F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 12 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JODIE THOMAS CARLILE, III,
Plaintiff-Appellant-
Cross-Appellee
v. No. 00-2345 & 00-2383
(D.C. No. CIV-98-1463-LH/DJS)
CONOCO, INC., (D. N.M.)
Defendant-Appellee-
Cross-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY , BALDOCK , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Jodie Thomas Carlile, III, sued his former employer for
terminating his employment in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (ADA). The district court entered summary judgment
in favor of defendant and plaintiff appeals. Defendant cross appeals the district
court’s order denying its request for attorney fees as a prevailing party under 42
U.S.C. § 12205. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Underlying Facts
The parties are familiar with the facts. Therefore, we provide only a brief
summary. Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a mechanic and welder’s
technician at its gas plant. Beginning in 1993, plaintiff suffered occasional brief
periods of unconsciousness. Defendant’s medical director imposed restrictions on
plaintiff’s work environment, such as not working at heights, around heavy
moving equipment, or high heat sources. Consequently, plaintiff’s employment
was terminated in May 1996 because the medical restrictions prevented him from
doing his past job and there were no other positions that would accommodate his
restrictions. He sued, claiming defendant violated the ADA because it regarded
him as disabled and unable to perform any of the jobs at its gas plant. The district
court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant, but denied defendant’s
request for an award of attorney fees. Both parties appeal.
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Jurisdictional Challenge
As a preliminary matter, we address defendant’s motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s appeal. Defendant charges that plaintiff’s notice of appeal was
untimely, thus divesting this court of jurisdiction. See Parker v. Bd. of Pub.
Utils. , 77 F.3d 1289, 1290 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The filing of a timely notice of
appeal is an absolute prerequisite to [appellate] jurisdiction.”). The judgment was
entered on May 31, 2000. On June 12, 2000, plaintiff filed a pro se motion for
reconsideration. On June 15, 2000, plaintiff’s attorney filed a motion for
reconsideration. Only the pro se motion, filed within ten days of the judgment,
could toll the running of the time limit for filing a notice of appeal. See Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(4) (time to appeal runs from entry of the order disposing of Rule 59
motion); Trotter v. Regents of Univ. of N.M. , 219 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir.
2000) (motion filed within ten days of judgment questioning its correctness
treated as Rule 59 motion; if Rule 59 motion is made within ten days from
judgment, time to appeal runs from order disposing of motion). Counsel’s
reliance on Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) for an additional three days to mail his motion is
misplaced. Rule 6(e) provides for an additional three days for mailing when the
paper deserving a response is served upon the party by mail. The summary
judgment and final order documents were sent to plaintiff’s attorney by facsimile
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transmission on May 31, 2000. Consequently, plaintiff was not entitled to an
additional three days for mailing. 1
The issue is whether the pro se motion to reconsider tolled the time to file a
notice of appeal or whether, as defendant argues, only a motion signed by a
represented party can do so. Defendant invokes Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) and
D.N.M.L.R. 83.5 for the requirement that every pleading be signed by the attorney
of record. We decline to hold that a party who successfully protected his rights
must forfeit them in favor of a rigid reading of the rules. Instead, we conclude
that the pro se motion to reconsider served to toll the time for filing a notice of
appeal. Accordingly, the notice of appeal was timely because it was filed on
September 8, 2000, within thirty days after the August 24, 2000 order disposing
of the motion to reconsider. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Moreover, the notice of
appeal served to permit our consideration of the summary judgment’s merits. See
Grubb v. FDIC , 868 F.2d 1151, 1154 n.4 (10th Cir. 1989) (appeal from order
denying Rule 59 motion sufficient to permit consideration of judgment’s merits if
appeal is “otherwise proper, the intent to appeal from the final judgment is clear,
1
Effective December 1, 2001, amendments to Rules 5 and 6 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provide for three additional days to respond to a
pleading served by electronic means or through the court’s transmission facilities.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) (referring to service under Rule 5(b)(2)(D)). This case was
decided under the rules in effect prior to December 1.
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and the opposing party was not misled or prejudiced”). Therefore, we have
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s appeal.
Plaintiff’s Appeal
Turning to the merits, we review de novo the district court’s grant of
summary judgment, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment. McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125,
1128 (10th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
A prima facie case under the ADA requires that a plaintiff show “(1) that
[he] is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that [he] is qualified–with or
without reasonable accommodation; and (3) that [he] was discriminated against
because of [his] disability.” McKenzie v. Dovala , 242 F.3d 967, 969 (10th Cir.
2001) (quotation omitted). Disability under the ADA may be established by a
plaintiff who is regarded as having an impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activity. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
On appeal, plaintiff contends that he met the first prong of a prima facie
case by showing that he was “disabled” because defendant regarded him as having
a disability. He maintains that defendant regarded him as substantially limited in
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the major life activity of working because none of the jobs at defendant’s gas
plant could accommodate the restrictions imposed on plaintiff by its medical
director.
“[I]n order to establish a disability under the ‘regarded as’ prong of the
ADA with respect to the major life activity of working, an individual must show
that the employer regarded him or her as being substantially limited in performing
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.” Steele v.
Thiokol Corp. , 241 F.3d 1248, 1256 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted); accord
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999). Here, plaintiff’s
claim is based on defendant’s determination that he could not perform any of the
nine jobs at its gas plant.
It is undisputed that since the time his employment with defendant was
terminated, plaintiff has been working as a welder, as well as a mechanic and
roustabout. The undisputed record evidence demonstrates that plaintiff is, at
most, regarded as unable to perform the welding jobs at defendant’s gas plant. He
presented no evidence to show that defendant regarded him as being substantially
limited in performing either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes. “This is insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that petitioner is
regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working.” Murphy
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 527 U.S. 516, 525 (1999). Therefore, plaintiff has
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not established a prima facie case because he has not established that he is
“disabled” under the ADA. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of
defendant was correct.
Defendant’s Cross Appeal
For its cross appeal, defendant challenges the district court’s order denying
its request for attorney fees. The ADA authorizes the district court, in its
discretion, to award attorney fees to the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 12205.
Defendant claims it is entitled to attorney fees because plaintiff’s case was
frivolous and filed in bad faith.
We review the district court’s attorney-fee decision for an abuse of
discretion. Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc. , 124 F.3d 1221,
1231 (10th Cir. 1997). We apply a de novo review to the district court’s statutory
interpretation and legal analysis. Id.
A prevailing defendant may recover attorney fees “upon a finding that the
plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though
not brought in subjective bad faith.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC , 434
U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (addressing attorney fees under Title VII; made applicable
to ADA by Roe , 124 F.3d at 1232 & n.7). The district court should not, in
hindsight, characterize a plaintiff’s case as frivolous simply because it was
ultimately unsuccessful. Id. at 421-22.
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Defendant claims the district court’s legal analysis was flawed because it
failed to consider various factors in evaluating frivolousness and because it
wholly failed to consider the bad-faith argument. The district court stated,
however, that it had considered the parties’ pleadings. Therefore, we assume that
the district court reviewed and considered defendant’s arguments. Cf. Green v.
Branson , 108 F.3d 1296, 1305 (10th Cir. 1997) (appellate court assumes district
court reviewed magistrate judge’s report). We are satisfied from our review of
the record that the district court properly exercised its discretion in ruling that a
fee award was not warranted.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s appeal is denied. The judgment
of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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