246 (quotations omitted). The judge may draw reasonable inferences from the
affidavit in support of the search warrant application. See United States v.
Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1205 (10th Cir. 1998). The issuing judge must
ultimately make a practical, common-sense decision based on the totality of the
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circumstances. See United States v. Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d 927, 931 (10th Cir.
1990). This court affords great deference to the judge’s final determination. See
id.
On appeal, Cervini claims the information in the affidavit does not
establish that the transmission of pornographic images originated from a computer
at his residence or that he even owned a computer. Cervini further argues the
second telephone line in his residence could have been used for a purpose other
than establishing an Internet connection.
Affording great deference to the issuing judge’s determination, this court
concludes the search warrant affidavit asserted sufficient facts to establish
probable cause that evidence of criminal activity would be found in Cervini’s
residence. Terry Wade, a Special Agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and former agent for the Oklahoma Bureau of Investigation, applied for a warrant
to search Cervini’s residence, attaching a personal affidavit to the application in
support of the warrant. The affidavit describes in some detail the process by
which an individual may post a message to an Internet newsgroup and the manner
in which the individual may be traced from his posting.
In addition, the affidavit includes details of the specific crime for which the
search warrant was sought. Special Agent Wade indicated in his affidavit that
two images of child pornography were posted to an Internet newsgroup just before
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1:00 a.m. on April 27, 1999. The message header accompanying the transmission
contained the Internet protocol (IP) address 206.154.188.85 and revealed that the
message was posted from a news server owned by Innovative Technology, Ltd.,
an Internet service provider (ISP). The ISP’s records revealed that the account
responsible for the posting had been in use for four hours and was not logged off
until just before 3:00 a.m. In response to a grand jury subpoena, the ISP
identified the account holder from the IP address as Michael Cervini. The ISP
provided Cervini’s address and indicated that his customer account status was
active. Cervini’s residential address was corroborated through both a records
check of Southwestern Oklahoma State University and an Oklahoma driver’s
license query.
Further, current telephone listings revealed that Cervini’s residence
contained two active telephone lines. Special Agent Wade indicated that based
upon his knowledge and training, it is common practice for individuals utilizing a
home computer for access to the Internet to have a second telephone line in their
home. Wade further indicated that he conducted an interview with Cervini’s
neighbor who revealed that Cervini was knowledgeable about computers and had
worked on a computer-related project for a family member of the neighbor’s at
Cervini’s home.
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In his brief, Cervini pays little regard to the standard for establishing
probable cause. The search warrant affidavit must demonstrate a “fair
probability” that a search of Cervini’s residence would uncover evidence
connecting Cervini to the pornographic postings. Simpson, 152 F.3d at 1246. It
need not eliminate all other possible conclusions which could be derived from the
alleged facts. The issuing judge reasonably could have inferred from the facts
provided in the affidavit that (1) an individual is likely to generate child
pornography in a location where he has the greatest expectation of privacy; (2) a
computer would be found at an ISP subscriber’s residence; (3) Cervini was most
likely at home at 1:00 a.m.; and (4) as the account holder, Cervini was the person
using the account. Contrary to Cervini’s claim, these conclusions do not require
the issuing judge to pile inference upon inference. The totality of the facts enable
a reasonable person to draw the common-sense conclusion that evidence of the
crime would be found at Cervini’s residence. 1 See United States v. $149,442.43
in U.S. Currency, 965 F.2d 868, 874 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Where an affidavit
describes circumstances which would warrant a person of reasonable caution to
1
Cervini claims the information gathered from his neighbor was stale
because no time frame was given for the alleged computer-related project
performed at his home. This court need not determine whether the information
was stale. Even without this information, the affidavit contains sufficient facts to
support the issuance of a search warrant.
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believe that the articles sought would be at appellant’s residence, then a sufficient
nexus has been established.”).
Cervini also argues on appeal that the district court erred in not holding an
evidentiary hearing on the issues he raised in his motion to suppress. Cervini
alleges that the search warrant affidavit recklessly omitted information that would
have vitiated probable cause. Specifically, Cervini claims (1) the affidavit lists
the e-mail address eyeBme@fish.net as the source of the pornographic postings,
while Cervini’s e-mail address was mike@ITLnet.net during the relevant time
period; (2) the affiant discovered that Cervini was a student at Southwestern
Oklahoma State University and that, in the course of learning this information, the
affiant also should have learned that Cervini was employed by the University as a
Library Computer Technician with access to many computers; and (3) the
affidavit was void of information that the pornographic images could have been
posted on the Internet from anywhere in the world through the use of a computer
at any location. Because Cervini failed to raise the last two arguments before the
district court, this court deems them waived and only addresses his argument
regarding the e-mail address. See United States v. Dewitt, 946 F.2d 1497, 1502
(10th Cir. 1991).
A defendant is entitled to a hearing only if he can make a “substantial
preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with
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reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant
affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of
probable cause.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). The rule
entitling a defendant to a hearing also applies to material omissions if the
omissions are so probative as to negate probable cause. See United States v.
Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1377 (10th Cir. 1997); DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d
618, 622 (10th Cir. 1990). A defendant makes a preliminary showing if he
demonstrates that the exclusion of a false statement contained in the affidavit or
the inclusion of a material omission not contained in the affidavit would have
vitiated probable cause. See Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 581-83 (10th Cir.
1990); Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d at 933.
Although Cervini characterizes the problem with the affidavit as an
omission, his claim in fact includes both an allegation of a false statement and an
allegation of a material omission. The inclusion of eyeBme@fish.net as the e-
mail address connected to Cervini’s Internet account is more properly
characterized as an alleged false statement, while the exclusion of Cervini’s e-
mail address as mike@ITLnet.net is accurately characterized as an alleged
material omission. Regardless of how the issue is framed, however, Cervini did
not demonstrate to the district court that the exclusion of the eyeBme@fish.net e-
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mail address or the inclusion of the mike@ITLnet.net e-mail address in the
affidavit would have vitiated probable cause. 2
Even if the eyeBme@fish.net e-mail address is excluded from the affidavit,
a connection between the pornographic postings and Cervini arises through the IP
address linked to his ISP account. Hence, the exclusion of the eyeBme@fish.net
e-mail address from the affidavit would not have negated a finding of probable
cause. An examination of the alleged material omission results in the same
conclusion. Including mike@ITLnet.net as Cervini’s alleged e-mail address
would not create an inconsistency in the affidavit, nor would it render the
affidavit insufficient to establish probable cause.
The affidavit sets forth the following relevant information. When an
individual posts a message to an Internet newsgroup, the message is sent through
a newsgroup computer server that automatically attaches a “message header” to
the message. In this case, the “message header” on the messages that
accompanied the pornographic images showed an IP address of 206.154.188.85,
which is the IP address linked to Cervini’s ISP account. The individual who
posted the pornographic images placed a text return address of eyeBme@fish.net
2
This court need not address whether the affidavit actually contained a
false statement or omitted material information because Cervini cannot
demonstrate that the alleged false statement or material omission were necessary
to the finding of probable cause.
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in each of the messages accompanying the images. According to the affidavit,
however, this text return address is not automatically attached to the message as is
the IP address. It would be reasonable for an issuing judge to infer that an
automatically-attached identifier is more accurate than an e-mail address imputed
by the individual posting the pornographic images who might want to conceal his
identity. Even with the inclusion of the e-mail address mike@ITLnet.net, the IP
address still links Cervini’s ISP account to the posting of pornographic images.
The exclusion of the alleged false statement and inclusion of the alleged
material omission would not have undermined the probable cause determination.
Cervini made no such showing in his motion to suppress to the district court to
warrant a hearing. Thus, this court holds the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Cervini an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this court affirms the district court’s denial
of Cervini’s motion to suppress and affirms the district court’s refusal to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the matter.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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