F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
AUG 14 2001
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 00-1276
v.
KEVIN CHARLES EATON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 99-CR-329-N)
Sean Connelly, Assistant United States Attorney, District of Colorado, (Thomas
L. Strickland, United States Attorney, District of Colorado, with him on the
briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Wade H. Eldridge, Wade H. Eldridge, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant.
Before BRISCOE, ANDERSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Kevin C. Eaton was convicted in a jury trial for unlawfully
possessing three unregistered explosive devices in violation of 26 U.S.C. §
5861(d). During the trial, the district court rejected Eaton’s assertion that the
circumstances of his case were analogous to those in United States v. Dalton, 960
F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1992). The district court therefore denied Eaton’s motion for
judgment of acquittal and, during the jury instruction conference, rejected his
proposed instruction based on Dalton. Eaton challenges these rulings. He also
challenges several aspects of his sentence. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
II. BACKGROUND
As a member of a motorcycle club, Eaton frequently attended motorcycle
rallies which brought several such clubs together throughout Colorado. He
became friendly with a member of a different motorcycle club who he knew as
Bo, an undercover identity assumed by Special Agent Blake Boteler. Special
Agent Boteler had infiltrated a motorcycle club in an attempt to uncover evidence
of illegal firearm and narcotics trafficking in the outlaw motorcycle club
community. 1 Both Eaton and Special Agent Boteler served as the enforcers for
their respective motorcycle clubs.
1
These clubs describe themselves as outlaw motorcycle clubs because they
“live outside the law.”
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During a conversation between the two men at a motorcycle rally, Eaton
expressed an interest in obtaining blasting caps. Special Agent Boteler indicated
that he would look into acquiring some from a friend in New Mexico. During the
same conversation, Boteler informed Eaton he was interested in obtaining three
pipe bombs and asked Eaton if he would make them for him. Special Agent
Boteler indicated to Eaton that he needed the bombs to use on a car. Eaton agreed
to build the pipe bombs.
Shortly thereafter, Special Agent Boteler went to Eaton’s house to pick up
the pipe bombs. Eaton gave Boteler three constructed pipe bombs and four plastic
bags filled with smokeless powder to put in the pipes. Special Agent Boteler
asked Eaton to explain the most effective way to blow up a car. Eaton responded
by telling him to place the bombs near the gas tank. During the course of their
meeting, Special Agent Boteler indicated that the bombs would be used on
someone who deserved it. Eaton acknowledged that Boteler’s planned actions
were felonious.
Eaton was subsequently indicted for unlawfully possessing three
unregistered explosive devices in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Following a
jury trial, Eaton was found guilty of the charge. The district court sentenced
Eaton to fifty-seven months imprisonment. In calculating Eaton’s sentence, the
district court enhanced his base offense level by one level for the number of
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devices used in the offense, two levels for an offense involving a destructive
device, and four levels for the transfer of a firearm with knowledge that it would
be used in connection with another felony offense. The district court refused to
adjust Eaton’s sentence downward for his alleged acceptance of responsibility.
On appeal, Eaton challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for
judgment of acquittal and the district court’s refusal to give his proposed jury
instruction. Eaton also challenges the district court’s calculation of his sentence
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Proposed Jury Instruction
Eaton claims the district court should have granted his motion for
judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, should have given his proposed jury
instruction pursuant to United States v. Dalton, 960 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1992). A
district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo.
See United States v. Schluneger, 184 F.3d 1154, 1158 (10th Cir.1999). Although
this court reviews a district court’s refusal to give a particular jury instruction for
abuse of discretion, we examine the instructions as a whole de novo to determine
whether the instructions adequately state the governing law. See United States v.
Pacheco, 154 F.3d 1236, 1238 (10th Cir. 1998).
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In Dalton, this court held that due process barred a defendant’s conviction
under a statute that punished his failure to register a machinegun when the
registration of a machinegun was precluded by law. See 960 F.2d at 122. Eaton
analogizes his case to Dalton, claiming it was impossible for him to register a
pipe bomb with the ATF and he therefore cannot be punished for his failure to
comply with the registration statute. Dalton involved a situation in which a
particular statute criminalized possession of a machine gun, thereby making gun
registration legally impossible. See id. at 122-23; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1)
(“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun.”).
There is no similar statute criminalizing the possession of a destructive device
such as a pipe bomb. Without such a statute, it was not legally impossible for
Eaton to register the pipe bomb. See United States v. McCollom, 12 F.3d 968,
971 (10th Cir. 1993). He could have imprinted a serial number on the pipe bomb
and attempted to register it with the ATF. Whether the ATF would have accepted
the pipe bomb for registration does not bear on the issue of legal impossibility.
See id. Thus, Eaton was not deprived of due process. 2
B. Sentencing Issues
Eaton raises four issues on appeal related to the sentence imposed by the
2
Eaton relies on his assertion that the pipe bombs could not be registered in
order to support a Fifth Amendment claim. Because Eaton was not legally
prohibited from registering the pipe bombs, his claim fails.
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district court. Eaton claims the district court erred by (1) refusing to grant him a
two-level downward adjustment pursuant to § 3E1.1(a) of the Sentencing
Guidelines for acceptance of responsibility, (2) subjecting him to a four-level
enhancement pursuant to § 2K2.1(b)(5) of the Sentencing Guidelines for unlawful
transfer of a firearm with reason to believe it would be used in connection with
another felony offense, (3) rejecting his claim that the government engaged in
outrageous conduct, and (4) failing to submit to the jury questions of fact that
increased his sentence in contravention of the United States Supreme Court’s
declaration in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). This court reviews
the district court’s legal conclusions under the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and
its factual findings for clear error, affording great deference to the district court’s
application of the Guidelines to the facts. See United States v. Janusz, 135 F.3d
1319, 1324 (10th Cir. 1998); see also U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.5. Constitutional
challenges to a sentence are also reviewed de novo. See United States v. Jones,
213 F.3d 1253, 1261 (10th Cir. 2000).
(1) Acceptance of Responsibility
Eaton challenges the district court’s refusal to apply a two-level reduction
to his sentence for acceptance of responsibility. At trial, Eaton asserted an
entrapment defense. As the district court correctly noted, an assertion of
entrapment as a defense does not bar a defendant from receiving a two-level
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reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See United States v. Garcia, 182 F.3d
1165, 1172 (10th Cir. 1999). Eaton, however, bears the burden of demonstrating
an “affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct.”
United States v. McAlpine, 32 F.3d 484, 489 (10th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted).
When a defendant is convicted at trial, a sentencing court’s determination
that he has accepted responsibility is based primarily on pre-trial statements and
conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.2. In this case, the district court indicated
that it was not aware of any pretrial statements or conduct by Eaton that would
support a determination that Eaton accepted responsibility for the crime of
conviction. The district court thus concluded that the reduction was not merited.
Eaton makes no claim that he ever made pre-trial statements or engaged in pre-
trial conduct that would suggest he accepted responsibility for the crime of
conviction. Eaton simply claims he deserved the reduction because he testified
truthfully at trial about making devices that, when taken apart and put back
together with gun powder, were pipe bombs. It is clear the district court did not
believe that Eaton met his burden of demonstrating an affirmative acceptance of
personal responsibility. Bearing in mind this court’s deference to the sentencing
judge’s determination, we cannot conclude that the district court’s factual
findings were clearly erroneous. Thus, a two-level reduction was not warranted.
(2) Transfer of Firearm in Connection with Another Felony
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The district court imposed a four-level enhancement pursuant to §
2K2.1(b)(5) of the Sentencing Guidelines, which provides for such an adjustment
if a defendant “possessed or transferred any firearm or ammunition with
knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in
connection with another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5). The term
firearm includes destructive devices such as pipe bombs. See 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(3)(D); id. § 921(a)(4)(A)(i). A felony offense includes any federal, state,
or local offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. See
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n.7. The district court found that Eaton’s testimony
supported “an inference of knowledge that the pipe bombs had the intended use of
feloniously destroying a car and, at a later point in time, that they had the
intended use of homicide.” Eaton claims that because pipe bombs have no
purpose other than blowing things up, the potential to commit a felony offense is
always present when one possesses such a destructive device. Thus, Eaton
argues, the commission of a felony offense such as arson or murder is
coincidental to the bombs and not separate from their intended use and the
enhancement is therefore not warranted. 3
3
Eaton also suggests the enhancement might not apply because the
destructive devices were never used to commit a separate crime. Although Eaton
later appears to dismiss his own argument, it is worth noting the law on this point.
Even if a separate felony is never committed, a four-level enhancement is
appropriate if the destructive device had the potential to facilitate a separate
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The only authority Eaton cites to support his claim is United States v.
Gomez-Arrellano, 5 F.3d 464, 466-67 (10th Cir. 1993). Eaton’s reliance on
Gomez-Arrellano, however, is misguided. Gomez-Arrellano does not stand for
the proposition that because felony offenses are coincidental to certain types of
weapons, a sentence enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5) is not appropriate.
Gomez-Arrellano prohibits the § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement if possession of a
firearm is merely coincidental to a separate offense. See id. If this court accepts
Eaton’s argument, a sentence enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5) would never be
permissible in connection with a conviction for any crime involving a destructive
device. This is not the rule. The mere fact that a destructive device has the
potential to facilitate a felony does not exempt the application of § 2K2.1(b)(5).
To the extent that Eaton challenges the district court’s application of §
2K2.1(b)(5) to the facts of this case, this court finds no error in the imposition of
the four-level enhancement. Eaton testified that he was aware Special Agent
Boteler wanted to use the pipe bomb to blow up a car. He even instructed the
agent on the most effective way to blow it up by putting the bomb underneath the
gas tank. Eaton’s own testimony plainly indicates that he had reason to believe
the bomb would be used in connection with another felony offense.
felony offense. See United States v. Bunner, 134 F.3d 1000, 1006 (10th Cir.
1998).
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Eaton also claims the imposition of the four-level enhancement constitutes
impermissible double counting because the district court already imposed a two-
level enhancement pursuant to § 2K2.1(b)(3) of the Sentencing Guidelines.
Impermissible double counting occurs when the same conduct of the defendant is
used to support separate increases under different enhancement provisions which
necessarily overlap, are indistinct, and serve identical purposes. See United
States v. Flinn, 18 F.3d 826, 829 (10th Cir. 1994).
Section 2K2.1(b)(3) provides for a two-level enhancement if the offense
involved a destructive device. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(3). Section 2K2.1(b)(5)
provides for a four-level enhancement if the defendant possessed or transferred a
firearm, including a destructive device, with reason to believe that it would be
used in connection with another felony offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5).
Despite Eaton’s contentions to the contrary, these provisions serve distinct
purposes. Whereas § 2K2.1(b)(3) provides an enhancement for the mere
involvement of a destructive device, § 2K2.1(b)(5) focuses on the defendant’s
knowledge that the device will be used in connection with a separate felony
offense. The facts in any given case may warrant a sentence enhancement under §
2K2.1(b)(3) and not § 2K2.1(b)(5). Because the provisions serve distinct
purposes, the district court’s enhancement of Eaton’s sentence under both §
2K2.1(b)(3) and § 2K2.1(b)(5) did not constitute double counting.
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(3) Alleged Outrageous Governmental Conduct
Eaton claims the government engaged in such outrageous conduct that the
district court should have disregarded the Sentencing Guidelines and not
calculated his sentence based on the involvement of three pipe bombs or his
knowledge that the bombs would be used for a separate felony. Section
2K2.1(b)(1)(A) of the Sentencing Guidelines enhances a defendant’s base level
offense by one level if the offense involves three or four firearms. See U.S.S.G. §
2K2.1(b)(1)(A). As noted above, § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhances a defendant’s base level
offense for transferring a firearm with knowledge that it will be used in
connection with a separate felony. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5). Eaton suggests
the government agent asked him to produce three pipe bombs and informed him
that using them on a car was a felony simply to increase his potential penalty at
sentencing.
A defendant must overcome a very high threshold to establish outrageous
governmental conduct. See United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 964 (10th Cir.
1996). The challenged conduct must be so shocking, outrageous, and intolerable
that it offends the universal sense of justice. See United States v. Mosley, 965
F.2d 906, 910 (10th Cir. 1992). The undercover agent’s behavior does not rise to
this level. Eaton was not coerced nor reluctant to produce three pipe bombs for
Special Agent Boteler. Cf. United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1105, 1108
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(9th Cir. 1994) (remanding for resentencing due to sentencing entrapment based
on fact that defendant sold large quantity of drugs due to coercion from
government agent). 4 Eaton acknowledged that using the bomb to blow up a car
was a felony and even explained the most effective way to carry out this act.
Accordingly, the district court properly rejected Eaton’s outrageous governmental
conduct claim.
(4) Apprendi Claim
Eaton claims that because the jury did not make factual determinations with
regard to the sentence enhancements under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) and § 2K2.1(b)(5),
he should be resentenced based only on the elements decided by the jury in light
of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000). Because Eaton’s fifty-seven month sentence was not above the
maximum term for the crime of conviction, Apprendi is not implicated. See
United States v. Heckard, 238 F.3d 1222, 1235 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that no
Apprendi error exists when a defendant’s sentence falls below the statutory
maximum); see also 26 U.S.C. § 5871 (providing a ten-year imprisonment
maximum for a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)). Thus, Eaton’s claim is without
merit.
“Outrageous governmental conduct” is the same concept as “sentencing
4
entrapment.” See United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 963 & n.5 (10th Cir.
1996).
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court is AFFIRMED.
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