F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 30 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ROBERT ROTUNNO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-2373
(D.C. No. CIV-99-1011-MV/LCS)
LARRY G. MASSANARI, * Acting (D. N.M.)
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration ,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, BALDOCK , Circuit Judge, and BRORBY , Senior
Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
*
On March 29, 2001, Larry G. Massanari became the Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. In accordance with Rule 43(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Mr. Massanari is substituted for Kenneth S. Apfel as the
appellee in this action.
**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Robert Rotunno appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner’s decision denying Mr. Rotunno’s application for Social Security
disability insurance benefits. Like the district court, we review the
Commissioner’s decision to determine whether his factual findings are supported
by substantial evidence and whether he applied the correct legal standards.
Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir.
1994). For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
Mr. Rotunno applied for benefits in January 1995 alleging that he became
disabled in October 1985 due to injuries to his right shoulder, right knee and
back. His insured status expired in March 1987, so he had to show that he was
totally disabled prior to that date. See Henrie v. United States Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs. , 13 F.3d 359, 360 (10th Cir. 1993). In May 1996, an administrative
law judge determined, at step five of the five-part sequential process, see
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, that Mr. Rotunno was not disabled. On appeal to the
district court, the court granted the Commissioner’s motion to remand the case for
a supplemental hearing to obtain vocational expert testimony and to allow
Mr. Rotunno the opportunity to submit additional evidence.
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Following the supplemental hearing, a different ALJ again determined that
Mr. Rotunno was not disabled during the relevant period. The ALJ found him
severely impaired primarily due to right shoulder problems, and apparently also
due to a problem with his right knee, but that the severity of his impairments did
not meet a listing requirement. The ALJ determined that he could not return to
his past relevant work as a carpenter, but that he
retained a residual functional capacity which supported work
activities which allowed him to alternate sitting, standing and
walking throughout the workday, which required no overhead use of
his right upper extremity, and which required no lifting of more than
45 pounds. Nonexertional factors did not significantly alter this
work capacity.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 239-40. Relying on the testimony of a vocational
expert, the ALJ determined that Mr. Rotunno could perform the job of security or
gate guard and that this job existed in significant numbers in the national or
regional economy. The ALJ therefore concluded that Mr. Rotunno was not
disabled. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the
final decision of the Commissioner.
On appeal, Mr. Rotunno first contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that
he had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform the job of guard. 1
This
argument takes two tacks. In one, Mr. Rotunno contends that the ALJ ignored
1
The Commissioner incorrectly contends that Mr. Rotunno waived this issue
by failing to raise it in the district court. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 1 at 17-20.
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vocational expert testimony that demonstrates he could not perform this job. He
relies, however, on answers to questions that contained hypothetical impairments
that the ALJ ultimately did not accept, i.e., the need to use a cane, an inability to
stand for more than twenty minutes or pick up more than five pounds, and a need
to lie down two to three hours a day. 2
The ALJ based his decision on responses to
hypothetical questions that reflected the impairments the ALJ did accept, and
those responses provided an adequate basis for the ALJ’s decision. See Qualls v.
Apfel , 206 F.3d 1368, 1373 (10th Cir. 2000).
Mr. Rotunno also contends, in challenging the ALJ’s determination
regarding his ability to perform the guard job, that the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles classifies this job at the light exertional level, that he cannot perform the
full range of light work because of his need to alternate sitting and standing, and
that the ALJ failed to elicit vocational expert testimony reconciling the
difference, citing Haddock v. Apfel , 196 F.3d 1084, 1089 (10th Cir. 1999). To the
contrary, the vocational expert specifically testified that while the guard job was
classified as light work, it could be performed sitting or standing at will, again
providing adequate evidence for the ALJ’s decision.
2
The ALJ rejected the first and last of these claimed limitations based on his
determination Mr. Rotunno lacked credibility in asserting these limitations, a
determination we affirm below.
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Mr. Rotunno next contends that the ALJ should have found him disabled
under the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, also
know as the “grids.” In particular, he contends he met the requirements for a
determination of disability under Rule 201.10 of the grids. This rule, however,
applies to someone whose maximum exertional level is sedentary. The ALJ
determined that Mr. Rotunno’s maximum exertional level was light, with
a sit/stand option and limited use of his upper right extremity. Rule 201.10
therefore does not apply to Mr. Rotunno. See Daniels v. Apfel , 154 F.3d 1129,
1132 (10th Cir. 1998) (grids direct conclusion whether claimant disabled or not
when relevant vocational and RFC findings “coincide with all of the criteria of
a particular rule”) (quotation omitted). The rule that covers an RFC limited to
light work, given the relevant vocational factors, directs a finding of not disabled.
See Rule 202.11.
Finally, Mr. Rotunno contends the ALJ erred in finding that he lacked
credibility generally and in a number of specific areas affecting his ability to
work. “Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of
fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial
evidence.” Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation
omitted). First, Mr. Rotunno argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting his contention
that he used a cane or crutches during the relevant period. Mr. Rotunno
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underwent knee surgery in January 1986, and the ALJ noted that one doctor, in
conjunction with an examination of his shoulder, indicated in August 1986 that he
had had good results from his knee surgery thus far. The ALJ further stated that
there was no indication Mr. Rotunno required further medical attention for his
knee before his insured status ended. Additionally, the ALJ pointed to activities
he was performing in 1995, connected with buying and fixing up rental properties,
and stated that there was no evidence his knee condition had deteriorated from the
date last insured to 1995. This is sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s
conclusion.
Mr. Rotunno next contends the district court erred in using his lack of
medical treatment as evidence that his impairments were not as serious as he
contended. See id. (noting that frequency of medical contacts is relevant to
subjective complaints of severity of impairment). He contends that he could not
afford medical treatment during the relevant period because his Worker’s
Compensation insurer had stopped paying his medical bills when he settled with
the insurer and he could not afford medical treatment on his own. The
Commissioner points out that the settlement included a $60,000 cash payment.
We see no error in the ALJ’s reliance on this credibility factor.
Mr. Rotunno claims the ALJ erred by finding he did not need to “nap” for
several hours a day when in fact he claimed only that he needed to lie down
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frequently. It is clear, however, that the ALJ was referring to his alleged need to
lie down. The ALJ found this allegation not credible because Mr. Rotunno never
reported this need to lie down to any doctor, and no doctor indicated he had any
condition requiring such rest. This is a sufficient basis for the ALJ’s decision.
Finally, Mr. Rotunno argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting his claim of
limited manual dexterity in his right hand. In December 1986, one of his doctors
indicated that Mr. Rotunno reported occasional numbness in his right hand, but
the doctor’s subsequent notes do not further reflect this complaint, and an
examination revealed no neurological deficits in his right arm. Again, we see no
error in the ALJ’s rejection of Mr. Rotunna’s allegation of an impairment in
manual dexterity.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Senior Circuit Judge
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