F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 27 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 00-8044
(D. Wyo.)
GLEN WAYT, (D.Ct. No. 99-CR-92-5)
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, Circuit Judge, and PORFILIO and BRORBY, Senior Circuit
Judges.
Glen Wayt appeals from the district court’s determination he was competent
to stand trial. Mr. Wayt contends the district court incorrectly determined a
personality disorder is not a “mental disease or defect,” as used in 18 U.S.C.
§ 4241(d). 1 Mr. Wayt also asserts the district court committed plain error when it
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1
18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) provides:
Determination and disposition. – If, after the hearing, the
allowed him to assume the burden of proving his incompetence.
After reviewing the district court’s ruling, we hold the district court applied
the proper legal standard. The district court’s decision was a factual one,
supported by specific findings, and its conclusion that Mr. Wayt was competent
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241 was not clearly erroneous. Mr. Wayt’s second claim
of error also fails because the assignment of the burden of proof did not affect the
district court’s determination. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and affirm the district court’s decision.
FACTS
Glen Wayt was indicted in the United States District Court for the District
of Wyoming on conspiracy, possession of methamphetamine with intent to
distribute, and aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine charges, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, and 841(a)(1),
court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that
he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense,
the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the
Attorney General.
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(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(C). Mr. Wayt was evaluated by Dr. Ralph Ihle, at the
government’s request, after Mr. Wayt’s counsel alleged a jailhouse fight resulted
in a head injury that rendered Mr. Wayt unable to understand the proceedings
against him or to assist counsel in his case. When Mr. Wayt asked for an
evaluation by Dr. Grant Fleming, the district court granted his motion. Mr. Wayt
then requested and received a competency hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241
and 4247.
Both doctors testified at the competency hearing and provided copies of
their reports. The doctors agreed on several points: 1) Mr. Wayt possessed the
cognitive capability to understand the proceedings; 2) Mr. Wayt did not exhibit
paranoia sufficient to constitute a psychotic disorder; and 3) tests indicated signs
of malingering. The doctors differed on whether Mr. Wayt could properly assist
counsel in his defense.
Dr. Fleming testified he spoke with Mr. Wayt’s girlfriend, who described
Mr. Wayt as a long-term user of methamphetamine. Dr. Fleming explained Mr.
Wayt exhibited characteristics of a long-term user and Mr. Wayt’s long-term
methamphetamine abuse resulted in paranoia. Dr. Fleming concluded Mr. Wayt’s
paranoia was so strong it would significantly affect his ability to assist counsel
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and he was not competent to provide adequate information for his defense.
Dr. Ihle recognized that whether a personality disorder was severe enough
to be a “mental disease or defect” under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 is “ultimately the
court’s decision.” Dr. Ihle did not find any major mental disorder that would
result in significant impairment of Mr. Wayt’s ability to understand the nature of
the proceedings or impair his ability to properly assist counsel. Weighing this
testimony, the district court found Mr. Wayt competent to stand trial.
After the district court resolved the competency issue, Mr. Wayt entered a
conditional guilty plea to the conspiracy count as part of a plea agreement with
the government. The parties stipulated to the relevant conduct, and the district
court sentenced Mr. Wayt to 121 months imprisonment and five years supervised
release.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Wayt contends the district court incorrectly concluded, as a matter of
law, that a personality disorder derived from long-term substance abuse cannot
constitute a mental disease or defect under 18 U.S.C. § 4241. The government
argues the district court’s ruling was a factual analysis specifically applying the
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law to Mr. Wayt’s situation, not a legal conclusion precluding all defendants with
personality disorders from the protection of 18 U.S.C. § 4241.
Competency to stand trial is an issue of constitutional significance, and a
question concerning whether the district court applied the appropriate test is a
question of law, subject to de novo review. See Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546,
1550 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911 (1992). However, the question
of whether a defendant is competent to stand trial is a factual determination, set
aside only if clearly erroneous. United States v. Verduzco-Martinez, 186 F.3d
1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 1999). A finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing
court is left with the “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The district court’s ruling had four parts: 1) Mr. Wayt was casting about
for a defense and his complaints about lost memory were not credible; 2) Dr.
Fleming’s conclusions concerning Mr. Wayt’s drug use were unreliable because
the reports of his drug use are unreliable; 3) even if the reports were reliable, Dr.
Fleming did not present a causal connection between drug use and Mr. Wayt’s
personality disorder; and 4) even if Mr. Wayt had a personality disorder with
paranoid features, “it ha[d] not been established by a preponderance of the
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evidence for purposes of the Court ruling as to the incompetence of this particular
accused.” In other words, Mr. Wayt’s personality disorder 2 did not meet the
statutory standards, and he was competent to stand trial.
Although the government contended a personality disorder is not a mental
disease or defect, the district court’s thorough competency ruling was based on
factual findings. In sum, the district court concluded Mr. Wayt was competent to
stand trial. The district court’s findings are not clearly erroneous. Contrary to
Mr. Wayt’s contentions, the district court’s ruling does not convey a generalized
legal rule that personality disorders do not qualify for consideration under 18
U.S.C. § 4241. We find more than adequate support in the record for its findings
and, therefore, uphold the district court’s decision.
As his second issue on appeal, Mr. Wayt asserts the district court
committed plain error when it allocated the burden of proof. To establish plain
error, Mr. Wayt must show: 1) there was an error; 2) the error was clear or
obvious under current law; and 3) the error affected substantial rights. United
2
The presence of some degree of mental disorder does not necessarily mean the
defendant is incompetent to assist in his own defense. See United States v. Mackovich,
209 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 905 (2000); accord Verduzco-
Martinez, 186 F.3d at 1212.
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States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1308 (10th Cir. 2000). If these three elements
are met, we may exercise our “discretion to correct the error if it ‘seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id.
(quotation marks and citations omitted).
The federal statute providing for competency hearings does not allocate the
burden of proof. United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d 403, 410 (2d Cir. 1995); 18
U.S.C. §§ 4241, 4247. We need not resolve the question here, because the district
court’s allocation of the burden of proof did not affect the outcome of its
competency determination. The district court correctly noted the standard of
proof in the competency hearing was the preponderance of the evidence. 18
U.S.C. § 4241(d). “[T]he allocation of the burden of proof to the defendant will
affect competency determinations only in a narrow class of cases where the
evidence is in equipoise; that is, where the evidence that a defendant is competent
is just as strong as the evidence that he is incompetent.” Medina v. California,
505 U.S. 437, 441, 449 (1992) (applying state law with “preponderance of the
evidence” standard).
The evidence in this case was not in equipoise. When the district court
concluded Mr. Wayt was competent, it found: 1) Dr. Fleming’s conclusions were
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based on unreliable information and were therefore unreliable; 2) Mr. Wayt was
not credible but was casting about for defenses; and 3) Dr. Fleming did not
establish a causal connection between Mr. Wayt’s drug use and his personality
disorder. In contrast, the district court found Dr. Ihle, and the information he
relied upon, extremely credible. Therefore, we find no error. However, even if
we had found error, the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings
were not seriously affected. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s
competency determination.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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