Searcy v. Simmons

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
AUG 19 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

EDGAR SEARCY,

Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 00-3161

CHARLES SIMMONS, Secretary of
Corrections, ROBERT D.
HANNIGAN, Warden,

Defendants - Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. No. 94-3421-KHV)

Matthew C. Miller (and Matthew J. Wiltanger, with him on the briefs), Shook,
Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Overland Park, Kansas, for Plaintiff - Appellant.

Timothy G. Madden, Kansas Department of Corrections, Topeka, Kansas, for
Defendants - Appellees.

Before KELLY and MCKAY, Circuit Judges and BRIMMER *, District Judge.

KELLY, Circuit Judge.

*
The Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, Jr., United States District Judge,
District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
 Plaintiff-Appellant Edgar Searcy, who at all times relevant to this appeal

was an inmate housed in the Hutchinson Correctional Facility (“HCF”), brought

an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violation of certain constitutional

rights stemming from the Kansas Department of Corrections’ (“KDOC”) Sexual

Abuse Treatment Program (“SATP”). The district court entered summary

judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims and Mr. Searcy timely filed his

notice of appeal. Searcy v. Simmons, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (D. Kan. 2000). We

abated briefing pending a sister panel’s decision in Lile v. McKune, 224 F.3d

1175 (10th Cir. 2000), which addressed an inmate’s similar allegations of

violations of constitutional rights stemming from operation of the SATP. Upon

publication of that decision, briefs were filed and we heard oral argument, but we

abated decision on the case after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lile.

The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Lile and remanded

the case. McKune v. Lile, 122 S. Ct. 2017 (2002). Although the facts in this case

differ slightly from those in McKune, we conclude that it controls.

Background

In January 1997, Mr. Searcy entered a plea of nolo contendere to charges of

sexual exploitation of a child and was sentenced to 65 months imprisonment. To

assist in the rehabilitation of sex offenders and other inmates with a history of

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sexually deviant behavior, the KDOC instituted the SATP. Because of his

conviction of a sex offense, the KDOC recommended that Mr. Searcy be placed in

the SATP. Mr. Searcy accepted this recommendation by signing an inmate

program plan that stated,

I acknowledge that I have been afforded an opportunity to
enter into a program plan. I understand that such a program plan is
optional but that failure to participate in or successfully complete
recommended programs shall result in the withholding of good time
credits which affect my date of release.

Aplee. Supp. App. at 15.

Inmates in the SATP must complete and sign a form stating that they accept

responsibility for the crime for which they have been sentenced. In addition,

inmates in the SATP must complete a sexual history form. In completing the

sexual history form, the inmates must list sexual activities where they were the

perpetrator and a victim was involved, regardless of whether criminal charges

were brought in response to the activity in question. Although inmates in the

SATP apparently are not required to divulge full details of these prior incidents,

see Aplee. Supp. App. at 56, they are provided a sample sexual history form that

calls for the name of the victim, the victim’s age, and the age of the inmate at the

time of the incident. Aplt. App. at 243. The SATP uses a polygraph examination

to verify the truth and completeness of each inmate’s sexual history.

An inmate’s sexual history receives limited confidentiality. They are

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informed that the information they provide could be revealed in a variety of

circumstances, including when required under mandatory child abuse reporting

laws, see Kan. Stat. § 38-1522, pursuant to a court order, or when the information

is need to protect a third party. See McKune, 122 S. Ct. at 2023 (noting that

release of the sexual history information is a possibility).

Mr. Searcy refused to sign the admission of responsibility form on the

ground that he was not willing to admit to having committed the crime of sexual

exploitation of a child. 1 Certain consequences resulted from this refusal. At all

times relevant to this case, the KDOC had in effect its Internal Management

Policy and Procedure 11-101 (“IMPP”). The IMPP, implemented to provide a

system of earnable privileges subsequent to changes in Kansas sentencing laws,

establishes levels of privileges and incentives to inmates. The lowest level, level

one, allows an inmate limited activities, limited expenditures, limited incentive

pay, and only limited access to personal property. At level three, the highest level

for an incarcerated inmate and the level at which the KDOC had classified Mr.

1
While the KDOC apparently based its conclusion that Mr. Searcy failed to
participate in the SATP on the ground that he refused to admit responsibility, it is
also clear that he objects to providing a sexual history. Be that as it may, we
conclude that admitting responsibility to his crime of conviction could have
potentially incriminated Mr. Searcy, despite the fact he pleaded nolo contendere.
See Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941, 945 (5th Cir. 1966) (noting that self-
incrimination was implicated because “[s]till open to [the defendant] were the
processes of motion for new trial (including the opportunity to discover new
evidence), appeal, petition for certiorari, and collateral attack.”).

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Searcy prior to his refusal to sign the required forms for the SATP, inmates may

purchase audiovisual equipment, handicraft materials and supplies, participate in

all organizations and formalized activities, maintain magazine and newspaper

subscriptions, and have other expenditure and visitation privileges not available at

the lower levels.

In addition, under the pertinent prison regulations, inmates that do not

“constructively work or participate in assigned programs” lose the ability to earn

any additional good time credits. Kan. Admin. Reg. § 44-6-124(g)(6). Because

the KDOC considers the admission of responsibility and sexual history an integral

part of the rehabilitative process of the SATP, an inmate’s refusal to provide

these is deemed a refusal to participate in an assigned program. As a result, an

inmate that refuses to provide the required information loses the opportunity to

earn any further good time credits. In addition, those good time credits that an

inmate loses due to his non-participation cannot be regained. Kan. Admin. Reg. §

44-6-124(e) (“If the entire allocation of good time credits is not awarded at a

program classification review, part of that allocation shall not be awarded at a

later date.”).

As a result of these policies, Mr. Searcy’s refusal to admit responsibility

and to provide his sexual history resulted in his reduction from level three to level

one. Pursuant to the reduction in his privilege level, prison officials took Mr.

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Searcy’s television, radio, and typewriter. In doing so, prison officials informed

Mr. Searcy that the property would be sent outside of the HCF. Mr. Searcy

refused to sign the consent form for this removal because he apparently had no

one outside the prison to care for the property. The prison officials then sent the

property to Mr. Searcy’s out-of-state relatives whom Mr. Searcy believes will

never return his property to him.

Mr. Searcy then brought this § 1983 action, alleging that prison officials

had violated various constitutional rights, including: (1) his Fifth Amendment

right against self-incrimination; (2) his Freedom of Speech under the First

Amendment when they punished him for asserting his right to remain silent; (3)

his right of Free Exercise of Religion when they punished him for adhering to his

religious tenets by not untruthfully admitting to crimes he did not commit; and (4)

his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when they

sent his property from the HCF without his consent. On cross-motions for

summary judgment, the district court rejected all of Mr. Searcy’s claims of

constitutional violations and granted the Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment.

Discussion

In this appeal, Mr. Searcy challenges the district court’s grant of summary

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judgment to the Defendants on his Self-Incrimination, Free Exercise of Religion,

and Due Process claims. We review the district court’s grant of summary

judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the district court.

Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Serv., 165

F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). When applying this standard, we view the

evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Id.

Self-Incrimination

In Lile v. McKune, 224 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2000), the panel concluded

that the KDOC’s policy of imposing penalties for an inmate’s refusal to

participate in the SATP for fear of self-incrimination violated the Fifth

Amendment. The inmate in that case, Robert Lile, received a reduction in his

privilege level and a transfer to a maximum security prison for his refusal to

divulge his sexual history as part of the SATP. Id. at 1182. The panel concluded

that the imposition of these penalties for a refusal to provide potentially self-

incriminating statements constituted “impermissible compulsion.” Id. at 1189.

A divided Supreme Court reversed. Four Justices stated that the question

of whether the KDOC compelled self-incriminating statements from SATP

participants could be answered by looking to the standard enunciated by the

Supreme Court in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). McKune v. Lile, 122

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S. Ct. 2017, 2026–27 (2002). In Sandin, the Supreme Court held that challenged

prison conditions could not give rise to a due process violation unless those

conditions constitute “atypical and significant hardship[s] on [inmates] in relation

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. Based on Sandin’s “useful

instruction,” McKune, 122 S. Ct. at 2027, the plurality concluded that the

penalties imposed against Lile were significantly less than potential penalties

other inmates faced in cases where the Supreme Court ruled that there was no

Fifth Amendment violation. See, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976)

(no Fifth Amendment violation where inmate’s silence could be used against him

in a prison disciplinary proceeding); Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523

U.S. 272 (1998) (no Fifth Amendment violation where death row inmate was

forced to choose between incriminating himself at clemency interview and having

adverse inferences drawn from his silence); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420

(1984) (defendant’s fear of returning to prison if he remained silent did not result

in a compelled confession in violation of the Fifth Amendment). As such, and in

the context of the rehabilitative purposes of the SATP, the plurality concluded

that the KDOC did not violate Lile’s Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination. McKune, 122 S. Ct. at 2032.

Justice O’Connor, though not joining the plurality, did concur in the

judgment. Although Justice O’Connor did not agree with the plurality that a

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finding of compulsion under the Fifth Amendment should be measured by

reference to Sandin’s “atypical and significant hardship” standard, she did agree

that the consequences of Lile’s refusal to incriminate himself were not “so great

as to constitute compulsion for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination.” Id. at 2032–33 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Because

Justice O’Connor based her conclusion on the narrower ground that the KDOC’s

policy was not compulsion under the Fifth Amendment, we view her concurrence

as the holding of the Court in McKune. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.

188, 193 (1977) (stating that the holding of a fragmented Court “may be viewed

as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the

narrowest grounds . . . .”) (internal quotation omitted).

Had the only consequences Mr. Searcy suffered for his refusal to provide

his sexual history been the reduction in his privilege level and a concomitant

transfer to a maximum security prison, McKune would clearly call for affirming

the district court’s decision. In McKune, however, the plurality noted specifically

that Lile’s refusal to participate in the SATP for fear of self-incrimination did not

extend his term of incarceration nor affect his eligibility for good-time credits.

122 S. Ct. at 2027. In contrast to Lile, who was convicted in 1983, Mr. Searcy is

subject to a prison regulation, Kan. Admin. Reg. § 44-6-124(g)(6), promulgated in

1995. See Lile, 224 F.3d at 1182 (discussing the non-applicability of § 44-6-

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124(g)(6) to Lile); see also Stansbury v. Hannigan, 960 P.2d 227, 236 (Kan. 1998)

(holding that application of § 44-6-124(g)(6) to an inmate convicted in 1991

constituted an unconstitutional ex post facto law). That regulation provides that

“[a] refusal by an inmate to constructively work or participate in assigned

programs shall result in the withholding of 100% of the good time credits for that

program classification review period . . . .” Kan. Admin. Reg. § 44-6-124(g)(6).

Mr. Searcy, convicted in 1997, was therefore subject to § 44-6-124(g)(6)’s

mandatory withholding of good-time credits. As such, Mr. Searcy’s case requires

an independent examination as to whether the negative consequence of his refusal

to incriminate himself, 2 the loss of good-time credits, constitutes compulsion

2
We note here that both the panel in Lile and the Supreme Court in McKune
determined that the sexual history and admission of responsibility implicated the
self-incrimination privilege. The Kansas Supreme Court, however, stated in
Bankes v. Simmons, 963 P.2d 412 (Kan. 1998), that “respondents, in
administering their Sexual Abuse Treatment Program, can insist that the petitioner
admit responsibility, so long as his or her admission is not used against the
petitioner in later criminal proceedings.” 963 P.2d at 420. That case, however,
addressed use of such statements in civil proceedings, id. at 417, and the court’s
statement regarding criminal proceedings could be viewed as nothing more than
dicta. Further, in neither this case nor McKune did the state of Kansas indicate
that it would never pursue a prosecution based upon information obtained through
the SATP. See McKune, 122 S. Ct. at 2025 (noting that the “State confirms its
valid interest in deterrence by keeping open the option to prosecute a particularly
dangerous sex offender”). Thus, it appears that Mr. Searcy’s self-incrimination
privilege could be affected by the information required for his participation in the
SATP.

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under the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination privilege. 3

At first blush, it might seem that the KDOC is punishing Mr. Searcy

directly in response to his invocation of his self-incrimination privilege. Looking

at events sequentially without reference to the context, the KDOC recommended

Mr. Searcy for the SATP, Mr. Searcy accepted this recommendation (although

refusal to participate would have resulted in the withholding of good-time credits,

see Aplee. Supp. App. at 15), the SATP, as an integral part of the program,

required Mr. Searcy to provide incriminating information, Mr. Searcy refused to

do so, and, as a consequence, the KDOC withheld his good-time credits. But this

concatenation of events does not so much describe compulsion as it does display

the consequences of Mr. Searcy’s own individual choice.

“[T]he Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credits for

satisfactory behavior while in prison.” Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557

(1974), and it is quite clear that Kansas does not make any promises regarding an

inmate’s ability to earn good time credits. See Kan. Stat. § 21-4722 (granting the

secretary of corrections discretion to develop a good-time credit award system);

3
While we are mindful that Mr. Searcy suffered consequences other than
the withdrawal of good time credit opportunities, those other consequences were
rejected by a majority of the Supreme Court as constituting compulsion under the
Fifth Amendment. As such, our independent examination focuses on the good
time credits, but our conclusion recognizes the entire set of consequences
occasioned upon Mr. Searcy.

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see also Kansas v. Golston, 7 P.3d 1132, 1135 (Kan. 2000) (“The grant or denial

of good time credits is totally within the discretion of penal authorities.”)

(internal quotation omitted). This is especially so for inmates who, like Mr.

Searcy, were convicted subsequent to the promulgation of Kan. Admin. Reg. § 44-

6-124, which states only that an “inmate may earn good time credits which shall

be subtracted from the minimum sentence . . . .” Kan. Admin. Reg. 44-6-124(a)

(emphasis added); see also Frazee v. Maschner, 750 P.2d 418, 421 (Kan. Ct. App.

1988) (stating that there is “no present liberty interest in the possibility of

receiving” good time credits). Indeed, a close read of the regulation reveals that

even if Mr. Searcy did fully participate in the SATP, he would still not be

guaranteed any good-time credits. See Kan. Admin Reg. §§ 44-6-124(f)(1)–(6)

(listing factors for KDOC to consider in determining whether to award good time

credits). Thus, at most, foreclosing Mr. Searcy from the mere opportunity to earn

good time credits is not a new penalty, but only the withholding of a benefit that

the KDOC is under no obligation to give.

Mr. Searcy therefore, was left with a choice: take advantage of a benefit the

KDOC provided or turn down that benefit in order to avoid providing what he

feared, perhaps legitimately, would be self-incriminating statements. “Although a

defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow

whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always

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forbid requiring him to choose.” McKune, 122 S. Ct. at 2035 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring) (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971)). Mr.

Searcy, having been convicted through a fair criminal process of a sex offense,

was made aware of the consequences of any failure on his part to complete the

SATP upon intake into the prison. The fact that the KDOC will not let Mr.

Searcy complete the SATP unfettered by its more unpleasant aspects does not

render his original choice to enter the program any less voluntary. See Woodard,

523 U.S. at 286 (“It is difficult to see how a voluntary interview could ‘compel’

respondent to speak.”).

Finally, Mr. Searcy’s predicament is quite different than the situation

where, as described by Justice O’Connor in her McKune concurrence, the

consequences of refusing to provide information “go beyond the criminal process

and appear, starkly, as government attempts to compel testimony.” McKune, 122

S. Ct. at 2035 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The SATP’s policy of requiring

admission of responsibility and providing a sexual history is one central to its

mission of rehabilitating sex offenders. 4 See Aplee. Supp. App. at 30–31 (letter

4
While there seems to be no question that the KDOC has a valid state
interest in operating the SATP, see McKune, 122 S. Ct. at 2024–25 (plurality
opinion), our conclusion that the KDOC’s actions were not compulsion negates
any need to enter into a balancing analysis under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
89 (1987). The First Circuit did just that in Ainsworth v. Risley, 244 F.3d 209,
214–221 (1st Cir. 2001), a case with similar facts to this appeal, and concluded
(continued...)

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from Barbara K. Schwartz, Ph.D., discussing the benefits of acknowledging past

sexual abuse); see also McKune, 122 S. Ct. at 2024 (plurality opinion) (“Research

indicates that offenders who deny all allegations of sexual abuse are three times

more likely to fail in treatment . . . .”) (citing B. Maletzky & K. McGovern,

Treating the Sexual Offender 253–55 (1991)). While the potential for

incrimination is not disputed, there is no assertion that the KDOC is using the

SATP as a surreptitious means to obtain evidence for criminal prosecutions. See

McKune, 122 S. Ct. at 2028 (plurality opinion) (“There is no indication that the

SATP is an elaborate attempt to avoid the protections afforded by the privilege

against compelled self-incrimination.”). Mr. Searcy’s lost privileges and lost

opportunity to earn future good time credits are quite simply not the result of his

refusal to incriminate himself, but are a consequence of his inability to complete

rehabilitation the KDOC has determined—in light of the serious offense for

which Mr. Searcy was convicted—is in the best interest for Mr. Searcy and

society. See Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978, 982 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc)

(holding that state officials may take adverse administrative action for failure to

respond to inquiries, even where the answers might incriminate, where the

4
(...continued)
that there was no violation of the self-incrimination privilege. The Supreme
Court, however, vacated that decision in light of McKune. Ainsworth v. Stanley,
122 S. Ct. 2652 (2002) (mem.). Further, none of the opinions in McKune
performed a Turner v. Safley analysis to reach their respective conclusions.

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adverse consequences are imposed for failure to answer a relevant inquiry and not

for refusal to give up a constitutional right); see also Doe v. Sauer, 186 F.3d 903,

906 (8th Cir. 1999) (Fifth Amendment not violated where prison denied benefits

to an inmate who refused to make statements necessary for his rehabilitation).

We conclude that the pressure imposed upon Mr. Searcy for his refusal to

provide an admission of responsibility and a sexual history for the SATP does not

“rise[] to a level where it is likely to ‘compe[l]’ a person ‘to be a witness against

himself.’” McKune, 122 S. Ct. at 2033 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting U.S.

Const. amend. V).

First Amendment

Mr. Searcy also claims that the admission of responsibility requirement for

the SATP violates his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion.

According to Mr. Searcy, his sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit him from

lying. Because, according to Mr. Searcy, he did not commit the offense of sexual

exploitation of a child, signing an admission of responsibility form for that crime

would constitute a lie. As such, under Mr. Searcy’s reasoning, punishing him for

not admitting responsibility constitutes punishment for exercising his religious

principles.

The district court rejected Mr. Searcy’s assertion of a First Amendment

violation on two grounds. First, the district court noted that Mr. Searcy’s

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participation in the SATP was voluntary. Searcy, 97 F. Supp. 2d. at 1061.

Because of the voluntary nature of the program, the district court concluded that

Mr. Searcy could hardly claim that the KDOC, by way of the SATP, was forcing

him to tell a lie. The district court also analyzed Mr. Searcy’s claim using the

factors from O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350–52 (1987). Using

that framework, the district court concluded that the SATP’s requirement for an

admission of responsibility was a reasonable regulation that was not violative of

the First Amendment.

In light of our conclusion that the KDOC’s system of revoking privileges

and withdrawing good time credit opportunities in response to an inmate’s refusal

to participate in the SATP does not amount to compulsion, Mr. Searcy’s First

Amendment claim must fail. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (“The

Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any

showing of direct governmental compulsion . . . .”). Mr. Searcy is free to adhere

to his religion’s proscription against lying. In doing so, however, he loses certain

privileges he would have received had he complied fully with the requirements

for the SATP. This does not present an infringement of Mr. Searcy’s

constitutional right to free exercise of religion. This is especially so because the

requirement of admission of responsibility is generally applicable to all inmates in

the SATP and is not pointed at any particular religion or religious belief. See

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Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that neutral laws

of general applicability that proscribe or require conduct contrary to religious

belief do not violate Free Exercise Clause).

Even were we to assume the admission of responsibility impinges upon Mr.

Searcy’s right to freely exercise his religious beliefs, we would agree with the

district court that the requirement is “reasonably related” to the KDOC’s

penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; see also O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349.

The Turner case provided the following four factors to consider in determining

whether a prison regulation is reasonable, and therefore valid, despite its

impingement upon an inmate’s constitutional right: (1) the regulation must have a

logical connection to a legitimate governmental interest; (2) whether an inmate

has an alternative means of exercising the right; (3) what impact accommodation

of the right would have on guards, other inmates, and the general allocation of

resources; and (4) whether there are obvious alternatives that would accommodate

the inmate’s right at a de minimis cost.

The state’s interest in rehabilitating sex offenders is a valid one, and the

requirement for admission of responsibility is considered a legitimate part of the

rehabilitative process. See McKune, 122 S. Ct. at 2024–25. As the district court

noted, in the context of this case the applicability of whether Mr. Searcy has an

alternative means to exercise his tenets against lying seems questionable. Be that

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as it may, Mr. Searcy can avoid this difficulty by not joining what we have

already concluded is a voluntary program. Clearly, accommodating Mr. Searcy in

this instance would undermine the precept of the entire SATP, that admission of

responsibility and overcoming denial are integral to the rehabilitation of sex

offenders. Finally, Mr. Searcy’s suggestion that the KDOC has an alternative

means of accommodating his free exercise rights—not requiring an admission of

responsibility—would eviscerate the SATP’s legitimate rehabilitative process of

accepting responsibility for past behavior. As such, it is not an alternative at all.

Due Process

Mr. Searcy also claims the KDOC violated his constitutional right to due

process when it sent his property to his relatives without his consent. The district

court reasoned that because, under Kansas law, Mr. Searcy still retained formal

ownership of the property, the requirements of procedural due process were met

when the prison authorities provided him the opportunity to dictate where to send

the property. 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1064–65. As to Mr. Searcy’s argument that in all

likelihood the relatives would not return the property, the district court found it

irrelevant because of Mr. Searcy’s opportunity to dictate where the prison

authorities should send the property.

We agree with the district court. It is well-settled that “[w]hile an inmate’s

ownership of property is a protected property interest that may not be infringed

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without due process, there is a difference between the right to own property and

the right to possess property while in prison.” Hatten v. White, 275 F.3d 1208,

1210 (10th Cir. 2002). As the district court noted, under Kansas law Mr. Searcy

is still the owner of the property. Stansbury, 960 P.2d at 238. As such, the

KDOC’s action of sending his property to his relatives did not deprive Mr. Searcy

of ownership of the property.

The record reveals that Mr. Searcy had every opportunity to dictate where

his property should go, but refused to do so. Given his refusal, it was entirely

proper for the prison authorities to dispatch Mr. Searcy’s property in the manner

they did. Indeed, the federal prison regulations provide for similar disposal of

contraband, defined broadly to include any material prohibited by statute or

regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 500.1(h), in instances where an inmate refuses to provide

an address to send the confiscated property. 28 C.F.R. § 553.13(b)(2)(iii)

(“Where the inmate has established ownership . . . but . . . refuses to provide a

mailing address for return of the property, the property is to be disposed of

through approved methods, including destruction of the property.”). While there

may be a case, such as that suggested by Mr. Searcy, where a prison so limits an

inmate’s control over his property that it has effectively vanquished any

meaningful ownership interest, this is not it. First, the KDOC provided Mr.

Searcy a meaningful opportunity to decide the fate of his own property. Second,

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the KDOC acted reasonably in sending the property to Mr. Searcy’s own relatives.

AFFIRMED

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