F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
AUG 22 2001
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 00-4156
PAUL GARFINKLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. No. 99-CV-128-B)
Submitted on the briefs:
J. David Bogenschutz of Bogenschutz & Dutko, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Defendant-Appellant.
Paul M. Warner, United States Attorney; Wayne T. Dance, Assistant United States
Attorney, Chief Appellate Section, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR and McKAY , Circuit Judges, and BRORBY , Senior Circuit
Judge.
McKAY , Circuit Judge.
Paul Garfinkle appeals from the district court’s order adopting the
recommendation of the magistrate judge in this case and dismissing appellant’s
petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 1
Our jurisdiction over this appeal arises from 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). “We review
the district court’s legal rulings on a § 2255 motion de novo and its findings of
fact for clear error.” United States v. Kennedy , 225 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir.
2000) (further quotation omitted), cert. denied , 121 S. Ct. 1406 (2001).
Appellant was originally sentenced to five years’ probation after pleading
guilty to money laundering and conspiracy. He was subsequently charged with
violating conditions of his probation and his probation was revoked. Appellant
was resentenced to two years’ imprisonment followed by three years’ supervised
release. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his new sentence. See United States
v. Garfinkle , No. 98-4040, 1998 WL 781022, at **2 (10th Cir. Nov. 6, 1998)
(unpublished order and judgment).
In his § 2255 motion, appellant did not challenge the imprisonment portion
of his new sentence, but contended that the sentencing court could not legally
impose supervised release after revocation of his probation. After dismissing the
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
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motion, the district court granted appellant a certificate of appealability on the
issue. 2 See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). We note that, while appellant did not
raise this issue on direct appeal from his resentencing, he alleges that his counsel
was ineffective for failing to raise it, a contention that, if true, would constitute
cause for his default. See Murray v. Carrier , 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
Therefore, we examine appellant’s arguments, as did the district court, in light of
the standards applicable to ineffective assistance claims set out in Strickland v.
Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Appellant presents three main arguments to support his contention that the
district court could not legally sentence him to a term of supervised release
following revocation of his probation. First, he contends that the provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 3583 prohibit any sentence beyond the two-year term of
imprisonment he received. Then he argues that this court’s decision in United
States v. Rockwell , 984 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1993), overruled by Johnson v.
United States , 529 U.S. 694 (2000), precludes the district court from imposing
2
Appellant also contended, before the district court, that upon resentencing
the court should have given him credit for time spent on probation. The district
court rejected the argument and did not grant a certificate of appealability on this
point. However, because appellant does not raise the argument on appeal, it is
waived. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon , 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7
(10th Cir. 1994).
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an additional term of supervised release. 3
Underlying these two theories
is appellant’s last main point: that probation and supervised release are
functionally equivalent.
Before the magistrate judge, appellant alleged that his original sentence
was five years’ supervised release. See Appellant’s App. at 10, 41. The
magistrate judge noted that the record demonstrated otherwise; appellant was
actually sentenced to probation. See id. at 51. Not until his counseled objections
to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation did appellant contend that
probation and supervised release are functionally equivalent, relying on
introductory comments to Chapter 7 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
Manual. In this circuit, theories raised for the first time in objections to the
magistrate judge’s report are deemed waived. See Marshall v. Chater , 75 F.3d
1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996). Therefore, we decline to address appellant’s
argument that probation and supervised release are functionally equivalent. 4
However, in light of appellant’s initial arguments before the magistrate judge that
18 U.S.C. § 3583 and Rockwell should be applied to his case--both authorities
3
Despite the abrogation of Rockwell by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Johnson , appellant contends that Rockwell still applies to his case because it was
intact at the time of the conduct underlying his conviction. See Johnson , 529 U.S.
at 701 (holding that “postrevocation penalties relate to the original offense”).
4
Furthermore, contrary to this court’s rules, appellant failed to identify in his
opening brief where his arguments were raised and ruled on by the district court.
See 10th Cir. R. 28.2(C)(2).
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dealing with revocation of supervised release--we note that supervised release and
probation are not equivalent in this setting and, therefore, those authorities do not
apply here.
Revocations of probation are not governed by § 3583 but by a separate
provision of the sentencing laws, 18 U.S.C. § 3565. Therefore, appellant’s first
argument that, before its amendment in 1994, § 3583 prohibited the district court
from imposing a term of supervised release after his probation revocation is
inapt. 5 Appellant does not acknowledge either the provisions of § 3565 or the
district court’s ruling that he was not resentenced in reliance on § 3583, see
Appellant’s App. at 53. Further, the version of § 3565 applicable to appellant’s
resentencing did not limit the sentencing court as did the pre-amendment version
of § 3583. 6
5
Appellant also argues that, because he was sentenced to two years’
imprisonment, the maximum penalty available for his revocation under § 3583,
the district court could not add a term of supervised release. This argument was
not raised until appellant’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and is
therefore waived. Marshall , 75 F.3d at 1426.
6
Although we have no previous published authority on point, we note that
this court has followed this same analysis in an unpublished order and judgment.
See United States v. Vogt , No. 96-1192, 1997 WL 20125, at **3 (10th Cir.
Jan. 21, 1997) (unpublished order & judgment). Vogt , as an unpublished
decision of this court, is not binding precedent, see 10th Cir. R. 36.3(A);
however, its relevant facts are closely similar to those in appellant’s case, and we
find it persuasive.
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Similarly, this court’s decision in Rockwell, on which appellant relies for
his second argument, is distinguishable from appellant’s case because the
petitioner in Rockwell had been sentenced to a term of supervised release, not
probation. See 984 F.2d at 1113. 7
Because we conclude that Rockwell does not
apply to the facts of appellant’s case, we do not address counsel’s arguments that
application of Johnson , which overruled Rockwell, would be impermissibly
retroactive in this instance.
In light of the different sentencing provisions applicable to revocations of
supervised release and revocations of probation, those issues that appellant
properly preserved for appellate review lack merit. Accordingly, we agree
with the district court that appellant has not shown that his former counsel
was ineffective for failing to raise these non-meritorious arguments. See Foster
v. Ward , 182 F.3d 1177, 1186 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1027
(2000). The judgment of the district court dismissing appellant’s § 2255
motion is AFFIRMED.
7
See also Vogt , 1997 WL 20125, at **1 (unpublished order and judgment).
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