F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUL 2 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
THE GUIDES, LTD., a Colorado limited
liability company, doing business as The
Africa House; and TSEGHE FOOTE,
individually,
Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-
Appellees,
v. No. 99-1388
THE YARMOUTH GROUP PROPERTY No. 99-1389
MANAGEMENT, INC.*; TABOR No. 99-1392
CENTER ASSOCIATES, L.P., No. 99-1455
No. 99-1459
Defendants/Appellees/Cross- No. 99-1464
Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NO. 96-S-2516)
Darold W. Killmer (David H. Miller and Mari Newman with him on the brief), Miller,
Lane, Killmer & Greisen, LLP, Denver, Colorado, for the Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-
Appellees.
Robert Lawrence Ashe, Jr., Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia,
(Kelly J. Koelker and Maureen E. O'Neill, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP,
Atlanta, Georgia; Dov M. Grunschlag, Steinhart & Falconer, LLP, San Francisco,
California; and James L. Aab, Aab & Botts, LLC, Denver, Colorado, with him on the
*
The Yarmouth Group Property Management, Inc., is now known as Jones Lang
LaSalle Property Management, Inc.
brief for Tabor Center Associates, L.P.; David H. Stacy, Elzi Pringle & Gurr, Denver,
Colorado, for The Yarmouth Group Property Management, Inc., joins in the brief for
Tabor Center Associates, L.P.), for the Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
Before BRISCOE and MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges; and JENKINS, Senior District
Judge.**
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs Tseghe Foote and The Guides, Ltd., d/b/a The Africa House (hereinafter
Africa House) brought a civil rights action against defendants The Yarmouth Group
Property Management, Inc., and Tabor Center Associates, L.P., alleging the defendants
had violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and had intentionally interfered with Africa House’s
prospective business advantages in conjunction with the defendants’ eviction and failure
to lease retail space for Africa House. A jury found in favor of Foote and Africa House
on all counts, and awarded each plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages. Following
post-trial motions, the district court dismissed Foote as an individual plaintiff for lack of
standing and vacated the jury’s award to her. The district court also granted Africa
House’s request for attorney fees, although it reduced the requested rates, and further
granted prejudgment interest to Africa House.
The defendants appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for judgment as a
**
The Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, United States Senior District Judge for the
District of Utah, sitting by designation.
2
matter of law and motion for new trial or remittitur, as well as the district court’s award of
prejudgment interest. The plaintiffs cross-appeal the dismissal of Foote as an individual
plaintiff and the reduction in attorney fees. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
I.
The Guides, Ltd., is a subchapter S corporation organized under Colorado law and
doing business as The Africa House, a retail store specializing in African art and artifacts.
Tseghe Foote, an immigrant from Ethiopia, is its sole shareholder and president. In 1993,
Foote entered into two separate short-term lease agreements with the prior owners of the
Tabor Center, a downtown mall in Denver, Colorado, for Africa House to occupy space
322 at the Center. The first short-term agreement ran from February through August of
1993, and the second ran month-to-month beginning in September 1993. Under the terms
of the leases, the rent consisted of a base amount of approximately $23 per square foot,
and 15% of sales above a predetermined level. The lease did not require Africa House to
make any payments for mall operating costs or to incur any improvement or build-out
expenses. In exchange for these favorable terms, the lease provided that the owners could
terminate the tenancy or relocate the business with fifteen days’ notice if they required
space 322 for any reason. The possibility of relocation was dependant upon available
space and the owners’ judgment concerning merchandising mix and balance.
In October 1994, defendant Tabor Center Associates acquired the Tabor Center
3
and became the plaintiffs’ landlord. In February 1995, defendant Yarmouth assumed
management responsibilities for the Center. In an effort to improve the profitability of
the Center, Yarmouth implemented new leasing procedures that included negotiating
long-term leases with future tenants. Yarmouth also approached existing tenants to
negotiate new long-term and short-term tenancies. However, Yarmouth did not approach
Foote, and in fact had no contact with her until September 1996 when Foote approached
Yarmouth to discuss the possibility of renewing or entering into a new lease.
From this initial meeting until late October 1996, Foote had several meetings with
representatives of Yarmouth concerning the possibility of leasing space at the Tabor
Center. However, Yarmouth would not clarify its intentions or engage in serious
negotiations. Foote and Yarmouth discussed a possible space for relocation of the
business, but Yarmouth would not assure Foote that the space would be available, even
though it was undisputed there were many empty spaces available at the Tabor Center.
During these attempted negotiations, a representative from Yarmouth made
misrepresentations to Foote concerning the lease at space 322 and commented that her
store: (1) did not “mix well” with other tenants; (2) was not glamourous enough; (3) “had
to go”; (4) did not “fit the image of Tabor Center”; (5) should change its name; (6)
devalued the Tabor Center; and (7) was unsophisticated. Yarmouth also drew up
blueprints which did not include Foote’s store.
On September 13, 1996, General Nutrition Centers (GNC), a national vitamin and
4
health chain, entered into a ten-year lease with Yarmouth for space 322 at an annual rent
double that charged for Africa House. Foote was not informed of this lease while she
negotiated with Yarmouth. On September 24, 1996, Foote arrived at her store to find a
man making detailed measurements. When she called management to find out the
purpose of the measurements, she was informed that it was an attempt to lower the
insurance rates for the Center. It was only later that Foote learned that space 322 had
been leased to GNC, and the measurements were made in connection with that lease.
On September 26, Yarmouth informed Foote that Africa House would not be
offered a long-term lease because its gross sales did not meet or exceed $800,000.
Yarmouth was also reluctant to offer Africa House a different space or a short-term lease.
On October 14, 1996, the defendants served Foote with notice terminating her lease for
space 322. The termination notice did not contain any offer of relocation or a short-term
lease, even though other tenants who had been terminated by Yarmouth were offered such
options. Foote hired an attorney to negotiate with Yarmouth. Yarmouth eventually
offered Africa House a four-month lease for space 202 in the Center, but Foote rejected
the lease due to its short duration.
On October 29, 1996, Foote filed the complaint in this action against Yarmouth
and Tabor Center Associates, along with an application for a temporary restraining order.
Before a hearing on the order, the parties stipulated to relocate the business to space 202
until the legal issues were resolved. In the complaint, Foote brought claims on her own
5
behalf and on behalf of Africa House, alleging that the defendants had (1) unlawfully
interfered with the right to make and enforce a contract, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981;
and (2) unlawfully interfered with the right to lease real property, in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1982. Africa House also brought a claim alleging that the defendants had
intentionally interfered with its prospective business advantages.
A jury found in favor of both Foote and Africa House on all claims. The jury
awarded $200,000 in compensatory damages and $1,500,000 in punitive damages to
Foote; and awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive
damages to Africa House. The defendants filed a motion for new trial or remittitur,
which the district court denied. The defendants also filed a motion for judgment as a
matter of law. The district court granted this motion in part, finding that Foote’s claims
merged with those of Africa House and, therefore, she was without standing. The court
dismissed Foote and set aside the verdict and damages in her favor. The plaintiffs filed
an application for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The district court
granted this motion, but reduced the hourly rates requested. The district court further
granted the plaintiffs’ motion for prejudgment interest.
II.
We first address plaintiffs’ contention that the district court erred in dismissing
Foote’s § 1981 and § 1982 claims for lack of standing. The district court reasoned that
dismissal was necessary because the injury was suffered by Africa House rather than
6
Foote, in that the defendants had refused to contract with or lease property to Africa
House rather than to Foote individually, and that Foote’s claim for injuries was the result
of that refusal. The plaintiffs argue on appeal that Foote has standing because as sole
shareholder of Africa House she suffered injury separate and distinct from that of Africa
House, and further that she has standing in her own right because she signed a guaranty
contract in her 1993 lease which gave rise to a special duty separate and distinct from that
owed to Africa House.
We review issues of standing de novo. Faustin v. City & County of Denver,
Colorado, 268 F.3d 942, 947 (10th Cir. 2001). In order to determine whether Foote has
standing to claim injury under §1981 and § 1982, we first consider the language used in
those statutes. Section 42 U.S.C. 1981 guarantees the right of all persons to “make and
enforce” contracts. Section 42 U.S.C. 1982 guarantees the right to “inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” It has been held that
“[p]rudential limitations on standing ordinarily require that an action under section 1981
or 1982 be brought by the direct victims of the alleged discrimination because they are
best situated to assert the individual rights in question.” Clifton Terrace Assocs., Ltd. v.
United Technologies Corp., 929 F.2d 714, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
In the instant case, Foote alleged discrimination based on her race. However, the
party seeking to contract with the defendants and to lease property, and thus the direct
victim of the alleged discrimination, was Foote’s corporation, Africa House, rather than
7
Foote herself.1 We agree that Africa House has standing to assert discrimination claims
under § 1981 and § 1982 where such discrimination is based on the race of one of its
employees. See Gersman v. Group Health Ass’n, Inc., 931 F.2d 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1991),
vacated on other grounds, 502 U.S. 1068 (1992).2 The question is whether Foote has
standing to bring a claim for emotional damages which she herself allegedly suffered as a
result of the defendants’ discrimination.
We have held that, as a general rule, a stockholder cannot maintain a personal
action against a third party for harm caused to the corporation. Stat-Tech Intern. Corp. v.
Delutes, 47 F.3d 1054, 1060 (10th Cir. 1995). There is, however, an exception to this
rule where the actions of the third party that injure the corporation also cause injury to the
shareholder which is unique to himself or herself as a shareholder of the corporation and
not suffered by the other shareholders. Id.
Foote alleged that she suffered emotional distress as a result of the defendants’
1
According to the Stipulated Pretrial Order, the plaintiffs’ claims with regard to
§ 1981 and § 1982 are that “defendants have denied The Africa House the opportunity to
rent or negotiate for the rental of retail space at The Shops at Tabor Center.” App. at 61.
The complaint identifies Africa House as the corporation. Id. at 36.
2
In Gersman, a corporation, CSI, brought a § 1981 claim against a defendant who
had ended a contractual relationship when the defendant learned that the president of CSI
was Jewish. The court held that CSI had standing to bring suit under § 1981 because the
injury it suffered fell “within the zone of interests protected by the statute,” in that the
termination of the contract was “solely because an individual associated with CSI was
Jewish.” 931 F.2d at 1569. See also Hudson Valley Freedom Theater, Inc. v. Heimbach,
671 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding theater corporation had standing to assert claim
alleging it was discriminated against because it sought to involve the black and Hispanic
communities).
8
actions. However, this distress arose from the failure of the defendants to contract with or
lease to Africa House and was a product of the economic damages which were suffered
by the corporation. Foote suffered no violation of her contract rights or right to lease that
was in any way different from the violations claimed by Africa House. Her claim is
derivative of that of Africa House and she does not have standing to sue on her own
behalf. See Bellows v. Amoco Oil Co., 118 F.3d 268, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that
plaintiff who was president of a corporation and 51% shareholder had no individual cause
of action under § 1981 for emotional distress arising from discrimination against the
corporation based on plaintiff’s race).
Foote also argues that she has standing as the result of her guarantee of the
corporation’s 1993 lease. However, we reject the premise that a stockholder’s status as a
guarantor gives the stockholder status to assert an individual claim against a third party
where that harm is derivative of that suffered by the corporation. See Sparling v.
Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); Nicholson v. Ash, 800 P.2d
1352, 1357 (Colo. App. 1990). Foote’s status as guarantor of the previous lease is of no
significance to her claim that the defendants refused to contract or lease to her
corporation.
We hold that the district court did not err in dismissing Foote as an individual
plaintiff and setting aside the damages awarded to her.
9
III.
We next consider the defendants’ contention that their motion for judgment as a
matter of law should have been granted because there was insufficient evidence to sustain
the jury’s finding of intentional race discrimination. In reviewing the district court’s
denial of a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law, we apply the same
standard as the district court. Tyler v. RE/MAX Mountain States, Inc., 232 F.3d 808, 812
(10th Cir. 2000). We review all the evidence in the record, construing it and all
inferences drawn therefrom most favorably to the nonmoving party, and refrain from
making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence. Id. A party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law only if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the
claim. Hampton v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091, 1103 (10th Cir. 2001).
A § 1981 or § 1982 plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant intentionally discriminated against him or her on the basis of race. See
Stewart v. Adolph Coors Co., 217 F.3d 1285, 1288 (10th Cir. 2000). Such proof may
come from either direct or indirect evidence. Hampton, 247 F.3d at 1107. When asked to
review the sufficiency of the evidence in §1981 and § 1982 claims based on indirect
discrimination, we assume that the plaintiff met his or her burden of proving a prima facie
claim and the claim properly went to trial, leaving only the question of whether the
plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination that the adverse
action was taken on the basis of race. Id. at 1108; Stewart, 217 F.3d at 1288.
10
Based on the record as a whole, we conclude there was sufficient evidence from
which a jury could infer that the defendants discriminated against Africa House.
Although the undisputed evidence indicated that Africa House was always an excellent
tenant at the Tabor Center, and although the defendants could not identify a legitimate
reason why she would not be an appropriate tenant in the future, the defendants made no
attempt to discuss the possibility of a future lease. The defendants told Foote that Africa
House was not eligible for a long-term lease because it did not have enough gross annual
sales; however, at the same time they offered a long-term lease to another business whose
year-to-date sales were approximately $20,000 less and whose rent-to-sales ratio was
comparable. When Foote attempted to pursue a short-term lease, she was told that spaces
were unavailable or was begrudgingly offered only a temporary lease even though, at the
same time, the defendants were soliciting other tenants for short-term leases. At one
point, the defendants made misrepresentations to Foote concerning why they were taking
measurements of her business, telling her the measurements were for insurance purposes
when they were actually in preparation for a new tenant.
Further, there is evidence from which a jury could infer that Foote's race and the
perceived race of Africa House's clientele were the basis for this discriminatory conduct.
There was testimony from Jana Thorpe, a tenant who was offered a long-term lease, that
when she asked whether Foote’s business would be offered a long-term lease, she was
told that the business “didn’t fit the proposed image of the Tabor Center.” App. at 1343.
11
She interpreted this statement to mean that “Africa House didn’t fit the image of the
Tabor Center [because] Africa House was a store owned by a black person that sold
things from Africa and had black customers.” Id. at 1344. There was also testimony that
Yarmouth management told Foote that her business did not “mix well,” was not
glamourous enough, and devalued the Center, while at the same time tenants who were
not black were encouraged to sign leases. Further, management stated at various times
that the name “Africa House” should be changed.
Reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we cannot say that “the evidence points
but one way, and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting [the plaintiffs’]
claim.” Hampton, 247 F.3d at 1107. The district court did not err in denying the
defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law based on the sufficiency of the
evidence.
IV.
The defendants next contend there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
determination that they interfered with Africa House’s prospective business advantages,
and that the district court erred in denying their motion for judgment as a matter of law as
to that claim. They argue that Africa House failed to introduce evidence that the
defendants induced or otherwise caused a third person not to enter into or continue a
prospective business relationship.
After a careful review of the record, we are unable to find any evidence to support
12
the jury’s verdict. On appeal, Africa House similarly fails to point to any evidence which
would support the verdict. As a result, we reverse the jury’s verdict on this issue.
V.
The defendants next argue that the district court committed several trial errors
which, individually and cumulatively, require reversal. “When a party seeks 'reversal of a
jury verdict or of a denial of a motion for new trial' by claiming trial errors, it 'must
establish the alleged trial errors were both prejudicial and clearly erroneous.'” Baty v.
Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gust v. Jones, 162
F.3d 587, 591 (10th Cir. 1998)).
First, defendants assert that it was error for the district court to allow the lay
opinion testimony of three witnesses: Jana Thorpe, Phil Pankoff, and David Fine. Under
Federal Rule of Evidence 701, lay opinion must be “(a) rationally based on the perception
of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue.” The admission of lay opinion testimony is within the
sound discretion of the district court. Gust, 162 F.3d at 595. We conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony. The testimony of
Thorpe, Pankoff and Fine was rationally based on their perceptions and helpful to a
determination of facts in issue.
The defendants also argue that the district court erred in denying their motions in
limine seeking to exclude (1) the plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dr. William Kaempfer, and
13
(2) irrelevant comparative evidence. The district court denied the motions, reserving the
issues for trial. At trial, the defendants did not object to any of the testimony identified in
their motions in limine. As a result, they have failed to preserve these alleged errors for
appeal. See Hampton, 247 F.3d at 1113 (stating that failure to make a timely and proper
objection constitutes waiver of the issue absent plain error resulting in manifest injustice).
We conclude that the defendants have failed to show the denial of their motions in limine
resulted in manifest injustice.
The defendants further contend that the district court abused its discretion when it
granted the plaintiffs’ motion in limine to exclude a finding made by the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission that there was no cause to believe that the defendants had
discriminated against the plaintiffs in the leasing decision. However, the decision of
whether to admit or exclude findings of a civil rights commission lies within the sound
discretion of the district court. See Denny v. Hutchinson Sales Corp., 649 F.2d 816, 821-
22 (10th Cir. 1981). The defendants sought to admit the finding on the grounds that it
might contain statements to the commission that would contradict Foote’s testimony at
trial. The district court excluded the evidence, but stated that it would entertain a motion
for reconsideration in the event that Foote actually did make statements at trial that
conflicted with her testimony to the commission. The defendants made no attempt to do
so, and do not now point to any conflicting statements. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in granting the plaintiffs’ motion in limine to exclude the commission report.
14
The defendants next argue that the district court erred when it allowed plaintiffs’
counsel, during closing argument, to refer to the size and scope of the defendants’
operations. Plaintiffs’ counsel implored the jury to “send a clear message” “all the way to
Sydney, Australia where [the defendants] are based on the other side of the world,” and
further implied that the large size, international operations, and presumed profitability of
the defendants warranted a large award of punitive damages. App. at 1725-27. However,
the defendants did not object to this statement at closing argument, and we will not
address it on appeal. See Glenn v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 32 F.3d 1462, 1465 (10th Cir.
1994) (holding that “[a] party who waits until the jury returns an unfavorable verdict to
complain about improper comments during opening statement and closing argument is
bound by that risky decision and should not be granted relief”)
Finally, the defendants contend that the district court erred in allowing Foote to
remain as a plaintiff in the case. They argue that her presence in the case confused the
jury. However, at no time during trial did the defendants object to Foote’s presence as a
plaintiff. Under the circumstances, there was no error.
VI.
We next consider the defendants’ argument that the compensatory damages
awarded to Africa House were not supported by sufficient evidence. The jury was
instructed that, in determining compensatory damages, it could consider (1) financial
losses, including lost profits and expenses; and (2) loss of good name, reputation, honor
15
or integrity. The jury ultimately awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages.
We will uphold a jury's award of damages unless it is clearly erroneous or there is
no evidence to support the award. See Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Services, 101
F.3d 1324, 1330 (10th Cir. 1996). “[T]he amount of damages awarded by a jury can be
supported by any competent evidence tending to sustain it.” Advantor Capital Corp. v.
Yeary, 136 F.3d 1259, 1266 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Bennett v. Longacre, 774 F.2d
1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1985)).
Dr. William Kaempfer testified as to Africa House’s lost profits, ultimately fixing
the lost profits as a result of the defendants’ conduct at $75,316.95. The defendants argue
that this testimony was unreliable. However, the jury apparently found the testimony
credible. “It is within the virtually exclusive purview of the jury to evaluate credibility
and fix damages.” United Intern. Holdings v. Wharf (Holdings), 210 F.3d 1207, 1230
(10th Cir. 2000). Thus, Dr. Kaempfer’s testimony was sufficient to support $75,316.95 in
compensatory damages.
We do not, however, reach the same conclusion regarding the remaining
$74,683.05 in compensatory damages awarded by the jury. The plaintiffs contend that the
award is supported by the testimony of Andrew Warren, Lewis Gaiter, Kathleen
Scheuerman, and Foote herself. However, while financial consultants Warren and Gaiter
suggested new business strategies which would help Africa House increase its business,
most of these business strategies were not adopted, and in fact the suggestions were made
16
more than one year prior to the alleged actions of the defendants. They expressed no
opinion concerning lost profits or loss of Africa House’s good name, honor or integrity.
Similarly, Kathleen Scheuerman, an employee of Africa House, testified only that the
business in the new space was not as profitable as it was in the old space, and her
testimony in no way supports an award for lost profits above that presented by Dr.
Kaempfer, nor does it provide any evidence of a loss of good name, reputation, honor or
integrity.
Finally, Foote’s testimony fails to support lost profits over and above those
calculated by her expert, and does not mention any damage to Africa House’s good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity. As a result, we conclude there is insufficient evidence to
sustain a compensatory damage award over and above $75,316.95, and remand with
directions that the district court enter a remittitur reducing the compensatory damages
awarded to Africa House to that amount or, in the alternative, order a new trial.
VII.
The defendants contend that the district court erred in denying their motion for
judgment as a matter of law, arguing the punitive damages awarded to Africa House are
not supported by the evidence.3
3
The plaintiffs argue that defendants failed to raise the issue of insufficient
evidence to support punitive damages in their Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) motions, and therefore
should not have been allowed to raise the issue in a Fed R. Civ. P. 50(b) motion, or on
appeal. However, the plaintiffs themselves failed to object on this basis in their response
to the defendants’ Rule 50(b) motion. Under such circumstances, the plaintiffs may not
17
“Whether sufficient evidence exists to support punitive damages is a question of
law reviewed de novo.” Fitzgerald v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.3d 1257,
1262 (10th Cir. 1995). We have held that the standard for punitive damages in actions
claiming a violation of federal civil rights requires that the discrimination must have been
malicious, willful, and in gross disregard of the rights of the plaintiff. See Hampton, 247
F.3d at 1115.
We conclude that this standard for punitive damages cannot be satisfied by a
showing of intentional discrimination alone. Otherwise, every jury verdict in a successful
§ 1981 or § 1982 claim would include an award of punitive damages. Instead, we believe
that a plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with malicious, willful or gross
disregard of a plaintiff’s rights over and above intentional discrimination.
In examining the evidence, we are not persuaded that the plaintiffs proved the
defendants acted in malicious, willful or gross disregard of their rights. While the
indirect evidence in this case is sufficient to establish that the defendants intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis of race, there is no evidence which would
assert the failure of the defendants to raise the insufficient evidence issue. When the
non-moving party fails to raise the inadequacy of a Rule 50(a) motion in opposition to a
Rule 50(b) motion, that party cannot raise waiver as an argument on appeal. See Williams
v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 572 (3d Cir. 1997); Thompson & Wallace of Memphis, Inc. v.
Falconwood Corp., 100 F.3d 429, 435 (5th Cir. 1996); Whelan v. Abell, 48 F.3d 1247,
1251-53 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Gibeau v. Nellis, 18 F.3d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1994); Collins v.
Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 698 (7th Cir. 1987); Beauford v. Sisters of Mercy Province of
Detroit, Inc., 816 F.2d 1104, 1108 n.3 (6th Cir. 1987); Halsell v. Kimberly Clark Corp.,
683 F.2d 285, 293-95 (8th Cir. 1982). Therefore, we will address the issue.
18
show that the defendants acted in malicious or willful disregard of Africa House’s rights.
As a result, we reverse the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion for judgment
as a matter of law as to the $1 million in punitive damages awarded to Africa House.
VIII.
The defendants next contend that the district court abused its discretion when it
applied a state law rate of interest to compute the award of prejudgment interest to Africa
House. The district court applied a 9% interest rate to the prejudgment interest award
pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-21-101. The defendants argue that the district
court should have applied the rate of interest for post-judgment awards found in 28
U.S.C. § 1961 because the district court’s jurisdiction was based on a federal question
jurisdiction rather than diversity jurisdiction.
We agree that a federal rate of interest rather than the state rate applies where
jurisdiction is based on a federal question, and therefore the district court erred in
determining that it was bound to apply the state rate of interest. See Carpenters Dist.
Council of New Orleans & Vicinity v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1288 (5th
Cir. 1994) (stating that “federal law governs the range of remedies, including the
allowance and rate of prejudgment interest, where a cause of action, as in this case, arises
out of federal statute”). See also U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d
1223, 1254 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating that an award of prejudgment interest in a federal
securities law claim is controlled by federal law), overruled by implication on other
19
grounds by Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994). We therefore remand to the district court to fix the rate of prejudgment interest.
See Towerridge, Inc. v. T.A.O., Inc., 111 F.3d 758, 764 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating where
the prejudgment rate is governed by federal law, a court is free to choose any rate which
would fairly compensate the plaintiff for the delay); see also Jones v. Unum Life Ins. Co.
of America, 223 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that because there is no federal
statute that purports to control the rate of prejudgment interest, the rate is left to the
discretion of the district court).
The defendants also contend that the district court erred in awarding prejudgment
interest from the date that the claim accrued rather than as the lost profits occurred. They
argue that because the lost profits did not all occur at the time the claim accrued,
awarding prejudgment interest from the date the claim accrued gives a windfall to the
plaintiffs.
The purpose of prejudgment interest is “'to compensate the wronged party for
being deprived of the monetary value of his loss from the time of the loss to the payment
of judgment.'” Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1549, 1554 (10th Cir. 1992)
(quoting U.S. Industries, 854 F.2d at 1256). It appears that the district court in the case at
hand may have felt bound to apply state law found in Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-21-101
to the calculation of prejudgment interest, which provides for prejudgment interest to be
calculated from the date the action accrued. On remand, we direct the district court to
20
consider the timing of the award of prejudgment interest that will serve to fairly
compensate Africa House for the deprivation of the monetary value of its loss.
IX.
The plaintiffs also contend that the district court erred in reducing the rates at
which attorney fees were calculated for purposes of its award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
The plaintiffs had requested fees for a total of 482.70 hours by attorney Darold Killmer at
$250 per hour, 309.55 hours by attorney David Miller at $250 per hour, and 118.60 hours
by attorney Mari Newman at $115 per hour. The district court reduced Killmer’s and
Miller’s hourly rates to $200 and reduced Newman’s hourly rate to $100, finding that the
plaintiffs had failed to produce evidence showing that the higher rates were reasonable.
“In light of the discretionary nature of the district court’s decision, we review an
attorney’s fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) for an abuse of discretion.” Robinson v.
City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir. 1998). We review the district court’s
factual findings for clear error, and the court’s legal conclusions de novo. Id.
A claimant who files an application for attorney fees under § 1988(b) has the
burden to prove that the fee is reasonable. Id. A reasonable rate is the prevailing market
rate in the relevant community. Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir.
1996). To meet this burden, the claimant must:
produce satisfactory evidence - in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits -
that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community
for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience
and reputation. A rate determined in this way is normally deemed to be
21
reasonable and is referred to - for convenience - as the prevailing market
rate.
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11 (1984).
Here, the evidence fails to show that the requested rates were reasonable. While
Killmer submitted an affidavit as to the prevailing rates at his firm and another local firm,
the rates charged by attorneys at the other firm ranged from only $160 to $190 per hour.
An affidavit from Lynn Feiger, a former partner of Killmer, stated only that she charged
$310 per hour for the same type of work. While this evidence serves to establish Feiger’s
rate, it does not establish the rates charged were consistent with rates charged by
comparably skilled lawyers in the community. Similarly, the only evidence of the
appropriateness of Newman’s hourly rate was provided in the affidavit of Killmer.
The defendants contend that, instead of relying on their asserted rates, the district
court incorrectly relied on its own knowledge. However, we are unpersuaded by this
argument. Where a district court does not have before it adequate evidence of prevailing
market rates, the court may use other relevant factors, including its own knowledge, to
establish the rate. See Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 157 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1998).
We conclude that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiffs failed to
satisfy their burden of establishing the reasonableness of the requested attorney fees and
in reducing those rates according to its own knowledge of the prevailing market rate.
22
X.
The decision of the district court dismissing Foote for lack of standing is
AFFIRMED. We VACATE the judgment and direct the district court to dismiss Africa
House’s claim of intentional interference with prospective business advantages. We
REVERSE the district court’s denial of the defendants’ request for a remittitur and
REMAND with directions that the district court enter a remittitur order reducing the
compensatory damages awarded to Africa House to $75,316.95 or, in the alternative, to
grant a new trial. We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion for a
new trial for alleged evidentiary errors. We REVERSE the district court’s denial of the
defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law as to the punitive damages awarded to
Africa House and VACATE the award of punitive damages. We REVERSE the district
court’s order granting prejudgment interest at the state rate from the date the claim
accrued, and REMAND for a determination of the rate of prejudgment interest and for a
determination of the date or dates of accrual. We AFFIRM the district court’s award of
attorney fees.
23
Nos. 99-1388 et al., The Guides v. The Yarmouth Group
JENKINS, Senior District Judge, concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the majority opinion with one modest exception. I would reverse the
order of the court below dismissing Ms. Foote’s jury award and reinstate her
compensatory damages judgment of $200,000.
Section 1981 states that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make
and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
Section 1982 states that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right . . . as
is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994). Initially enacted pursuant to the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, sections 1981 and 1982 were “intended [to protect] . . . citizens of the
United States in enjoyment of certain rights without discrimination on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude,” United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555
(1875), or because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics, St. Francis College v. Al-
Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987), and to “confer on [African-Americans] a civil status
equivalent to that enjoyed by white persons.” Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697, 703 (3d Cir.
1949). The protection afforded by these statutes finds its roots in the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168–72 (1976)
(Thirteenth Amendment); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437–44 (1968)
(same); General Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 384–91 (1982)
(Fourteenth Amendment).
Although neither section 1981 or 1982 define “person” or “citizen,” respectively,
the United States Supreme Court has provided useful guidance. In Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Court stated
that, for the purposes of standing under the Fourteenth Amendment, “a corporation . . .
has no racial identity and cannot be the direct target of the . . . alleged discrimination.”
Id. at 263.
In today’s opinion, the majority disregards Arlington Heights in concluding that
Africa House has standing because under sections 1981 and 1982, “the direct victim of
the alleged discrimination, was Foote’s corporation, Africa House, rather than Foote
herself.”
In this case, Africa House by itself cannot have standing to assert section 1981 and
1982 claims because, as Arlington Heights explains, a corporation cannot be the direct
target or victim of racial discrimination. However, the Court in Arlington Heights did not
address whether a corporation would have standing if it were an indirect target of racial
discrimination, that is, whether a corporation has standing when it suffers an injury such
as lost profits resulting from unlawful discrimination directed at a member of a protected
class. Cases since Arlington Heights indicate that a corporation that is harmed by
discriminatory action has standing to litigate that harm. See Hudson Valley Freedom
Theater, Inc. v. Heimbach, 671 F.2d 702, 708 (2d Cir. 1982) (Pierce, J., concurring)
(“[U]nder the 14th Amendment and the statutes which seek to implement its purposes,
2
any person, including a colorless corporate ‘person’, although not a member of a
protected group, has an implied cause of action against any other person who, with
racially discriminatory intent, causes . . . it . . . [an] injury.”). This view comports with
the Court’s dictum in Arlington Heights and the purposes for which Congress enacted
sections 1981 and 1982.
The majority relies on Gersman v. Group Health Association, Inc., 931 F.2d 1565
(D.C. Cir. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 502 U.S. 1068 (1992), to hold that “Africa
House has standing to assert discrimination claims under § 1981 and § 1982 where such
discrimination is based on the race of one of its employees.”
I agree with the reasoning in Gersman,1 and I agree that the jury correctly found
1
Gersman adequately addresses the difficult issues raised in Arlington Heights. In
Gersman, the defendant argued that the corporation, CSI, did not have standing to bring a
cause of action under section 1981 because CSI lacked a racial or religious identity.
Gersman, 931 F.2d at 1568. The court declined to rule that “racial identity is a predicate
to discriminatory harm” and instead approached the issue “by assuming that, if a
corporation can suffer harm from discrimination, it has standing to litigate that harm.” Id.
Addressing this issue further, the court stated
a party may suffer a legally cognizable injury from discrimination even where that
party is not a member of a protected minority group. Thus, it is not necessary to
determine whether CSI has a “racial identity.” [Given that a corporation exists as
an entity separate from its employees, officers and stockholders,] [s]uch a query
would lead to difficulties of determining what, in fact, constitutes a racial identity.
. . . For example, in the present case, CSI alleges that it has a racial identity
because it is operated and owned by Mr. and Mrs. Gersman, who are both Jewish.
Yet the situation would be no different if Gentile shareholders owned CSI and [the
defendant] ended the contractual relationship because the corporation had a single
Jewish employee. Thus, CSI need not have a “Jewish identity,” or even have
predominantly Jewish owners or employees, in order to suffer injury from [the
defendant’s] discriminatory actions.
3
that Africa House suffered an injury resulting from unlawful discrimination. However,
the jury also found that the defendants had discriminated against Ms. Foote because of
her race and that Ms. Foote suffered a compensable injury distinct from that suffered by
Africa House.2 Ms. Foote, as is required by our prior cases,3 is a member of the protected
class under sections 1981 and 1982 and was the direct target of the defendants’ racial
Id. at 1570.
The jury was instructed:
2
If you find that either or both of the Defendants discriminated on the
basis of Plaintiffs’ race in the making or enforcement of a lease for the
Tabor Center for which they were qualified, you may award reasonable
compensation for the following:
– financial losses (for either Plaintiff Tseghe Foote or Plaintiff Africa
House);
– pain, suffering, and physical and emotional distress (for Plaintiff Tseghe
Foote only).
...
If you find for the Plaintiffs, or either of them, on more than one
claim for relief, you may award damages only once for the same business
losses.
(Jt. App. vol. I-A, at 308, 310.)
3
In this Circuit, a racial identity is the cornerstone of a section 1981 and 1982 cause of
action and a necessary element of a plaintiff’s prima facie case. See Shawl v. Dillards,
Inc., No. 99-1409, 2001 WL 967887, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001) (“To establish a
claim under § 1981, the plaintiffs must show that (1) they are members of a protected
class . . . .” (citing Hampton v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091, 1101 (10th
Cir.2001))).
4
discrimination whether she was acting in her individual capacity in seeking to enter into
the prospective lease contract,4 or was acting as agent for her corporation. She is entitled
to redress for her own injuries that also fall clearly within the zone of interests protected
by sections 1981 and 1982. The defendants caused injury both to Africa House and Ms.
Foote by refusing to deal with Ms. Foote—a refusal the jury found to be racially
motivated. Affirming the defendants’ liability to the corporate plaintiff, Africa House,
acknowledges that the corporation suffered an injury resulting from unlawful
discrimination—racial discrimination for which Ms. Foote served as the very human
direct target.
In dismissing Ms. Foote’s claims, the majority relies on Bellows v. Amoco Oil
Company, 118 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 1997). However, Bellows does not support the
majority’s holding for several reasons. First, in Bellows, the jury found in favor of the
defendant Amoco on the corporate plaintiff’s section 1981 claim. The corporate plaintiff,
Phillips Industrial Constructors, Inc. (“PICI”), did not appeal the jury’s determination and
was therefore not before the Fifth Circuit at all. As the court itself stated: “The obvious
problem that Bellow faces with [his] argument, of course, is that the jury found that
4
The majority bases its holding that the corporation was the direct victim of the alleged
discrimination, in part, on the fact that the injury—the refusal to contract with or lease
property—was suffered by Africa House, not Ms. Foote individually. However, the
majority ignores evidence in the record that suggests that Ms. Foote leased space from the
defendants under her own name, “Tseghe Foote, Tenant.” On the existing record,
whether Africa House was to be the party to the prospective contract is ambiguous at best.
(Jt. App. vol. X, at 2445–49.)
5
Amoco did not interfere with PICI’s contracts, or ability to contract, with Amoco on the
basis of race.” Id. at 276. In other words, the court found that Bellow’s claim, as it was
dependent on PICI’s dismissed claim against Amoco, was meritless on appeal. Second,
the facts are distinguishable from the facts of the present case in that Bellow’s claim was
one step removed from the cause of action as expressed by PICI. That is, in Bellows,
plaintiff Bellow claimed that Amoco discriminated against him on the basis of his race by
engaging in conduct that had the effect of terminating, modifying, or changing Bellow’s
right to contract with PICI as distinguished from PICI’s right to contract with Amoco. Id.
at 272–73.
Ms. Foote is not asserting that the defendants interfered with her right to contract
with Africa House. Ms. Foote is asserting that she has an injury resulting directly from
the defendants’ discriminatory conduct towards her, separate and distinct from that
suffered by Africa House—an issue not raised or dealt with in Bellows or Gersman.
Rather than her claim being “derivative of that of Africa House,” if anything, Africa
House’s claim is derivative of the unlawful discrimination Ms. Foote experienced
firsthand in dealing with the defendants. Africa House could make no contract without
her participation. The jury found that the defendants frustrated Ms. Foote’s efforts to
obtain a new lease, and did so because of Ms. Foote’s race, thereby harming both Ms.
Foote and Africa House.
The majority dismisses Ms. Foote’s harm as merely “a product of the economic
6
damages which were suffered by the corporation.” Yet the uncontroverted testimony of
Ms. Foote and other witnesses established that she became deeply disturbed beginning in
September 1996—before Africa House had suffered any actual economic loss. The jury
found in Ms. Foote’s favor, awarding her $200,000 in damages.
The majority has simply substituted its judgment for that of the jury concerning
whether Ms. Foote suffered the mental anguish that she and others testified to at trial as
resulting from the discrimination she experienced.
I would therefore hold that both Africa House and Ms. Foote have standing to
assert the section 1981 and 1982 causes of action against the defendants, and that the
district court’s ruling as to Ms. Foote should be reversed and judgment in favor of Ms.
Foote should be reinstated as to compensatory damages.
7