F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 15 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
vs. No. 02-3030
(D.C. No. 01-CV-3228-WEB)
ANTONIO MARISCAL-PENA, (D. Kan.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. **
Defendant - Appellant Antonio Mariscal-Pena, a federal inmate appearing
pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) allowing him to appeal the
district court’s order denying relief on his motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Because Mr. Mariscal-Pena has failed to make a “substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000), we deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
In May 1999, Mr. Mariscal-Pena pled guilty to distribution of
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. In July, he was sentenced to
120 months imprisonment. Mr. Mariscal-Pena did not directly appeal his
sentence. Almost two years later, he filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition. Mr.
Mariscal-Pena argues that his conviction is void because (1) the indictment did
not include drug quantities in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000) 1 and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court
denied the § 2255 motion as time-barred, at least insofar as the Apprendi claims,
holding that Apprendi was not retroactive. It then denied Mr. Mariscal-Pena’s
ineffective assistance claim on the merits. While we agree with the district
court’s merits disposition, it is unnecessary to reach it.
Before reaching the merits of Mr. Mariscal-Pena’s motion, it is necessary to
determine whether it is timely. A one-year period of limitation applies to a §
2255 motion. The limitation period runs from the latest of -
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction became final;
[or]
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized
1
The Court has recently addressed this argument. United States v. Cotton,
122 S. Ct. 1781, 1784-85 (2002) (omission of drug quantity in an indictment is
not jurisdictional).
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by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized
by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review;
28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Mr. Mariscal-Pena filed his § 2255 motion almost two years after his
conviction became final. Consequently, his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim is time-barred. As to the Apprendi issue, this court has already determined
that Apprendi is not retroactively applicable to initial habeas petitions and § 2255
motions. United States v. Mora, No. 01-8020, __ F.3d __, 2002 WL 1317126, at
*3-4 (10th Cir. June 18, 2002). Therefore, although Mr. Mariscal-Pena’s motion
was filed within one year of the Apprendi decision, his Apprendi claim is also
time-barred.
We DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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