F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SEP 4 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 00-8053
v.
(District of Wyoming)
(D.C. No. 00-CR-46-01-D)
RAFAEL PEREZ-AGUIRRE, also
known as Bardomiano Perez-Macedo,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, PORFILIO, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit
Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant-appellant Rafael Perez-Aguirre entered a guilty plea to illegally
reentering the United States following deportation and prior conviction for an
aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a)(2) and 1326(b)(2). The
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
district court sentenced Perez-Aguirre to seventy months imprisonment. On
appeal, Perez-Aguirre challenges the district court’s refusal to depart from the
sentencing guidelines and the enhancement of his sentence based on a prior
aggravated felony conviction that was not charged in the indictment. Exercising
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms the district court as
to the sentence enhancement issue but lacks the authority to exercise jurisdiction
as to the departure issue.
II. BACKGROUND
Perez-Aguirre was stopped for speeding near Powell, Wyoming. During the
course of the traffic stop, the patrolman conducted a consensual search of the
vehicle and discovered a fraudulent Social Security card and a fraudulent alien
registration card. Perez-Aguirre was arrested and identified as a previously
deported alien who had been convicted of a controlled substance felony. The
records revealed that Perez-Aguirre had not received permission by the Attorney
General to reenter the United States.
Perez-Aguirre was indicted for (1) illegally reentering the United States
following deportation and prior conviction for an aggravated felony, (2)
knowingly and willfully using a fraudulent alien registration card, and (3)
knowingly and falsely, with intent to deceive, using a social security account
number not assigned to him. Perez-Aguirre pleaded guilty to the first charge, and
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the government dismissed the other two counts in the indictment. At the
sentencing hearing, Perez-Aguirre requested a downward departure from the
sentencing guidelines, which the district court refused to grant. Perez-Aguirre
was sentenced to seventy months imprisonment.
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Perez-Aguirre challenges the district court’s refusal to grant a
downward departure from the sentencing guidelines. He claims the district court
refused to recognize its authority and responsibility to grant the departure, which
he requested in light of his rehabilitation, family situation, community
involvement, and employment history. This court may exercise jurisdiction to
review a sentencing court’s refusal to depart from the sentencing guidelines only
when “the district court states that it does not have any authority to depart from
the sentencing guideline range for the entire class of circumstances proffered by
the defendant.” United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 887 (10th Cir. 1998).
During the sentencing hearing, the district court in this case heard
arguments from Perez-Aguirre and the government regarding the defendant’s
request for a downward departure. The transcript of the hearing clearly
demonstrates that the sentencing court considered Perez-Aguirre’s circumstances
but ultimately determined that there was nothing about the defendant “that takes
him outside the heartland of cases in any respect.” There is nothing in the record
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to support Perez-Aguirre’s assertion that the district court misunderstood its
authority to depart from the sentencing guidelines. Thus, this court has no
jurisdiction to review Perez-Aguirre’s departure claim.
Perez-Aguirre also alleges his constitutional rights were violated because
his sentence was enhanced under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) due to a prior aggravated
felony conviction that was not included as an element of the charged crime in the
indictment. Perez-Aguirre further asserts the district court should have advised
him that he was entitled to a jury determination on the element of his prior
conviction. In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
the increased punishment for a prior deportation after commission of an
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a sentencing factor and not a
separate element of the charged offense which must be included in the indictment
and for which there must be a jury determination. See 523 U.S. 224, 230-35
(1998); see also United States v. Martinez-Villalva, 232 F.3d 1329, 1331-32 (10th
Cir. 2000) (holding that Supreme Court’s decision in Almendarez-Torres was
unaffected by the Supreme Court’s later decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000)). Thus, Perez-Aguirre’s claim is without merit.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court may not exercise jurisdiction to review
the district court’s refusal to depart from the sentencing guidelines. With respect
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to the sentence enhancement at issue, this court AFFIRMS the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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