F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 25 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOSEPH RASCON,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 02-2028
TIM LEMASTER, Warden, New Mexico (D.C. No. CIV-01-845-JP/KBM)
State Penitentiary; ATTORNEY (D. New Mexico)
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEW
MEXICO,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before SEYMOUR, HENRY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Petitioner Joseph Rascon, a state prisoner appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
appealability to appeal the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition.
We deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.
Rascon was convicted by a jury in state court of numerous counts relating to sexual
abuse of his girlfriend's eldest daughter. He was sentenced to a total of 174 years of
imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the New Mexico Court of
Appeals, and the New Mexico Supreme Court denied certiorari on April 6, 2000. His
request for state post-conviction relief was denied and the New Mexico Supreme Court
denied certiorari on May 15, 2001.
Rascon filed his § 2254 habeas petition on July 23, 2001, raising six claims: (1)
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination; (2) denial of a speedy trial; (3) violation of due process rights because
he was not present at hearing on defense motion to compel production of medical records;
(4) involvement of trial judge in plea negotiations; (5) admission of video deposition at
trial; and (6) ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court adopted the magistrate
court's findings and recommended disposition and dismissed the petition.
On appeal, Rascon contends that his right to be present at all critical stages of the
trial was violated because he was not present at a hearing on whether he was entitled to
review the psychiatric records of the victim, and his counsel was ineffective for failing to
gain access to the records.
Prior to trial, Rascon's counsel requested access to the psychiatric records of the
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victim and the victim's sister. The records were subject to a confidentiality order. After
examining the records in camera to see if there was any exculpatory material that would
require disclosure of the records, the trial court refused disclosure.
A defendant has a due process right to be present at trial “'whenever his presence
has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against
the charge.'” Larson v. Tansy, 911 F.2d 392, 394 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934)). However, due process does not require the
defendant to be present “when [his] presence would be useless, or the benefit but a
shadow.” Id. We conclude that Rascon has failed to show how his presence at the
motion hearing could have aided his defense or how his absence prejudiced him. See
Hale v. Gibson, 227 F.3d 1298, 1312 (10th Cir. 2000).
Rascon also argues his counsel was ineffective because she failed to gain access to
the records after the prosecution arguably waived confidentiality. In order to be entitled
to relief, a petitioner must establish not only that his or her counsel was ineffective, but
that, absent counsel's errors, there is a “reasonable probability” that the outcome of the
trial would have been different. Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999).
Both the trial court and the New Mexico Court of Appeals determined there was nothing
exculpatory in the psychiatric records that required disclosure and Rascon's arguments do
not persuade us otherwise. Rascon has failed to show a reasonable probability that the
outcome of his trial would have been different if he had gained access to the records.
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As Rascon has failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B), we DENY a certificate of appealability
and DISMISS the appeal. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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