F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 7 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
STEPHEN BUTLER and MARY
BUTLER, as parents and next friend
of Joshua Butler, a minor,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v. No. 01-2177
(D. C. No. CIV-01-0466-MV/WWD)
RIO RANCHO PUBLIC SCHOOL (D. New Mexico)
DISTRICT; RIO RANCHO PUBLIC
SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, a
local public governing body of the State of
New Mexico; SUE CLEVELAND, an
individual; GARY TRIPP, an
individual; SALLY MARQUEZ, an
individual; GERARD HYATT, in his
individual and official capacity;
GEORGE DOE, in his individual and
official capacity,
Defendants - Appellants,
and
EDDIE SOTO, an individual;
CITY OF RIO RANCHO, a local public
governing body of the State of New
Mexico; OFFICER RUSS APGAR, in
his individual and official capacity;
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, a local
public governing body of the State of
New Mexico; and BRIAN
FITZPATRICK, an individual,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before HENRY and PORFILIO, Circuit Judges, and SAM, District Judge.**
Defendants Rio Rancho Public School District, Rio Rancho Public School Board
of Education, Sue Cleveland, Gary Tripp, Sally Marquez, Gerard Hyatt and George Doe
(collectively “the School”) appeal the judgment of the district court which granted the
motion for preliminary injunction of plaintiffs Stephen and Mary Butler, as parents and
next friend of Joshua Butler, ( the “Butlers”). For the reasons set forth below, the appeal
is dismissed as moot and the district court’s order for preliminary injunction is vacated.
I. BACKGROUND
During the 2000-2001 school year, 17 year-old Joshua Butler was a senior at Rio
Rancho High School. On February 9, 2001, knowing that his driving privileges had been
suspended by the School for reckless driving, Joshua drove his brother’s car to school and
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable David Sam, Senior Judge, United States District Court for the
District of Utah, sitting by designation.
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parked it in the faculty parking lot. A school security officer, Mr. Hyatt, noticing that the
car lacked a faculty parking permit, looked through the car windows and saw the handle
of a knife between the seat and the middle console in the front of the car. Police and the
principal were summoned. A licence check revealed the car was registered to Stephen
Butler, Joshua’s brother who was not a student at the School. Joshua was summoned to
the car by school officials; Joshua opened the car. A ten inch hunting knife, a 9 mm
Glock automatic pistol, ammunition and a marijuana pipe were found in the car.. Joshua
was taken into custody by police.
Pursuant to school policy, a hearing was held before a hearing officer for violation
of school weapon and drug policies. Joshua and his parents were present and represented
by counsel. Joshua testified that he did not know that the seized items were in the car.
Finding substantial evidence of violations, the hearing officer imposed a one year
suspension. Joshua appealed the decision to the school board, which upheld the
suspension.
On April 27, 2001, the Butlers filed a complaint against the School pursuant to 43
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of Joshua’s constitutional right to due process,
violations of the Fourth Amendment, conspiracy, and various claims under the New
Mexico Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs requested and were granted a preliminary injunction
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entered May 10, 2001, prohibiting the School from enforcing Joshua’s suspension,
ordering Joshua reinstated to school, permitting him to participate in graduation and
related activities and to receive a diploma. Joshua has since graduated from school and
received his diploma. This appeal is an interlocutory appeal of the lower court’s grant of
that injunctive relief.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Mootness.
As a threshold issue, the Butlers urge that the appeal is moot because there is no
longer any case or controversy for the court to review as the events addressed in the lower
court’s preliminary injunction have transpired. We agree. The mootness doctrine based
on the absence of a case or controversy was outlined in Fischbach v. New Mexico
Activities Ass’n, 38 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 1994).
Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may only
adjudicate live controversies. Generally, the actual controversy between the
parties “must exist at [all] stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not
simply at the date the action is initiated.”. If no such controversy exists, the
action is moot.
. . . .
An exception to the mootness doctrine arises in cases which are
“capable of repetition, yet evading review.” . . . . To meet this exception,
two conditions must be satisfied: “(1) the challenged action . . . [must be] in
its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration,
and (2) there . . . [must be] a reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party . . . [will] be subjected to the action again.”
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Id. at 1160-61 (citations omitted)
The School contends that its appeal is within the exception to the mootness doctrine
because it did not have an opportunity to fully litigate the issues in this case prior to
Joshua’s graduation inasmuch as the injunction was issued within 10 days of graduation.
The School obviously had minimal time in which to perfect an appeal. Still, it didn’t try.
The Butlers urge, and we concur, that the School could have, and should have, sought an
emergency request for stay, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 8, and saved the case from
mootness. See Fischbach, 38 F.3d at 1161 (finding no exception to mootness doctrine
where appellant “did not attempt to expedite an appeal of the preliminary injunction”
given to high school student and his parents). In any event, both conditions outlined in
Fischbach must be satisfied to meet the exception. As discussed next, this the School
can’t do.
The School urges that it satisfies the second condition for the mootness exception
because the younger sister of Joshua continues to attend Rio Rancho Schools and there is a
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the action again.
The Butlers correctly note that they as parents have not asserted any action in their own
right, or on behalf of any other child, and that there is no allegation in the complaint that
there are other children who may be subjected to the same conduct. They contend that
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Joshua is the only real party before the court and because he has graduated from high
school there is no expectation that he will be subjected the same conduct of which he
originally complained. We agree. Joshua is the complaining party and there is no basis to
believe that he (or his parents for that matter) will be subjected to the actions of the School
again.
B. Vacatur.
The School also moves the court for an order of vacatur.
[A]n appellate court must vacate a prior judgment only if review of the
judgment is ?