F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
FEB 15 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 01-1017
ROBERTO ROSALES-GARAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 00-CR-374-B)
Andrew Vogt, Assistant United States Attorney (Richard T. Spriggs, United States
Attorney, and Sean Connelly, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), Denver,
Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Lynn Hartfield, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. Katz, Federal Public
Defender, and Charles Szekely, Assistant Federal Public Defender, on the brief),
Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, and BALDOCK and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Roberto Rosales-Garay pled guilty in federal district court to one count
of “Unlawful Re-entry of a Deported Alien” in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Section
1326(a) generally provides that a previously deported alien who, without permission,
“enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States” is guilty of the
crime of unlawful reentry. Id. (emphasis added). According to the indictment and plea
agreement, the United States deported Defendant in August 1995, after the State of
California had convicted him of an aggravated felony drug offense. Then, “on or
about” August 1, 2000, immigration officials “found” Defendant in Aurora, Colorado,
and arrested him.
Because Defendant was on probation for a Colorado state “Driving While Ability
Impaired” (DWAI) misdemeanor conviction at the time of his August 1, 2000 arrest,1
see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1301, the presentence report recommended that the district
court, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d), add two criminal history points in calculating
Defendant’s criminal history. Guidelines § 4A1.1(d) directs the district court to add
two criminal history points “if the defendant committed the instant offense while under
any criminal justice sentence, including probation . . . .” Defendant objected to the
report, arguing that his § 1326(a) offense was a “status” offense which occurred on
the date he reentered the United States, and thus before his DWAI offense. The
1
On April 29, 2000, Defendant pled guilty to the DWAI charge in Jefferson
County Court, Golden, Colorado. On June 22, 2000, the same court sentenced Defendant
to one year probation.
2
district court rejected Defendant’s argument and added two criminal history points
to a previous five to reach a criminal history category of IV. This, together with
Defendant’s undisputed offense level of 21, yielded a guideline sentencing range
of 57-71 months. The district court sentenced Defendant to 57 months imprisonment
and he appealed.2
Our jurisdiction to review Defendant’s sentence arises under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
On appeal, Defendant again argues that because his illegal reentry occurred prior to his
DWAI conviction and sentence, the district court erred in adding two points to his
criminal history under § 4A1.1(d). Otherwise, according to Defendant, application
of § 4A1.1(d)’s two-point enhancement to a defendant “found in” the United States
unfairly depends upon the fortuitous timing of when immigration officials “find”
that defendant for purposes of § 1326(a). Because the propriety of the district
court’s decision to apply § 4A1.1(d) in this case presents a question of law, our
review is de novo. See United States v. Walters, 269 F.3d 1207, 1214 (10th Cir.
2001). We reject Defendant’s argument and affirm.3
2
Absent Defendant’s two challenged criminal history points, his guideline range
based upon a criminal history category of III would have been 46-57 months. In the plea
agreement, the Government agreed to recommend sentencing at the low end of the
applicable guideline range.
3
A conviction under § 1326(a) carries a maximum two-year sentence of
imprisonment. After filing the indictment against Defendant, however, the Government
filed a “Notice of Sentencing Enhancement.” The notice indicated Defendant was subject
to a maximum twenty-year sentence under § 1326(b)(2) because the Government had
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3
Three of our sister circuits have addressed under similar facts the exact argument
Defendant makes in this case. Each rejected the argument. United States v. Coeur, 196
F.3d 1344, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Cuevas, 75 F.3d 778, 784 (1st Cir
1996); United States v Santana-Castellano, 74 F.3d 593, 595-98 (5th Cir. 1996). The
plain language of § 1326(a) establishes that a previously deported alien who illegally
enters and remains in the United States can violate the statute at three different points
in time, namely, when the alien (1) “enters,” (2) “attempts to enter,” or (3) is at any time
“found in” the United States. We have held that the “found in” language of § 1326(a) is
synonymous with “discovered in.” United States v. Bencomo-Castillo, 176 F.3d 1300,
1303 (10th Cir. 1999) (district court properly sentenced defendant as an aggravated felon
under § 1326(b)(2) even though the amendment to the theft statute defining defendant’s
prior felony as aggravated took effect after he reentered United States and was arrested,
3
(...continued)
previously deported him following commission of his California aggravated felony.
On appeal, Defendant relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to argue
that the district court erred in sentencing him beyond the two-year maximum sentence
for the crime charged in the indictment. Assuming without deciding that Defendant
preserved this issue for appeal, binding case law forecloses Defendant’s argument
here. In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), the Supreme Court
held that the Government need not charge a prior aggravated felony conviction in an
indictment to trigger § 1326(b)’s enhanced statutory penalty. In United States v. Wilson,
244 F.3d 1208, 1216-17 (10th Cir. 2001), we concluded that Apprendi did not overrule
the narrow holding of Almendarez because the “new rule of Apprendi specifically carves
out the recidivism issue.” See United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582, 587-88 (10th Cir.
2000). Accordingly, Defendant’s 57-month sentence in this case is within the enhanced
statutory range of twenty years imprisonment.
4
but before immigration officials identified him as a previously deported alien). “[F]or
an alien to be ‘found,’ the government must have ‘knowledge of the illegality of his
presence, through the exercise of diligence typical of law enforcement authorities.’”
Id. (quoting Santana-Castellano, 74 F.3d at 598).
In this case, the Government indicted Defendant for the offense of being
“found in” the United States “on or about” August 1, 2000. That was the charge to
which Defendant pled guilty. See Coeur, 196 F.3d at 1346 (where a previously deported
alien pleads guilty to being “found in” the United States on a date certain, the question of
when the alien committed the § 1326(a) offense becomes settled). Although Defendant
reentered the United States on a date prior to his Colorado state DWAI conviction and
sentence, he committed the § 1326(a) offense charged in the indictment when he was
“found.” On or about August 1, 2000, Defendant indisputably was serving a criminal
probation sentence for his DWAI conviction. Thus, the district court did not err in
adding two points to Defendant’s criminal history pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d).4
4
Defendant suggests that application of § 4A1.1(d) in his case presents an equal
protection problem because a similarly situated hypothetical offender could have avoided
the addition of two criminal history points if “found” before sentencing in the state court.
Suffice it to say that § 4A1.1(d) as applied in this case does not violation equal protection
guarantees. Convicted criminals are not a suspect class and § 4A1.1(d) “is rationally
related to the legitimate government interest of administrative efficiency in application
of the Guidelines.” United States v. Carroll, 110 F.3d 457, 462 (7th Cir. 1997). “The use
of any specific measuring scheme in calculating criminal history will necessarily involve
line-drawing likely to be offensive to the defendant who . . . misses the cut off . . . .” Id.
at 461; see also United States v. Carson, 988 F.2d 80, 82 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
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5
AFFIRMED.
4
(...continued)
§ 4A1.1 does not violate equal protection guarantees).
6