F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
OCT 26 2001
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 01-2099
v. (D.C. No. CIV-00-1051)
(New Mexico)
JAIME MENDEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, McKAY, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
Jaime Mendez, a pro se federal prisoner, moves this court for a certificate
of appealability in order to appeal the district court’s denial of his request for
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We deny his request and dismiss the appeal.
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Mr. Mendez was indicted for possessing with intent to distribute more than
500 grams of methamphetamine. After he filed a motion to suppress, the district
court held a hearing on the matter and denied the motion. Mr. Mendez
subsequently pled guilty pursuant to an unconditional plea agreement which
contained a non-binding stipulation that Mr. Mendez was entitled to a reduction
in his sentence under the “safety valve” provision of 18 U.S.C. §3553 (f). Mr.
Mendez’ sentencing hearing was continued due to a dispute over whether he was
in fact entitled to treatment under this provision, which does not apply if a
defendant has more than one criminal history point. See id. §3553 (f)(1). When
the sentencing proceeding was resumed, the court concluded that Mr. Mendez had
four criminal history points and was therefore not eligible for a safety valve
reduction. Mr. Mendez was sentenced to 120 months incarceration and five years
of supervised release. Although he subsequently filed a direct appeal, this court
dismissed it upon his motion.
Mr. Mendez raises the following issues in his section 2255 motion. He
claims that his guilty plea was involuntary, that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress, and that his counsel was ineffective in advising him to
enter the plea and to waive his appeal. The matter was referred to a magistrate
judge, who recommended that relief be denied. After Mr. Mendez filed
objections to the magistrate judge’s report, the district court adopted the report,
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denied relief, and denied Mr. Mendez’ request for a certificate of appealability.
Mr. Mendez’ collateral challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea is
procedurally defaulted by his failure to pursue the matter on direct appeal. See
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998). The claim can therefore only
be raised in this proceeding if Mr. Mendez shows cause and prejudice for his
default, or that he is actually innocent. Id. at 622. He contends he can establish
cause because his counsel was ineffective in allegedly advising him to abandon
his direct appeal. As the magistrate judge pointed out, the record demonstrates
that counsel for Mr. Mendez filed a notice of appeal and designated the record,
thus preserving Mr. Mendez’ appeal rights. When Mr. Mendez signed the motion
to dismiss his appeal, he acknowledged that he knew he had a right to the appeal
and was electing instead to withdraw it. He has offered nothing to indicate that
his counsel was ineffective in any regard with respect to the dismissal.
Accordingly, he is barred from raising the voluntariness of his guilty plea.
Even if the claim were properly before us, we would hold it without merit.
Mr. Mendez contends that his plea was involuntary because his counsel gave him
erroneous advice with respect to the availability of the safety valve provision.
The Supreme Court has held, however, that in order to successfully challenge the
voluntariness of a guilty plea on the basis of ineffectiveness of counsel, a
petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
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errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have instead insisted on going
to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Mr. Mendez has never stated
that he wants to have his guilty plea vacated and to go to trial. It appears from
the record that once the parties realized Mr. Mendez would not be entitled to a
safety valve reduction, his counsel asked him if he wanted to withdraw his plea
and go to trial and Mr. Mendez declined to do so. Likewise in this court he does
not seek vacation of his plea, but argues only that he should have the right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Accordingly, his challenge to the
voluntariness of his plea is without merit.
Finally, we turn to Mr. Mendez’ argument that the district court erred in
denying his suppression motion. “Fourth Amendment violations are not
reviewable in a §2255 motion when the federal prisoner has had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the Fourth Amendment claim at trial and present issues on
direct appeal.” United States v. Cook, 997 F.2d 1312,1317 (10th Cir. 1993). Mr.
Mendez had such an opportunity here. The district court held a hearing on the
matter at which Mr. Mendez testified, and Mr. Mendez’ attorney preserved his
right to appeal the lower court’s decision. As we have discussed above, Mr.
Mendez has presented no evidence tending to show that his attorney was
ineffective with respect to his appeal rights. Accordingly, we conclude that Mr.
Mendez was provided the requisite full and fair opportunity to raise his Fourth
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Amendment claims both in the district court and on appeal. These claims are
therefore not reviewable in this proceeding.
For the reasons set out above, we conclude that Mr. Mendez has failed to
make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C.
§2253(c); Lennox v. Evans, 87 F.3d 431 (10th Cir. 1996). We therefore DENY
his motion for a certificate of appealability and DISMISS the appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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