UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 98-20280
Summary Calendar
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SHIRLEY J. LEWIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE CITY OF HOUSTON; THE CITY
OF HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendants-Appellees,
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No.CA-H-96-4240
October 27, 1998
Before KING, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Shirley J. Lewis, pro se, appeals the summary judgment granted
the City of Houston, dismissing her claims under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). We AFFIRM.
Lewis, who was employed by the City as a senior data entry
operator, was diagnosed with systemic lupus erythematosus in the
early 1990s; her last day at work was 27 February 1994. She
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
applied for long term disability benefits (LTD) on 15 August 1994.
On 3 November 1995, Lewis filed a charge of discrimination under
the ADA with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The City
terminated Lewis’s employee benefits on 1 October 1996.
The City moved for summary judgment, asserting that Lewis’s
claims of harassment and refusal to accommodate were time barred;
and that Lewis was estopped from claiming she was a “qualified
individual” under the ADA, because of her representations on
applications for LTD and Social Security Disability that she is
totally disabled. Summary judgment was granted for the City.
Lewis maintains that the district court erred in finding that
her claims were time barred because there was continuing
discrimination; and that material fact issues exist.
Of course, we review a summary judgment de novo, applying the
same standard as the district court. E.g., Freeman v. County of
Bexar, 142 F.3d 848, 850 (5th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is
proper where there is no material fact issue and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P.
56(c).
Having reviewed the record and the briefs, we AFFIRM the
summary judgment for essentially the reasons stated by the district
court. See Lewis v. City of Houston, No. 4:96-CV-04240, slip op.
at 3-6 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 1997).
AFFIRMED
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