F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 29 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
BARRY JAMES SNYDER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CACHE COUNTY, a political No. 00-4067
subdivision of the State of Utah; (District of Utah)
SIDNEY P. GROLL, Cache County (D.C. No. 98-CV-151-K)
Sheriff; DENNIS LARSON, Sergeant;
WAYNE BOYER, Sergeant; TROY
LIQUIN, Sergeant; TERRI
DUNCOMBE, Sergeant,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, HOLLOWAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
I. INTRODUCTION
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff-appellant Barry James Snyder brought this action in federal
district court against Cache County, Utah, and four officers of the Cache County
Sheriff’s Department (“Defendants”), alleging, inter alia, violations of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and state law. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds and dismissed Snyder’s claims.
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms the
district court.
II. BACKGROUND
On January 1, 1997, at approximately 10:30 a.m., Deputies Liquin and
Larson of the Cache County Sheriff’s Department served Snyder with an ex parte
protective order filed by his wife. The protective order prohibited Snyder from
“directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, telephoning, or otherwise
communicating with [his wife].” Snyder was ordered to stay away from his
wife’s “residence and its premises” and to not come within five hundred feet of
his wife and children. Law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over the
residence were given the authority to compel Snyder’s compliance with the order.
The serving deputies advised Snyder of the provisions outlined in the protective
order. Snyder was permitted to collect his personal belongings, and the deputies
escorted him out of the residence.
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Approximately two hours later, Snyder contacted the Sheriff’s Department
to inquire about retrieving additional clothing from his home. Deputy Liquin
made contact with Snyder and informed him that he would not escort Snyder back
to the residence. After answering another call, Deputy Liquin observed Snyder’s
vehicle parked in the driveway of Snyder’s neighbor, which was adjacent to the
residence. Deputy Liquin informed Snyder that he was not permitted to be within
five hundred feet of the residence and instructed him to leave the area. Deputy
Liquin called dispatch to inform them of the situation, and he was advised to stop
and detain Snyder. Snyder ultimately was arrested for violating the protective
order. Snyder was arraigned on January 3, 1997, at approximately 11:00 a.m., and
was released from jail on his own recognizance.
Snyder subsequently filed suit against Defendants, alleging, inter alia,
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Both parties filed motions for
summary judgment. The district court granted Defendants’ motion on qualified
immunity grounds and dismissed Snyder’s claims.
III. DISCUSSION
Prior to the district court’s summary judgment ruling, Snyder
simultaneously filed a motion for partial summary judgment and a motion for
continuance and notice of hearing in which he sought (1) a consolidated hearing
on the competing summary judgment motions and (2) a continuance of the hearing
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until a consolidated hearing could be scheduled and/or until discovery was
complete. In his motion, Snyder alleged the following: (1) only Defendants had
detailed knowledge of the facts underlying Snyder’s claims, (2) a former
employee of the sheriff’s department would testify in response to a subpoena that
“there was an acknowledged conspiracy and ‘policy’ within the Department to
embarrass, humiliate, inconvenience, and harass plaintiff,” and (3) Defendants’
counsel would not allow any depositions of his clients prior to the deposition of
Snyder. Although the district court did not rule on Snyder’s motion for
continuance and notice of hearing, it held a consolidated hearing on both parties’
motions for summary judgment. Snyder includes in his appeal a challenge to the
district court’s implicit denial of his motion for additional discovery. This court
reviews the denial for an abuse of discretion. See Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v.
Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000).
A district court may defer ruling on a summary judgment motion pending
further discovery “when the affidavits of the party opposing the motion indicate
that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify the party’s opposition.” Lewis v. City of Fort Collins, 903 F.2d 752, 758
(10th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). When
responding to a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, the
opposing party must file an affidavit that demonstrates “how discovery will
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enable them to rebut a defendant’s showing of objective reasonableness or . . .
demonstrate a connection between the information he would seek in discovery and
the validity of the defendant’s qualified immunity assertion.” Lewis, 903 F.2d at
758 (quotation omitted). Because Snyder neither filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit nor
provided the district court with a description of how discovery would enable him
to rebut Defendants’ showing that the decision to arrest Snyder was objectively
reasonable, this court concludes the district court did not abuse its discretion.
On the cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court determined
that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The court thus granted
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied Snyder’s motion for partial
summary judgment. Snyder challenges these rulings. This court reviews a
district court’s granting of qualified immunity de novo. See Nelson v. McMullen,
207 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2000).
Because Defendants raised a qualified immunity defense, Snyder bears the
burden of showing that Defendants’ actions violated a federal constitutional or
statutory right and that the right was clearly established at the time of Snyder’s
arrest. See id. at 1206. In the context of a warrentless arrest, Defendants are
“entitled to immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable
cause existed to arrest the plaintiff.” Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1476 (10th
Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). Snyder claims he was falsely arrested for
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allegedly violating the protective order, which prohibited Snyder from going
within five hundred feet of his wife, even though she was not at the residence at
the time of his arrest.
The district court found it was “reasonable that Deputy Liquin interpreted
Mr. Snyder’s presence at the neighbors to be in violation of the protective order.
Mr. Snyder was clearly not staying away from the residence by being present next
door. . . . [E]ven if the arresting officers misinterpreted the provisions of the Ex
Parte Protective Order, the misinterpretation was reasonable and does not rise to
the degree of outrageousness contemplated by the Supreme Court.” Having
reviewed the qualified immunity issue under the appropriate standard of review
along with all of the relevant evidence, this court holds that there is no reversible
error. Thus, this court affirms the district court for substantially the reasons
stated in its order dated November 23, 1999. 1
1
Snyder also argues his constitutional rights were violated because (1) he
did not receive a probable cause hearing and (2) the officer’s probable cause
statement was presented and sworn to a notary public rather than a judge or
magistrate, both in contravention of the Supreme Court’s holdings in County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), and Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975). Neither McLaughlin nor Gerstein contemplate the circumstances of this
case in which Snyder was arraigned and released from police custody within
forty-eight hours of his arrest. See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 55-56; Gerstein, 420
U.S. at 114. Moreover, Snyder offers no evidence to support his claim that the
probable cause determination in his case was delayed unreasonably. See
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56 (providing that probable cause determination made
within forty-eight hours may violate the promptness requirement if arrested
individual can prove that the determination was delayed unreasonably).
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Snyder also claims the district court erred in denying his motion to certify
to state court the issue of the meaning of the term “premises” as used in the ex
parte protective order. In his Rule 59 motion before the district court, Snyder
requested “an order vacating the judgment and referring the matter to the Utah
Court [of] Appeals for a determination of whether the arresting offcers [sic] had
probable cause for the arrest.” An unsettled question of Utah law, however, must
be certified to the Utah Supreme Court. See Utah R. App. P. 41(a). Nonetheless,
the district court denied Snyder’s motion, ruling that the case did not involve an
unsettled question of state law. Because the district court did not rule on the
issue of the meaning of “premises” and because it was unnecessary for it to do so,
this court need not consider certification.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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