IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-11107
Summary Calendar
TOBY L. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WAYNE SCOTT, DIRECTOR,
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, et al.
Defendants-Appellees.
- - - - - - - - - -
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(95-CV-15-C)
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November 12, 1998
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Toby L. Williams appeals from the
district court’s grant of a judgment as a matter of law for the
defendants on his civil rights claims. Williams has abandoned
any issues pertaining to the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for Cole by failing to address that matter in the
appellate brief he filed with this court. See Yohey v. Collins,
985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
Williams argues that the district court erred in granting
the defendants’ motion for a judgment as a matter of law on his
deliberate-indifference-to-serious-medical-needs and retaliation
claims. He contends that the district court abused its
discretion in refusing to issue writs of habeas corpus ad
testificandum and subpoenas and in denying his motion for the
appointment of counsel. He also contends that the district court
abused its discretion in purportedly imposing sanctions on him in
the form of loss of good-time credits for filing a frivolous
lawsuit.
The district court did not err in granting the defendants’
motion for a judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P.
50. No evidence suggests that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to Williams’ health or safety. See Varnado v.
Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 303 (1991). Further, no evidence was introduced
supporting Williams’s claim of retaliation beyond his testimony
of his own “personal belief that he is the victim of
retaliation.” See Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th
Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 559 (1997).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Williams’s motions for the issuance of writs of habeas corpus ad
testificandum and subpoenas because Williams did not indicate in
the motions the nature of the testimony sought. See Ballard v.
Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 1977); Cupit v. Jones, 835
F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987). Neither did the district court
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abuse its discretion in denying Williams’s motion for appointment
of counsel. Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir.
1982); see Jackson v. Dallas Police Dept., 811 F.2d 260, 261-62
(5th Cir. 1986).
Finally, Williams has failed to show that the district court
abused its discretion in imposing sanctions under Tex. Gov’t Code
Ann. § 498.0045. Williams has provided no support for his
contention that he lost good-time credits as a result of filing a
frivolous lawsuit; further, under § 498.0045, it is the Texas
Department of Corrections, not the federal district court, that
imposes sanctions for the filing of a frivolous lawsuit.
AFFIRMED.
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