F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
SEP 3 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
vs. No. 02-2054
JESUS MAGALLANES,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. CIV-99-964-JP)
Before KELLY, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. *
John V. Butcher, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New Mexico
for Defendant-Appellant.
David C. Iglesias, United States Attorney, and David N. Williams, Assistant
United States Attorney and Chief, Appellate Division, Albuquerque, New Mexico
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
*
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant-Appellant Jesus Magallanes, a federal inmate, seeks a certificate
of appealability (“COA”) allowing him to appeal from the district court’s order
denying relief on his motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because Mr.
Magallanes has failed to make a “substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
483-84 (2000), we deny the COA and dismiss the appeal.
In May 1997, Mr. Magallanes was indicted by a federal grand jury of
possession with intent to distribute more than 100 grams of methamphetamine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1), and carrying a firearm during a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Mr. Magallanes filed a
motion to suppress physical evidence that was denied by the district court. Mr.
Magallanes entered a conditional plea to the indictment, reserving the right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The plea agreement provided that his
sentence would be left to the discretion of the district court. The court sentenced
Mr. Magallanes to the minimum guideline sentence of eleven years and three
months on the distribution count and a mandatory consecutive five-year sentence
on the firearm count, for a total term of imprisonment of sixteen years and three
months. Mr. Magallanes unsuccessfully appealed to this court the denial of his
suppression motion. United States v. Magallanes, No. 98-2238, 1999 WL 252396
(10th Cir. Apr. 23, 1999) (unpublished).
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Mr. Magallanes then filed a pro se § 2255 motion that was denied by the
district court. This court then appointed counsel and granted a COA under 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c) on the following issues:
1. Whether the defendant’s conditional guilty plea was entered
into knowingly and voluntarily where the district court, in the
course of its Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (“Rule 11”)
colloquy, did not specifically advise the defendant that he was
exposing himself to a higher potential sentence by entering into
a conditional guilty plea rather than a traditional guilty plea?
2. Whether the defendant’s conditional guilty plea was entered
into knowingly and voluntarily where the district court
erroneously stated, in the course of its Rule 11 colloquy, that the
defendant’s maximum sentencing exposure was 15 years, when
his actual sentencing exposure was a minimum of 15 years and a
maximum of life imprisonment plus 5 years?
3. Whether the issue of the district court’s failure to adequately
advise the defendant under Rule 11 is procedurally barred or
whether the defendant can demonstrate cause and prejudice to
justify his failure to raise the issue on direct appeal?
4. Whether defendant’s attorney was constitutionally ineffective
for failing adequately to advise the defendant of the potential
sentencing consequences of his decision to enter a conditional
guilty plea rather than a traditional guilty plea?
United States v. Magallanes, No. 00-2124, 2001 WL 589863, at *1 (10th Cir. June
1, 2001). After briefing, this court held that the first issue was procedurally
barred, but vacated the district court’s order and remanded for an evidentiary
hearing and specific factual findings regarding the other three issues. Id. at *5.
This court declined to grant a COA on any other issues. Id.
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The remand hearing was conducted by a magistrate judge. At the hearing,
Mr. Magallanes moved the magistrate judge to consider an additional
ineffectiveness ground: whether his trial attorney erred in failing to object to the
absence of a role reduction adjustment in the presentence report. See U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.2; United States v. Harfst, 168 F.3d 398, 401-05 (10th Cir. 1999). The
magistrate judge denied this motion as untimely, relying upon the wisdom of
another highly-respected New Mexico state trial judge, “If you file a motion
before trial, you get a hearing. If you file a motion on the day of trial, you get a
ruling.” R. Doc. 30 at 3 n.2. The magistrate judge also based his denial on the
fact that this new ineffectiveness claim was not raised in the § 2255 motion. R.
Doc. 30 at 3.
Without explanation, the district court overruled the magistrate judge on
this point and denied the new ineffectiveness claim on the merits, reasoning that
Mr. Magallanes could not meet the prejudice prong of the test for ineffective
assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). R.
Doc. 32 at 1-7. In seeking to appeal, Mr. Magallanes argues only that the district
court erred on the merits concerning his new ineffectiveness claim. Aplt. Br. at
7-9.
The magistrate judge was correct that the new ineffectiveness claim should
not have been heard on the merits. First, turning to the original § 2255 appeal, we
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only granted a COA on four issues; a COA is an issue-by-issue jurisdictional
prerequisite to a merits determination on appeal. See Lackey v. Johnson, 116
F.3d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1997). Thus, the only issues before us in the original
appeal did not include Mr. Magallanes’ new ineffectiveness claim. Consequently,
our limited remand did not include that claim and the district court exceeded the
scope of our remand by deciding it on the merits. See Miller v. Champion, 262
F.3d 1066, 1070 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001). Although the mandate rule, requiring a
district court to act in conformity with an appellate remand, is one of discretion,
no exceptional circumstances suggest a need for greater flexibility in this case.
See United States v. Moore, 83 F.3d 1231, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing
rule and exceptions). In its present posture, this case does not involve
resentencing where a district court has discretion to go beyond the sentencing
error that resulted in the remand. United States v. Hicks, 146 F.3d 1198, 1200
(10th Cir. 1998).
That said, we certainly do not fault the district court for disposing of all
claims in an effort to facilitate any appeal. But to examine the new
ineffectiveness claim on appeal essentially would allow Mr. Magallanes to pursue
a claim not raised (let alone fairly presented) in his § 2255 motion. 1 See Smith v.
1
The argument that this issue was raised in the § 2255 motion, R. Doc. 31
at 2, is rejected. We note that a statement in a supporting memorandum that
counsel was negligent in not filing objections to the presentence report simply is
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Black, 970 F.2d 1383, 1389 (5th Cir. 1992) (declining to expand the scope of the
remand for an issue not presented in an initial habeas petition). Second, allowing
this claim to go forward at the remand hearing bypasses the procedures
envisioned by Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States
District Courts, particularly with respect to an answer by the government required
by Rule 5(a), and undermines the limitation on second or successive petitions,
which must be addressed by this court in the first instance. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255
& 2244(b)(2) & (3); Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 558 (1998) (motion to
recall an appellate mandate for reconsideration in light of new claims or evidence
is informed by § 2244(b)’s restrictions on second or successive motions); Lopez
v. Douglas, 141 F.3d 974, 975 (10th Cir.1998) (holding a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
motion to vacate the judgment denying an initial § 2254 motion was an
uncertified second or successive § 2254 motion).
We DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
not a fair presentation of this claim–it lacks specificity. We agree with the
magistrate judge on this point.
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